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This dissertation evaluates Robert S. McNamara’s management 
practices during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, concluding that over-
centralized decision-making proved to be the central feature of his 
management style with one significant exception. When it came to war, 
notably the Vietnam War, he undermanaged important aspects of that 
conflict. To better understand McNamara’s management decisions, this 
dissertation sets them in the context of his brilliance as a student in college 
and later in graduate school where he absorbed the technocratic management 
techniques then developing at the Harvard Business School. He applied his 
education successfully in the Army Air Force during World War II and later 
at the Ford Motor Company.
As Secretary of Defense he initiated a rigorous analytic approach to 
the defense budget and weapons acquisition through the Planning-
Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) he installed and the associated 
discipline of systems analysis that he brought to the department. Yet those 
innovations had the perverse effect of encouraging his proclivity to 
concentrate on managing data rather than managing people. Through costly 
errors such as the TFX plane controversy, McNamara discovered the limits 
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of technocratic business procedures in a public service environment which 
required a politically sensitive and socially adept approach.
McNamara disregarded many contemporary managerial techniques 
and models which emphasized delegation, flexibility, and informal 
communication.  His reluctance to delegate left many subordinates and 
colleagues without significant institutional roles in decision-making and thus 
without personal investment in the success of directives emanating from the 
office of the Secretary. More importantly, the plethora of low-level 
procedural decisions he funneled through his office took his time and 
attention away from more important high-level policy issues like the war. 
When viewed in the full context of his responsibilities, his overconcentration 
on budgets, logistics, and procedural details contributed to his relatively 
passive acceptance of the military’s battle strategies in Vietnam, which 
deserved closer examination. 
Bridging the histories of politics, war and public administration, this 
dissertation interrogates the context and consequences of McNamara’s 
application of current business management practice to public institutions.
Adviser: Louis Galambos
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“Not everything that matters can be measured, and not everything that can be 
measured matters.” ~ Albert Einstein
“If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.” ~ Various
It was a clear, cool winter day in February, 1967 when Robert S. 
McNamara rose to speak before a Millsaps College Convocation in Jackson, 
Mississippi. On the podium with him were the customary college officials 
and Senator John Stennis, the senior senator from Mississippi and chairman 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who had invited him to speak.
It had been a difficult year for McNamara. The war in Vietnam was 
deteriorating and was increasingly unpopular. A group of senators, including 
Stennis, were urging him to lift restraints on bombing while another group 
led by Senators Fulbright and Mansfield were urging a bombing pause. Only 
a few months before on a visit to Harvard, protesting students had 
surrounded McNamara’s car, forcing him to flee on foot through the streets 
of Cambridge. The day had long passed since McNamara had enjoyed the 
general approbation of Congress and the media. The president who had 
recruited him was dead. The military that had chafed under his leadership 
was growing increasingly vocal. His face and physical appearance clearly 
showed stress; known for his neat tailored look, his shirt collar now hung 
loose around his neck. Indeed, only a few months later a future secretary of 
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defense, Melvin E. Laird, would ask him in a public hearing, “Have you 
stayed too long?”1
In the midst of the chaos of war, McNamara had chosen to speak out 
on a subject that had consumed his energies for most of his adult life —
management. He began conventionally enough by pointing out the growing 
gap between the developed and underdeveloped world, characterizing the 
gulf as a “seismic fissure” that could produce an earthquake of violence if 
the threat were not contained. Then came a discussion of the “so-called brain 
drain” that was developing as scientists and technicians from more 
developed countries, especially European, sought opportunities in the United 
States. McNamara attributed this diaspora not to higher salaries or more 
advanced technology, but to “more modern and effective management” in 
the United States. “Management,” he argued, “is the most creative of all the 
arts … management is the gate through which social, political, economic, 
technical change — indeed change in every direction — is rationally and 
effectively spread through society … [T]o undermanage reality is not to 
keep it free. It is simply to let some force other than reason shape reality.”
                                                          
1 Richard A. Stubbing, The Defense Game: An Insider Explores the Astonishing Realities 
of America’s Defense Establishment, (NY: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 286.
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He went on to discuss the means by which he believed reason could 
be imposed on reality, championing hierarchical decision-making, 
quantitative analysis, and business education. First, “vital decision making, 
especially in policy matters must remain at the top.” Second, he admitted 
that “not every conceivable human situation can be reduced to lines on a 
graph” but “not to quantify what can be quantified is only to be content with 
something less than the full range of reason.” Finally, he argued that the best 
way to stop the brain drain was for Europe to improve its education system, 
for “Europe is weak educationally…particularly weak in its managerial
education.”2
The speech reflected a topic that McNamara was increasingly 
promoting — the potentiality of management. Nine months previously, in a 
speech at the preparatory school from which his younger daughter was 
graduating, Chatham Hall, he had tentatively suggested that the fear that 
“organization in modern society is growing too big and too complex — and 
that we are establishing management controls that are too massive…a 
depersonalized bureaucracy,” did not state the problem in a wholly realistic 
way. “It is possible,” he went on to argue, “that some of our gravest 
                                                          
2 News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), February 
24, 1967.
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problems in society arise not out of over-management, but precisely out of 
under-management.”3
We have no record of how the Millsaps speech was received. Some in 
the audience must have thought, “How can he be extolling so extravagantly 
the benefits of management, when it seems to be failing so miserably in 
Vietnam?” For McNamara, however, management was always the solution, 
not the problem. He was articulating a credo that he never renounced. It had 
carried him to great success in business, and had earned him respect and 
praise in high government service. He would continue to promote its value 
when he became head of the World Bank in 1968. McNamara was very 
much reflecting the accepted wisdom of the time, and in proposing that 
professional business management techniques could solve the challenges of 
an increasingly complex and labyrinthine government, he was in line with a 
decade-long shift in the attitudes of a growing number of the American 
business elite.
                                                          
3 News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), May 22, 
1966, p. 9.
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Historical Context: World War & Economic Crisis Pull Private Managers 
In And Out Of Government
Whereas the prevailing view of most businessmen toward government 
from the late nineteenth century through the 1930s had been either 
dismissive or downright negative, a number of businessmen nonetheless 
came to see positive aspects of selected governmental initiatives and 
accepted a responsibility to participate in their development and 
implementation. These men represented what the New York Times would 
call “a growing group of businessmen-statesmen, standing above politics, 
who are not only eminently successful in business but who can also see 
beyond business to the wider implications of statesmanship and the political 
and human problems it must deal with.”4  In part, this attitude reflected an 
acknowledgement that business must accommodate itself to the new power 
of the federal government. As Marion Folsom, a Kodak official, put it in 
1937, “as our civilization becomes more complex, it is only natural the 
government will have a little more to do with it than it had in the past …we 
must adjust ourselves to changed conditions.”5  It also manifested 
                                                          
4 New York Times (hereinafter “NYT”) editorial on the appointment of Paul Hoffman as 
Economic Cooperation Administrator April 7, 1948 p. 24.
5 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the National Association of Commercial 
Organization Secretaries Oct. 24-27, 1937 pp.205-208 as quoted in Robert Collins, The 
Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964 (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1981), p. 55.
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recognition that the legitimate scope of government had expanded and that,
as self-proclaimed elite members of society, businessmen had a 
responsibility in helping government meet its new responsibilities. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, however, this remained a minority view among 
U.S. business magnates.
Actually, the absence of businessmen in the federal government 
during the late nineteenth century is hardly surprising. One would not have 
expected the great entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century to join the 
government. One can scarcely imagine a McCormick, Armour, Rockefeller, 
or Carnegie presiding over a nascent bureaucracy. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, however, a new sort of industrial leader was emerging to 
take charge of many of the largest industrial firms. They were “bureaucrats” 
in the words of William Miller, men “who often must have been as occupied 
with getting and staying ahead in their companies as with keeping their 
companies ahead of the field.”6  
These new business leaders were skilled in management but that was 
not yet a skill needed in the federal government. By and large the main 
function of the federal government remained the “gathering of income and 
                                                          
6 William Miller, “American Historians and the Business Elite,” 9 Journal of Economic 
History (Nov. 1949) p. 189; see also Mabel Newcomer, The Big Business Executive: 
Factors That Made Him (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1955).
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appropriating funds.”7  There were a number of dynamic federal initiatives 
in the areas of conservation, railroad regulation, anti-trust, health and safety 
regulation and tariff reform, but the need in these areas was for expert 
knowledge rather than administrative competence. The era of big 
government was not far away but it had not yet arrived, and the businessman 
was not yet in demand. 
What created that demand was war, for modern global conflict 
demanded management and management was what the businessman could 
contribute. Driven by the imperatives of technology and the need to produce 
and deliver the sophisticated weaponry of modern warfare on a mass scale to 
the battlefield, the federal government needed organizational planning on a 
large scale during World War I. The government was compelled to turn to 
business for help, as Robert Cuff writes:
Big business outdistanced all others in 
organizational achievement, and provided the major 
model for bureaucratic developments among most 
other economic, political and social groups, 
including the state itself. …  A federal government 
which numbered only 256,000 civil servants by the 
turn of the century could hardly compete with the 
bureaucratic power in private hands.8
                                                          
7 Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1962), p. 
31.
8 Robert D. Cuff, The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations During 
World War I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973) p. 9.
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Even this figure is somewhat misleading. In practical terms the 
government was far smaller. Of the 256,000 employees Cuff cites, 211,000 
lived outside Washington. There were 136,000 postal workers and about 
45,000 in the armed services serving throughout the country and abroad. In 
the greater Washington area, there were only 28,000 federal workers in 
1901-- the year Cuff uses. By contrast, it is estimated that U.S. Steel had 
168,000 employees at the same time.9  A single private firm was managing a 
workforce six times the size of the federal government’s Washington cadre; 
organizational and managerial expertise necessarily advanced further in the 
private sector than in the public.
Not only did business have the managerial know-how, but 
businessmen were essential to the entire mobilization effort that carried the 
U.S. into the First World War because President Wilson would not consider 
reordering the existing fundamental relationships between industry and the 
government. The President eschewed any model similar to the British 
system which involved a central bureaucracy, independent state power and 
                                                          
9 John N. Ingham, Making Iron and Steel (Columbus, OH: Ohio Univ. Press, 1991) p. 
152. It would be interesting to compare the work force of other companies with that of 
the federal government, but such data are very difficult to uncover — a condition 
confirmed by the staff at the Hagley Research Library.
9
public planning.10  As Cuff points out, Wilson’s own public philosophy 
“subsumed both the idea of friendly cooperation between business and 
government and an ambiguity toward the role of the state.” It amounted to a 
cooperative “middle-way between rigid federal control on the one hand and 
free-wheeling laissez faire on the other.” It produced a unique American 
system of “public institutional recognition of private individuals and private 
interest groups [so that] the state remained particularly dependent upon 
outside talent and administrative mechanisms to fulfill the demands of 
modern warfare.” Although many business leaders championed a more 
centralized and directed government organization, the business volunteers 
who administered the programs fully accepted the ambiguity of the existing 
system. Their “central ideological aim throughout the war was to prove what 
private corporate leadership could achieve with a friendly business-
dominated state agency.”11
                                                          
10 As Jim Tomlinson writes, “The war brought an unparalleled level of state intervention 
into British industry … control of prices and profits and the government’s role in the 
labour-market impinged on almost every enterprise….”     The intervention had an 
important long-lasting political consequence for it led to “the widespread belief on the 
Left that the war had demonstrated the efficacy of state intervention in the economy.” 
Tomlinson, Government and the enterprise since 1900: the changing problem of 
efficiency (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1994) pp. 74-5, 81; see also H.S. Furniss, The State 
and Industry during the War (London: Co-operative Printing Society, 1918).
11 Cuff, op. cit., pp. 4, 5, 41, 111.
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The result of these compromises was a surge of public agencies 
staffed in large measure by business executives, and thousands of 
businessmen were eventually involved in the war effort.12  After the 
Armistice, most of them returned to their former positions, but many of them 
had caught what is now referred to as “Potomac fever.” Alongside 
influential individuals’ continuing public service — Herbert Hoover, for 
example, was among the most prominent of the WWI-era businessmen who 
never returned to private industry — the most lasting legacy of the war was 
a growing realization that business needed to establish a new relationship 
with the federal government. Alan Brinkley writes that “… according to 
subsequent mythology, the wartime experiment had been a brief and 
glorious moment of economic harmony, in which business, government, and 
labor cooperated effectively on behalf of the larger economic good.”13  The 
wartime experiment was scarcely a “glorious moment of economic 
harmony” as Brinkley goes on to point out, but it did push a number of 
                                                          
12 The Food, Fuel, and Railroad Administrations, The Shipping Board and the War Trade 
Board were established by legislation. The War Industries Board (WIB), on the other 
hand, never had legislative authority. It grew out of the Munitions Standards Board, an 
advisory body to the Council for National Defense; the WIB eventually obtained 
independent status by presidential directive under the authority given him by the 
Overman Act to reorganize the federal executive at his discretion. Since it had no 
legislative mandate, technically speaking, all the WIB’s powers derived from the 
President under his war powers authority. The extent of that power was never tested 
judicially.
13 Alan Brinkley, End of Reform (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 35.
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businessmen, academics and government officials to argue for a more 
cooperative and planned economic system and greater interaction between 
business and government.  
This temporary upturn in public-private cooperation was quickly 
scuttled by the following decade of economic disaster. The 1930s were not a 
good time for businessmen to enter the higher reaches of government 
service. The Depression had destroyed much of the credibility of business. 
“Business had insisted on all the credit for prosperity,” Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr. writes, “now it could hardly escape blame for adversity,” or as William 
Leuchtenburg observed, “[b]y the winter of 1932, the businessman had lost 
his magic and was as discredited as the Hopi rainmaker in a prolonged 
drought.”14  There were businessmen like Gerard Swope of GE who offered 
constructive suggestions to mitigate the devastating effects of the 
Depression, but by and large the business community was as perplexed as 
the rest of the nation and either kept silent or sought scapegoats, as did John 
Edgerton of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) when he 
argued that “… the real responsibility for their poverty… lay with the 
                                                          
14 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1957) p. 255; William Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Deal (NY: Harper & Row, 
1963), p. 22.
12
jobless themselves.”15  Nor would matters improve during the 1936 
campaign when FDR, virtually ignoring his opponent, campaigned against 
the so-called “economic royalists” and the forces of “organized money.” The 
relationship between business and the federal government had reached a low 
ebb.
Matters would change quickly, however, as the international situation 
became ominous and “Dr. New Deal became Dr. Win the War.” 
Businessmen started to stream back to Washington to assist in a mobilization 
effort that dwarfed anything hitherto experienced by the nation. There was a 
growing realization that government needed, in particular, the management 
skills of business. The United States was embarking on the largest military 
build-ups in its history, would soon undertake the greatest post-conflict 
reconstruction effort in history, and was in the process of developing a new 
welfare system, all of which required the collection, analysis, and 
coordination of unprecedented amounts of data, money, materiel and 
personnel. The general success of these enormous projects engendered a new 
excitement about the level of mastery Americans had achieved in the 
organizational sciences. Peter Drucker, the most prominent historian and 
promoter of “managerialism” has written, “For twenty-five years, from the 
                                                          
15 Leuchtenburg, op. cit., p.21; see also Schlesinger op. cit., pp.177-183.
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end of World War II to the end of the 1960s, a management boom swept 
over the entire world.”16
Drucker attributed this fascination to the stunningly successful 
performance of United States manufacturing during WWII and the central 
role management played in the implementation of the Marshall Plan. “The 
success of the Marshall Plan made management a best seller,” he wrote, 
“[s]uddenly everybody talked management, everybody studied 
management.”17  Management as an operating methodology was very much 
associated with the United States. It was promoted by Britain’s Sir Stafford 
Cripps, the socialist Chancellor of the Exchequer, who sent “productivity 
teams” to the United States to study its practices. Even the usually skeptical 
French joined in. The intellectual Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber predicted 
American domination of European markets because of superior management 
techniques in his best-selling Le Défi Americain. Both national and 
international pundits viewed professional management as very much an 
American discovery and an American obsession.
                                                          
16 Peter F. Drucker, Management : Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices (NY: Harper & 
Row, 1973), p. 11.  “Managerialism” is the practice of management which in turn 
consists of those tasks which must be accomplished for an institution to attain the 
objectives it has set for itself.  It involves administration but is a more encompassing set 
of activities.
17 Ibid., p. 13.
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The 1950s saw a vibrant self-confidence among business leaders 
specializing in managerialism; after the crisis of capitalist confidence in the 
1930s, events appeared to have proven that ingenuity and rational 
organizational techniques could conquer any problem. American technology 
appeared without peer, and many were confident that American business 
methods would also soon prevail. In many respects the attitude of these men 
was not far from Henry R. Luce’s vision of an “American Century”: 
America as the dynamic center of ever-widening 
spheres of enterprise, America as the training center 
of the skillful servants of mankind, America as the 
Good Samaritan, really believing again that it is 
more blessed to give than receive, and America as 
the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and 
Justice — out of these elements surely can be 
fashioned a vision of the 20th Century to which we 
can and will devote ourselves in joy and gladness 
and vigor and enthusiasm.18
One byproduct of Luce’s vision was an increased attention to creating 
a more efficient government.  After all, if America was to be the “center of 
ever-widening spheres of enterprise”, its federal government should be 
organized to reflect the best in management thought.  It was a goal embraced 
by both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower each of whom appointed a 
commission on government organization chaired by former-President 
Herbert Hoover.  The commissions made hundreds of recommendations, but 
                                                          
18 As quoted in Michael J. Hogan, ed., The Ambiguous Legacy, U.S. Foreign Relations in 
the “American Century” (NY: Cambridge Universal Press,1999) p. 28.
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the overriding message was, “Oh, if government would only act more like 
business, many of our problems would be solved.”19
Yet, that golden age of serene self-confidence did not last. By the late 
1960s, American management superiority had come under scrutiny. As a 
bundle of techniques — whether based on economics, statistics, or 
behavioral science — American-style management seemed to have serious 
limitations. As Drucker wrote more prophetically than he realized in 1973, 
“General Motors in the post-World War II period has been an outstanding 
success… [but it] may well be the best illustration of the inadequacy of the 
technocrat concept of management.”20
Throughout the first half of the century consuming global wars, 
alongside severe economic collapses and recoveries, created peaks and 
valleys of managerial confidence and governed the ebb and flow of private 
managers into public service. Robert McNamara’s education and career 
experiences were shaped by these global events and emerging attitudes. He 
absorbed the management techniques then current at the Harvard Business 
                                                          
19 The thought continues to resonate. When Senator McCain was asked what changes he 
would make in the Defense Department if he became president. He is reported as 
replying, that “he would seek to attract corporate leaders to improve the management of 
the Pentagon citing individuals like Frederick W. Smith, chief  executive of FedEx 
Corporation and John T. Chambers, the chief executive of Cisco Systems.” (NYT, April 
7, 2007, p.1).
20 Drucker, op. cit., p. 18.
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School (HBS) when the faculty was just beginning to rely heavily on 
quantitative analysis and control. At the time the school exemplified the 
technocratic concept of management. He used those techniques successfully 
in the Army Air Force during WWII and later at the Ford Motor Company. 
They were instrumental in his success as secretary of defense in establishing 
civilian control over the military and developing new budgetary techniques 
that reinforced that control. By eliminating duplication and overlapping 
programs, aligning budgets with missions, he made the national defense 
considerably more cost-effective. At the same time, the Vietnam War 
revealed the inadequacies of the new “science” of quantitative management. 
McNamara was not willing in the Millsaps speech, or even more than twenty 
years later, to admit that the discipline he practiced had proven inadequate.  
Historiographical Review
There have been thousands of pages written about McNamara during 
his service as secretary of defense but surprisingly few that focus on his 
management practices. Most of what has been written concentrates on the 
Vietnam War and falls into one of two categories. First, for those interested 
in political and diplomatic history, the dominant issues are McNamara’s role 
in the decisions that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson made regarding the 
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conflict, and the extent to which he bears responsibility for misleading the 
public as to the nature of the war. Alternatively, for those interested in
military history, the principal issue is the extent to which McNamara
micromanaged the war. Although those issues form part of the backdrop for 
the discussion of McNamara’s managerial practices in this work, they are 
not its focus. 
There is also specialized literature on particular programs that 
McNamara initiated and their actual or potential influence on public 
administration. For example, discussions of the planning, programming, and 
budget system, and the use of statistical analysis appear from time to time, 
especially in journals devoted to public administration. 
With the exception of the four works mentioned below, there are no 
works of which this author is aware that treat McNamara’s managerial 
practices as a major subject of inquiry. 
There is an excellent biography of McNamara by Deborah Shapley 
Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara published 
two years before McNamara’s own controversial wartime memoir.21
Shapley, a writer for Science magazine with a background in defense policy, 
                                                          
21 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993).
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had the advantage of more than 20 interviews with him. Regrettably, as she 
notes, “he [McNamara] did not agree to speak on the record about his role in 
the Vietnam War.”22 Nevertheless, it is an important source for anyone 
interested in McNamara. Shapley lays great stress on McNamara’s drive for 
“control,” a theme that also recurs in this work. Where the two works differ 
is in the greater detail in this dissertation as to how control manifested itself 
in McNamara’s managerial practices, especially as seen by his colleagues in 
the department.
I have only found three articles that specifically address McNamara’s 
managerialism. In 1995, Louis Galambos and David Milobsky wrote an 
extensive article for The Business History Review, “Organizing and 
Reorganizing the World Bank, 1946-1977: A Comparative Perspective.”23
Their study emphasizes the structural changes he brought to the Bank rather 
than how he managed the institution. To the extent the authors describe his 
managerial practices; they suggest that he had not altered them significantly 
from those he employed when he was at the Department of Defense (DoD). 
Ten years later, Abraham Zaleznick, a clinical psychologist and 
professor at the Harvard Business School, wrote an article entitled, “The 
                                                          
22 Ibid., p. 616.
23 Business History Review 69 (January 1995) 156-199.
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Education of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968.”24
Zaleznick argued that McNamara was “…unprepared intellectually and 
perhaps more seriously emotionally for the Office of Secretary of Defense… 
[and he] was ill-equipped for the learning the new job required.”25 Zaleznick 
suggested that McNamara’s failure to understand the Vietnam War was a 
result of his education — most particularly the case method used by the 
Harvard Business School. He argues that the case method system produces a 
self-referential sense of authority in the student unrelated to any theoretical 
framework. Consequently, when a particular course of action fails to 
produce a desired outcome, a manager schooled in the case method has 
nothing to fall back on. Regrettably, the article does not relate the argument 
either to McNamara’s management practices or to specific actions he took 
during the war.
More recently, in 2010, an article appeared in the Harvard Business 
Review emphasizing two points about McNamara’s managerial practices. 
First, his business decisions were not exclusively based on financial 
considerations but included a sense of social responsibility, for example, 
promoting safety in automobiles. Second, he was willing to question his own 
                                                          
24 Revue française de gestion, Issue 159, (Nov/Dec, 2005), pp. 45-70.
25 Ibid., p. 47.
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actions and learn from experience. Rosenzweig concludes by suggesting that 
his willingness to look back and profit from mistakes “…may be Robert 
McNamara’s greatest legacy as a manager.” 26 That may have been the case 
when McNamara was in retirement, but those who worked with him at Ford 
and DoD would be surprised by Rosenzweig’s assessment since he seldom 
looked back to consider his own decisions when he was actually engaged in 
management. Indeed, decades after the failure of the TFX project, he was 
unwilling to admit that he had made any fundamental mistakes in managing 
that effort.27
Methodology: McNamara As A Case Study
This dissertation seeks to assess Robert McNamara’s strengths and 
weaknesses as a manager of the Department of Defense. It places his 
performance as Secretary in the context of his previous managerial training 
through his educational, wartime, and business experiences. As good 
                                                          
26 Phil Rosenzweig, “Robert S. McNamara And the Revolution of Modern Management,” 
88 Harvard Business Review (Dec 2010), pp. 86-93.
27 According to his colleague William Kaufmann, “He [McNamara] was very open-
minded until he had mastered a subject, and then it was difficult to influence him,” 
William Kaufmann interview with Dr. Lawrence Kaplan and . Maurice Matloff, July 14, 
1986, (Washington, DC:  Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense), p. 18.  During 
the 1980s and 1990s historians from the Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense 
conducted a series of interviews with McNamara and many of his colleagues.  They are 
archived in the Historical Office under the interviewee’s name and are referred to 
hereafter by the interviewee’s name, OSD Interview, the date of the interview and the 
page number.  
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management depends upon matching the skills of the individual with the 
needs of his or her organization, the dissertation also devotes attention to 
considering the work environment of DoD as compared to the automotive 
business management structures within which McNamara worked and 
studied. As one might expect, there were problems, as DoD’s political and 
military milieus presented special challenges, and certain managerial skills 
— particularly communication skills — that could not transfer easily from 
Ford’s contentious hierarchy to a government department that needed to rely 
on informal cooperation.
McNamara is the fitting subject for an in-depth case study, since 
among the new generation of professionally trained managers who entered 
public service after World War II, he was indisputably one of the most 
influential, most widely-known and most controversial.   He was the first 
business school graduate to ascend to the cabinet level in the U.S. 
government, and through him we can interrogate the utility and adaptability 
of the precepts he learned at Harvard to the field of civil service. 
Furthermore, he had an unusually long tenure of office, serving for more 
than seven years and acting as both a peacetime and wartime Secretary. He 
was the first Defense Secretary to be in the direct chain of command from 
the president to the area commander and his experiences — so often 
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analyzed only as regards the particular conflict of Vietnam — raise more 
general concerns about the ill-defined dual role which any Defense Secretary 
might be called upon to perform in the event of war.  
McNamara’s very prominence and longevity in office mean that he 
cannot be regarded as representative of any wider business class, and the 
dissertation does not seek to draw broad conclusions about the impact of 
businessmen on government generally. Rather, it seeks to present a fair 
assessment of McNamara as a manager and to provide a template for the 
assessment of other prominent businessmen who served as McNamara’s 
contemporaries. Biographical and political studies of McNamara, the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and the Vietnam War already 
proliferate, but few focus substantially and deeply on the management angle 
of McNamara’s secretaryship, beyond the universal observation that he was 
over fond of quantification and micromanagement. Most monographs and 
many articles about the man concentrate on nailing down the extent to which 
he was responsible for high-level mistakes, particularly regarding the war.  
The role of the historian cannot exclude the need to judge 
performance and responsibility, but concentrating solely on the blame game 
is intellectually unproductive. McNamara has been pilloried by many critics, 
and alternatively his own Oscar-winning apologia has suggested to a new 
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generation that coherent “lessons” can be drawn from the tragedy of 
Vietnam. Rather than seeking to condemn or excuse, it is more productive to 
attempt to understand how McNamara approached the decision-making 
process by clarifying his intellectual training, personal predispositions, and 
institutional environments. As previously stated, assessing his performance 
as a manager means assessing the extent to which his skills addressed the 
needs of the Defense Department, and that involves evaluating the 
organization as well as the man. In scrutinizing his decision-making, we 
seek answers which eluded McNamara himself, who could find no reasons 
why he did not ask key questions about Vietnam policy and failed to 
recognize over-centralization as a problem in his own management. He did 
not see that his key strengths and successes as a manager themselves 
contributed to his under-management of the war — he over-managed areas 
of policy and procedure with which he was most facile and most 
comfortable, and thereby allowed them to crowd out higher-level problems 
he felt less prepared to face.
Regarding sources, this dissertation has mined the interviews of 
McNamara’s colleagues and subordinates which are collected in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, some of which — the letters in 
response to Tom Morris — are particularly addressed to questions of 
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management. The author has also benefitted directly from the insights of 
several of McNamara’s colleagues and biographers, with special 
appreciation for the insights of Deborah Shapley, Paul Ignatius, Charles 
Rossotti, Norman Augustine and the late Terry Williams, among others.  
Chapter Overview
The chapter arrangement of this study focuses first on the formative 
factors in McNamara’s personality and training, and then hones in on three 
comparative examples of his DoD management which provide a spectrum of 
success and failure, policy and procedure, overmanagement and 
undermanagement.
For purposes of this study we will focus on three challenges: a new 
budget process, building a new bi-service aircraft that neither of the services 
wanted, and the Vietnam War. The recasting of the defense budget required 
establishing a new paradigm and then a rigorous analysis of how programs 
desired by the services fit within it. It played to McNamara’s strengths, 
analytical brilliance in the context of quantitative analysis. It was also 
something he could control to a large degree.
The other two matters present entirely different management issues. In 
the case of the TFX it was how to persuade the Air Force and the Navy to 
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cooperate in the building of a new aircraft neither of them wanted. It was not 
something a Secretary of Defense had ever tried before and it required 
management techniques that were uncongenial to McNamara. As Alain 
Enthoven has pointed out, the powers of the Secretary of Defense are largely 
negative. “…he can stop the Services from doing things he does not want 
done…but it is very difficult—often impossible—for him to get the Services 
to do something they really don’t want to do.”28 Finally, any description of 
McNamara’s managerial abilities would be incomplete without some 
consideration of how he handled the one issue that is most associated with 
his name — the Vietnam War. 
Chapter One lays out McNamara’s pre-DoD formation, exploring key 
personality traits — competitiveness, facility with calculations, the tendency 
to see conversations as debates to be ruthlessly won — and illustrating how 
these personal proclivities were developed through the particular educational 
model of the Harvard Business School. It goes on to trace McNamara’s 
wartime experience as a statistical analyst and the particular logistical 
challenges he successfully faced with his academic quantitative tools. The 
chapter continues to cover his tenure at Ford, recapturing the key elements 
                                                          
28 Alain G. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?: Shaping The Defense 
Program 1961-1969 (NY: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 266.
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of its transformation from a disorderly, dying company to a restructured, 
rivalry-ridden but successful new entity under Henry Ford, II and his “whiz 
kid” managers. The chapter concludes by providing an analysis of the 
central elements of McNamara’s personal managerial style which had 
already developed and which would profoundly influence his future 
decisions. 
Chapter Two follows McNamara’s appointment as defense secretary 
to the Kennedy administration — a more haphazard process than one might 
expect — and then focuses on the first of the dissertation’s three highlighted 
projects: the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). This 
was one of McNamara’s greatest and most lasting achievements; by 
introducing systems analysis into the budgeting process, McNamara was 
able to eliminate redundant and contradictory programs that the military 
service branches had developed in their rivalry. The system refocused 
budget priorities, first determining a broad overall objective (for example, 
nuclear deterrence), then breaking down alternative means to achieve that 
objective (submarines, siloes, bombers), and finally allocating funds to the 
most cost-effective alternatives. The chapter explores the institutional 
resistance to procedural change which PPBS inspired and evaluates 
McNamara’s ability to win over his critics (it was poor). The chapter also 
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argues that, despite being ultimately successful, the PPBS system was overly
centralized and must be viewed as an aspect of overmanagement which —
when viewed in the full context of McNamara’s duties — misdirected time 
and attention to minutiae, thus leaving other high-level policy concerns at 
risk of neglect.
Chapter Three analyzes the experiences of McNamara’s colleagues 
and subordinates, who reported that working with him could be rewarding 
for his loyal group of top aides, but was largely unsatisfying for lower-level 
civil servants and actively antagonistic for many military personnel. 
McNamara had little ability to prioritize or delegate, which left many 
subordinates without significant institutional roles in decision-making and 
thus without particular investment or stakeholds in DoD directives. 
McNamara also had little respect for military traditions or for advice borne 
of experience rather than analytical expertise. As a result, he offended many 
potential allies, and in general ran his department with a formality in 
communication that stifled the free exchange of ideas. The chapter 
concludes that his brisk and territorial decision-making style was ill-suited to 
the needs of the Department, which required a more politically sensitive, 
socially adept approach.
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Chapter Four examines the TFX plane debacle, wherein McNamara
attempted to illustrate the principles of “commonality” (maximizing 
interchangeable parts when constructing planes in order to save money) and 
“program definition” (deciding on objectives and designs on paper before 
awarding a contract) by forcing the Army and Navy to design one plane to 
fulfill their contradictory mission requirements. The Army and Navy, of 
course, would each have preferred to design and construct their own model 
of plane, but McNamara eventually succeeded in getting them to accept a 
combo-design and left them the choice of contractor. He then over-ruled the 
contractor they unanimously chose. As a result, they were wholly alienated 
from the overall project and failed to efficiently carry it forward; 
additionally, the plane that had been approved on paper proved to have 
major design flaws when actually built. The end result was that no combo-
plane for the Army and Navy was successfully produced, though the 
production process (and Congressional investigations of the same) lingered 
on for years. The episode highlights McNamara’s tone-deaf approach to the 
softer side of management — “people-skills” — and illustrates the point that 
policies can be wrecked once important constituencies grow intransigent 
about carrying out new procedures.
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Chapter Five re-evaluates the common narrative of McNamara and 
the Vietnam War, arguing that rather than overmanaging the conflict, as he 
is usually accused of doing, he actually undermanaged it. The chapter 
explores McNamara’s appearance of activity, focusing especially on his 
numerous “fact-finding” missions, but points out that keeping busy is not 
synonymous with genuine leadership. The chapter argues that McNamara
departed from his normal mode of management when it came to Vietnam 
policy; he was tentative regarding his own competence to set wartime, life 
and death, on-the-ground strategy, and as a result avoided taking control of 
policy decisions. He also never assigned the Systems Analysis Office to 
perform any serious investigation of policy alternatives. He confined himself 
to logistics (which he managed quite successfully) and procedural decisions 
(famously including the selection of bombing targets and the quantification 
of Vietnamese bodies as yardsticks of success). 
Of course, each of these logistical and procedural decisions had 
implications for policy.  The chapter concludes that McNamara’s 
management of the war was atypically unassertive, and points out that his 
overmanagement of other policy and procedural defense projects constituted 
a mismanagement of his time and energy. It suggests that the contradictory 
requirements of peacetime and wartime must be more fully appreciated 
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when evaluating the management expectations placed upon the Secretary of 
Defense.
Overall, the dissertation suggests that McNamara’s managerial 
weaknesses become more comprehensible once it becomes clear how closely 
they were linked to his managerial strengths.   Facility with analytical tools 
designed to help gather massive amounts of data can easily tempt those 
gifted in rational analysis to over centralize authority and overcommit to 
mastering rather than delegating procedural matters. Further, McNamara’s 
competitive, assertive demeanor and his weak “people skills” were far better 
suited to the internecine managerial conflicts at Ford than to the far more 
politicized environments of government departments and military service 
branches. The common measurement of success in business — profit — had 
no clear equivalent in public life, and most public projects could not be 
gradually tested or easily retracted as was the common practice when 
exploring new possibilities in automobile manufacture. McNamara’s 
management of people and of time were deeply flawed and a clearer 
understanding of the comparative demands of the private institutions in 
which he trained and the public institutions he eventually managed help to 
explain the trajectory of his choices and mistakes.
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CHAPTER 1  
THE MAKING OF A BUSINESS MANAGER
Most executives, many scientists, and almost all business school graduates 
believe that if you analyze data, this will give you new ideas. Unfortunately, 
this belief is totally wrong. The mind can only see what it is prepared to see. ~ 
Edward de Bono
An education isn't how much you have committed to memory, or even how 
much you know. It's being able to differentiate between what you know and 
what you don't. ~ Anatole France
Throughout his life, McNamara attempted to rebut the generally-held 
belief that he found truth almost exclusively in numbers, but the case was 
and still is hard to make.29  Perhaps the most characteristic account of how 
McNamara’s mind worked occurred when he was general manager of the 
Ford Division. He came to work one morning and gave one of his top 
managers, Donald Frey, a church pamphlet on which he had been writing 
down his thoughts on a new car during service the day before. What the 
pamphlet contained was a series of numbers representing weight, 
dimensions, and cost. 
                                                          
29 Evan Thomas, the co-author, inter alia, of The Wise Men (NY: Simon and Schuster, 
1986) tells the anecdote that when he was interviewing McNamara about the possibility 
of writing his authorized biography, McNamara protested that he was falsely accused of 
being type cast as only being interested in numbers. He then proceeded to tell Thomas 
that he was the individual most responsible for promoting seat belts in cars and cited the 
number of persons whose lives had been saved. He went on to describe his stint at the 
World Bank, and the number of persons he had helped in that position. Thomas noted 
that McNamara would inevitably turn to numbers. Conversation with Evan Thomas, 
Chevy Chase, MD, May 14, 2010.
32
‘Bob’, Frey finally said, ‘ You’ve got everything 
down except what kind of car you want.’
‘What do you mean?’ McNamara asked.
‘Well, do you want a soft car, a hot sexy car, a 
comfortable car…Whose car is it, what does it feel like?’
‘That’s very interesting’, McNamara said, ‘Write down what you 
think is right’30
It is perfectly understandable why McNamara was so insistent on 
numbers. They played to his strengths. He was very good at analyzing 
figures. Byrne reports that “one wag joked that Bob’s brain cells had to be 
lined up in his head like the buttons on a calculator because he was so quick 
to access information from memory.”31  It was not only the ability to access, 
but the ability to analyze and manipulate those numbers that made him such 
a powerful interlocutor, for this was the period before hand calculators or 
computers were available, tools which have enabled individuals with lesser 
computation skills to hold their own in such discussions.  
Norman Augustine, who worked in the Secretary of Defense’s office 
during the McNamara years and would later become the Deputy Secretary of 
the Army, also noted another less favorable characteristic. Augustine, an 
engineer by training, liked to use graphs to illustrate points; McNamara did 
                                                          
30 David Halberstam, The Reckoning, (NY: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1968), 
p. 209. Halberstam does not footnote his quotes, but he did interview Donald Frey who 
became successively manager of Product Planning at Ford and CEO of Bell & Howell. 
31 Ibid, p. 254.
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not; he insisted that figures be presented in tables. The danger, Augustine 
noted, “is that it’s like looking at the world through a straw.”32 McNamara’s 
education, personality, and business experiences taught him how to see —
and how to overlook — different aspects of managerial problems. 
Evaluating the strengths and limits of his perception provides the foundation 
necessary to understand his later career.
McNamara’s Early Years
McNamara was born on June 19, 1916 in San Francisco to Robert 
James McNamara and Claranell Strange. His father was an executive in a 
wholesale shoe company where he remained his entire working life, rising to 
the position of regional sales manager. McNamara’s leading biographer 
leaves the distinct impression that he was never close to his father. Such was 
not the case with his mother, who subjected McNamara and his sister, Peg, 
to “intensive training” in their pre-school years. She impressed upon them 
the importance of rising “higher on the social and economic ladder” than 
their parents.33
                                                          
32 Interview, Norman Augustine, Lanham, MD, August 27, 2010.
33 Deborah Shapley, op. cit., p. 9.
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McNamara was a good, if not spectacular, student through his high 
school years. Right from the beginning of his schooling, however, one trait 
stood out—he was exceptionally competitive. In his memoir, he writes that, 
in the first grade, the teacher would give a test each month and reseat the 
class on the basis of the test results with pride of place to the first seat on the 
left-hand row. McNamara was determined to be in that seat and was there 
more often than not.34  McNamara achieved honors in high school and had 
the choice of Stanford or the University of California at Berkeley, opting for 
the latter because it was substantially less expensive. It was at Berkeley that 
McNamara’s superior intellectual abilities became manifest. First, he 
discovered his ability to analyze quantitatively at a very fast pace. 
Throughout his business and public careers, he would amaze colleagues with 
the rapidity with which he could detect an arithmetic mistake or a faulty 
mathematical conclusion. It was during college, he told his biographer, 
Shapley, that he began “to talk and think in numbers;” it was, she wrote, “a 
consciously adopted style.”35  It was also in college that he became 
fascinated with certain branches of philosophy — especially logic. Given 
                                                          
34 McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, (NY: Vintage Books, 
1996), p. 4.
35 Shapley, op. cit., p.13; see also Robert S. McNamara, op. cit., p.6  “And my 
mathematics professors taught me to see math as a process of thought — a language in 
which to express much, but certainly not all, of human activity.”
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McNamara’s life-long interest in quantitative techniques, one can easily 
imagine the thrill he felt when confronted by the intriguing questions that set 
theory and other mathematically-related inquiries raised. His interest in 
quantifying human behavior convinced McNamara to major in economics, 
and he blossomed academically.
Extra-curricular activities also left their mark. He was elected to a 
number of university leadership positions, including the most prestigious 
secret society, the Order of the Golden Bear. He was also one of the three 
University nominees for a Rhodes scholarship. He failed to win the 
competition, but never lost his enthusiasm for that symbol of academic 
excellence. According to his biographer, McNamara’s “missing the Rhodes 
was obviously a deep blow — all his professional life he would pride 
himself on hiring Rhodes scholars, and he would mention that friends or
protégés had been Rhodes scholars….”36  
But, as is so often the case, what seemed at the moment as a setback 
turned out to be a career defining event. Given his academic interests and the 
circumstances of the period, it is difficult to imagine a professional 
trajectory that could have led him to high public office if he had won a 
Rhodes. Instead of traveling to Oxford, England in the fall of 1937, he 
                                                          
36 Shapley, op. cit., pp. 17, 196.
36
crossed the country to Cambridge, Massachusetts, to enter the Harvard 
Business School. It was there that he found his intellectual calling and his 
true métier. Each of McNamara’s subsequent career moves can be traced 
directly from his years at the “B-school”.
Business School
When McNamara began business school, Harvard had become the 
most prestigious graduate business school in the country under the 
leadership of its long-term dean, Wallace Donham.  Its defining 
methodology was the “case method,” an approach to problem solving that 
was highly compatible with McNamara’s strengths. The method put a 
premium on the ability to analyze an issue with speed and clarity, and 
rewarded a competitive spirit. Unlike most other graduate schools, the B-
school graded class participation heavily. Those who were able to advance 
the discussion — as opposed to making merely an observation (what became 
known in a metaphor borrowed from golf as a “chip shot”) — were not only 
noticed by the faculty but rewarded with high grades. McNamara was 
noticed, and at the end of his first year was among the top students in the 
class. 
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In addition to classroom performance, the course of study included 
cooperative exercises in which a small group of students would analyze a 
business problem. McNamara excelled so conspicuously at these sessions 
that his Berkeley friend and Harvard classmate, Walter Haas (a future 
president of Levi Strauss), recalled that “it was terribly tempting to the rest 
of us to let Bob do all the work.”37  It was from these sessions that 
McNamara developed his skill at “summing up” — the ability to recapitulate 
the arguments on either side of an issue, prioritize them and suggest a 
consensus that initially appeared nonexistent or elusive. In recent years, 
Henry Kissinger reputedly has been the most skillful practitioner of the art in 
the halls of government, but McNamara would have been a fearsome 
competitor had the two been in the same administration. 38
At Harvard, McNamara came into contact with two men who were to 
have an important influence on his life. The first was Ross G. Walker, a tall, 
impeccably-dressed pedagogue of athletic-bearing who was professor of 
accounting. His scholarly output was modest and his principal outside 
activity, aside from the occasional consulting engagement, was addressing 
                                                          
37 Henry L. Trewhitt, McNamara (NY: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 35.
38 In a telephone interview with Tom Morris, Tex Thornton credited McNamara with 
“…a great capacity for organizing the thoughts of others.” Papers of Robert S. 
McNamara, Library of Congress, Part II, Book 78, Thomas Morris Folder, Interview June 
6, 1978, p.1
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professional societies about arcana such as “flexible budgets” and inventory 
costing. He was a popular professor, despite the dryness of the subject, 
because of his friendly manner, gentle humor, and obvious concern that his 
students not only understand the technical aspects of his subject but how it 
could help them in their future careers. 
Walker’s classes on accounting went well beyond a focus on financial 
reporting. His signature course “Aspects of Budgetary Control” mixed 
accounting issues with business statistics. The Introduction to the course 
stated:  “Business statistics consist essentially of the application of various 
technical methods to certain types of data with the object of disclosing 
truths.” As they discussed budgetary issues, students were exposed to 
statistical techniques like frequency distribution, index numbers, correlation 
and time series. The course emphasized how to use data, especially financial 
data, to direct management policy. As Walker put it, “Accounting is looking 
through the rearview mirror; budgeting is looking through the windshield.”39
McNamara took Walker’s course, and it made a memorable 
impression. Walker would subsequently tell the Boston Globe, when asked 
to comment on McNamara’s appointment as secretary of defense, “I’ve 
never seen anything like his [McNamara’s] phenomenal coordination 
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between ideas and the rate of flow as he expresses them. He is a master at 
handling complicated subjects under pressure ….”40  McNamara would also 
keep up with his old teacher. When he was about to leave the Air Force in 
1946 to join Ford, he wrote Walker and asked him for copies of some of the 
cases they had studied; later at Ford, he asked him to send qualified 
graduates who were interested in financial management.41
It was in Walker’s class that McNamara was introduced to General 
Motors’ (GM) system of financial management. In his seminal book, 
Concept of the Corporation, Peter Drucker defined “the central questions of 
corporate organization” as “the distribution of power and responsibility, the 
formulation of general and objective criteria of policy and action, [and] the 
selection and training of leaders….”42  GM approached these issues by 
means of a system of financially-controlled decentralization that “attempted 
to combine the greatest corporate unity with the greatest divisional 
autonomy and responsibility.”43  The lynchpin of the system was a financial 
accounting regime that GM’s president and later chairman, Alfred P. Sloan, 
and his chief financial officer, F. Donaldson Brown, had worked on for 
                                                          
40 Boston Globe, December 14, 1960, p. 16.
41 E.g. a letter from McNamara to Walker, April 4, 1946, Harvard Business School, Ross 
G. Walker papers, Box 3, folder, McNamara correspondence.
42 Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, revised ed. (NY: Mentor Books, 1972), 
p. 45.
43 Ibid., p. 50.
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years. The goal of the system was to allow top management to set overall 
corporate strategy and assign responsibility to the managers of subordinate 
divisions for implementation. Division managers were responsible for and 
had the authority to control day-to-day operations while top corporate staff 
could focus on long-range corporate goals, coordination between divisions 
and overall efficiency.
Consider some of the issues germane to managing a business with 
hundreds of products, tens of thousands of employees, and revenue in the 
hundreds of millions. How was one to determine whether a division was 
contributing its appropriate share to the corporation’s overall performance?  
How could one assure that one division’s success was not at the expense of 
another division?  How did one judge whether a division’s performance was 
the result of operating efficiency or extraneous and fortuitous economic 
circumstances?  For GM, at least, the answer was in an elaborate financial 
reporting system that attempted, and in large measure succeeded, in 
providing objective and uniform performance yardsticks. Since all divisions 
were operating on the same basis, top managers and division leaders could 
determine and compare how each part of the organization was performing.
GM measured each division’s return on investment by calculating two 
basic ratios: sales divided by investment (sales turnover ratio) and net 
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earnings divided by sales (operating ratio). These yardsticks were 
supplemented by an annual “Price Study” that enabled GM’s top 
management to coordinate each division’s operating plan and a so-called 
“flexible budget” that compared actual operating results to the approved 
budget so that adjustments could be made to the operating plan.44
As a young business graduate student, McNamara could hardly 
imagine that he would become a leader in the automotive industry and 
become intimately familiar with the multi-divisional system that he would 
help install at Ford. What he could appreciate at this stage of his career was 
the potential quantitative analysis held to influence business behavior and
how congenial the modes of statistical analysis discussed in Walker’s class 
were to his own analytical predispositions.
The other, and even greater, influence on McNamara was Edmund 
Learned. In contrast to the gentler Walker, Learned was direct, decisive and 
forceful. Widely respected within the business school, he was the “go to 
guy” on the faculty. Initially hired as an instructor in marketing, his interests 
gradually turned to business administration and management. In the period 
1939-1942, he was charged by the Dean to recast the course in business 
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statistics “into a course in the use of figures for management control.”45  The 
course would first be offered in 1946 under the simple but revealing title 
“Control.” Significantly, the emphasis had changed from the revelation of 
“truth” to “the wise use of figures and accounts towards some governing 
purpose.”
Learned had followed McNamara’s career at the B-school closely and 
saw him as a potential colleague. He was one of the three faculty examiners 
on McNamara’s orals committee and, in light of McNamara’s superior 
academic record, thought he would graduate “with high distinction.” This 
would have given him a strong boost towards the goal that Learned had in 
mind. But for a second time, McNamara was to be frustrated. His father’s 
death in the fall of 1938 and his trip to California to console his mother 
evidently disrupted his hitherto laser-like concentration. He graduated with a 
“high pass” rather than “high distinction.”
No faculty appointment was forthcoming so he returned to San 
Francisco to begin work with the accounting firm Price Waterhouse. 
Predictably, he hated the work and was looking for another position when 
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Dean Donham called to offer him a position as a junior instructor of 
accounting.  
In the meantime, McNamara had resumed his acquaintance with 
Margy Craig, a former girlfriend of his long-time friend, Vernon Goodin. 
The relationship matured and, just as he accepted the job, he asked her to 
marry him. Margy McNamara was a tiny, ebullient, outgoing woman who 
had graduated from Berkeley and taken a job as a physical education 
instructor. Teaching would be a passion throughout her life.  Shortly after 
her arrival in Washington, it would lead her to found Reading is 
Fundamental which has become one of the nation’s largest literacy 
educational organizations. Margy would provide McNamara with the firm 
emotional foundation he would need throughout his life. He did not have 
easy relations with his three children and although he had friends, he was 
such a private man that it was difficult for them to give him the emotional 
support he needed — especially during the turbulent Vietnam period. But 
Margy was a constant source of strength and her empathy must have been 
considerable for it was she, not he, who developed an ulcer in July, 1967 as 
the Vietnam policy unraveled.46
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Army Air Force
McNamara did well as a junior instructor, but it was a short career 
since the United States entered WWII just over one year after he started. He 
would be swept up in the war as were so many of his generation, but unlike 
most, for whom the war bore little relationship to their future careers, 
McNamara’s military experience would directly advance his career and 
would reinforce his commitment to quantitative analysis as an essential 
management tool. 
Since 1924, officers from the U.S. Army and the Navy regularly 
enrolled at the Harvard Business School. As it became increasingly evident 
that the country would become involved in the war, the Army began to 
reinforce its ties with faculty members. The Quartermaster General of the 
Army, who, like McNamara studied under Learned, invited his former 
teacher to attend the first civilian orientation course at the Command and 
General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth.47
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At the outset of the war, the Air Corps48 faced a daunting 
organizational agenda. One issue was the tremendous growth of aircraft and 
personnel. In November, 1941 just before Pearl Harbor, the Air Corps had 
only 1100 planes in the United States “fit for war service” and of these, only 
159 were four-engine aircraft. That force grew to 72,000 combat aircraft by 
the end of the war, and Air Force personnel grew from 292,000 officers and 
enlisted men to about 2.3 million during the same period.49  Another major 
issue was the complexity of its equipment. Aircraft were far more complex 
machines than the armaments traditionally used by the Army. The B-25 
bomber, for example, contained 165,000 separate parts.50  Administering the 
Air Corps required far more sophisticated management techniques than had 
hitherto been used by the United States military.
The first task was to establish an accurate, uniform data collection 
system. At the beginning of the war the Army had only an elementary 
system in place. For example, personnel were accounted for by a daily 
morning report that had been in use for generations. It listed total troop 
strength on hand exclusively by rank. In an infantry company this may have 
been sufficient (although barely), but hardly for an air force squadron, 
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especially a bomber squadron where commanders needed personnel data 
broken down by military occupational specialty, viz. the number of pilots, 
navigators, bombardiers, armorers, and mechanics. Similarly, to operate 
even at minimum efficiency, a commander needed to know the number of 
aircraft in ready combat status, the number grounded, the reasons they were 
out of service, and when they might be expected to return. At higher levels 
of command, leaders needed to know the status of aircraft in production and 
anticipated delivery times and — just as significant — the status of 
personnel in training. 
Yet, as late as the middle of 1942, the Air Corps chief, H. H. (“Hap”) 
Arnold, did not even know the number of aircraft he had in his inventory. 
Air Corps production was the responsibility of Air Material Command. To 
make sure that it fulfilled its monthly quotas, it would report to the Air Staff 
the number of aircraft it had “accepted” (i.e., paid for) even if the planes 
were still in production and not yet delivered. It took a meeting at the highest 
level to force Material Command to report only aircraft actually delivered 
before they could be brought into inventory.51
                                                          
51 Although the Air Staff lacked accurate information, it was not for lack of reports. Air 
Corps headquarters received an estimated 2500 reports from field organizations on a 
recurring basis. Frances Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces (Historical 
Studies No. 57, USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952), p. 8.
47
What was needed at the outset was a set of uniform reporting 
standards that would be observed throughout the Air Corps. To accomplish 
that task, Robert Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for the Air Corps and a 
former investment banker at Brown Brothers Harriman, encouraged the 
establishment of a Directorate of Statistical Control under the leadership of 
C.B. (“Tex”) Thornton, as part of the Air Staff.52  Lovett and Thornton were 
to become two of the most important influences on McNamara’s career.
Thornton was one of those remarkable individuals who pop up in 
chaotic times. A college drop-out, he had moved from Texas to Washington, 
D. C. in the early thirties and found a job as Under Clerk (CAF-1) in the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration. After a series of moves within New 
Deal agencies he was promoted to Assistant Statistician at the U. S. Housing 
Authority. On the strength of a report on low-cost housing that had come to 
the attention of Lovett, Thornton was hired as civilian head of a “small 
group of statisticians” that provided support for the Air Staff.53
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One of Thornton’s early priorities was to establish a school that would 
develop a cadre of statistical control officers who would provide the data 
higher commands needed.54 Thornton turned to the Harvard Business 
School, and specifically Learned, to establish the curriculum for a five-
(subsequently eight) week course. Learned chose twelve members of the 
faculty, including McNamara, to assist. They had only three weeks to 
prepare the curriculum and assemble the necessary material. McNamara was 
responsible for engineering, supply, and operations. Like the rest of the 
faculty, he also contributed to the development of standardized reports that 
would be used throughout the war and was part of the group that prepared 
“the directive for the famous 110 report on aircraft status,” one of the key 
reports used by commanders to determine combat strength. He taught at the 
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Statistical Control School for the balance of 1942, but the work became 
routine, and he realized that he was in jeopardy of being drafted.
He faced three choices:  wait to be drafted as an enlisted man; apply 
for Officers Candidate School or seek assignment in an overseas theater 
where he could receive a direct commission not available in the Zone of the 
Interior. He chose the last of these three options and along with fellow 
faculty member, Miles Mace, was assigned to the 8th Air Force in the United 
Kingdom, initially as a civilian and later as a captain. He would 
subsequently serve in Salina, Kansas — headquarters of the B-29 
superfortress program — as well as XX Bomber Command in Kharagpur, 
India, XXI Bomber Command in Guam, and lastly the Pentagon and Wright 
Field. 
Data collection and presentation were the first priorities of statistical 
officers like McNamara, but data analysis and operational suggestions were 
also a high priority. Some of the best known studies of the Statistical Control 
Division included a comparison of the effectiveness of the B-24 bomber as 
against the B-17, and the advisability of deploying B-17s in the Pacific 
50
theater after Germany surrendered. 55  Statistical Control also weighed in on 
one of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s constant complaints against 
the Air Force — not enough planes were reaching the front. The temptation 
in such circumstances would be to accede to the commander-in-chief’s 
wishes and send more planes. The Air Force resisted, however, and 
Statistical Control was able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the 
president that if the allocation of aircraft to the 8th Air Force in the UK did 
not match personnel availability, it would end up with one thousand 
bombers but only 500 crews to fly them.
The studies directly attributable to McNamara were for the 20th Air 
Force under General Lauris Norstad. They dealt with issues like bombing 
accuracy, mechanical malfunctions, and the number of sorties B-29 crews 
should be required to fly. He reported, for example, that accuracy could be 
substantially improved if bombing altitude were reduced by 5,000 feet to 
25,000 feet, a suggestion that Curtis LeMay (eventual Air Force Chief of 
Staff) apparently accepted.56  Another report wrestled with the constant 
problem of putting more B-29s over Japan. One of the major criticisms of 
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the performance of XXI Bomber Command in the Pacific was that too few 
aircraft were reaching their targets, usually because of mechanical problems. 
One potential remedy was to increase the number of sorties that a crew was 
required to fly. McNamara pointed out, however, that under existing 
casualty and replacement rates, increasing the per crew sortie rate to six per 
month would result in significant crew deficiencies in four months. Under 
such a scenario, a Bomber Command would not be able to operate at 
“planned levels” unless there was a significant increase in the number of 
replacement crews.57
It was in the CBI (China, Burma, India) Theater that McNamara made 
his greatest contribution to the war effort. Allied air strategy in the Pacific 
was to create two commands to bomb industrial targets in Japan, one located 
in Chentgu, China (XX Bomber Command), the other in the Mariana Islands 
(XXI Bomber Command). The difficulty was how to establish a credible 
base of operations in Chentgu. It was a logistical nightmare as there was no 
surface supply route. Everything had to be flown in “over the Hump,” an air 
route of approximately 700 miles from Assam Province in India to Chentgu 
that was generally considered one of the most dangerous in the world. As 
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one combat pilot described the operation, “Flying a P-47 in combat was not 
as dangerous as flying a C-47 across the Hump.”58 Most of the aircraft used 
to fly supplies had not been designed to operate at altitudes and under the 
conditions the route demanded. The workhorse was the C-47, and it could 
not operate at the extreme altitudes required to clear the Himalayas. 
Accordingly, it had to fly in the saddles between the highest of the 
mountains. Even at these altitudes carburetors would ice, controls could 
become sluggish, and air currents could tear a plane apart. “Scores [of 
aircraft] simply vanished as if swallowed by the mountains.” Furthermore, 
navigational equipment on many of the planes was primitive. When 
Commanding General Arnold visited the CBI in February 1943 and took the 
flight over the Hump to inspect the air facilities at Kunming, China, his 
plane became lost, and he was lucky to land at an airfield virtually out of 
gas, 100 miles from his intended destination.59
As statistical officer of the XX Bomber Command, McNamara
focused on increasing supplies delivered to Chengtu — his most impressive 
accomplishment during the war. The obstacles were formidable because of 
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the variety of aircraft used and the “cost” of delivery.60  For example, it took 
6,000 gallons of fuel for one tactical B-29 to deliver 2,000 gallons of fuel to 
Chengtu, and that same plane had to make seven round trips in order to 
deliver enough fuel for a single B-29 to fly one bombing mission over 
Japan.61 To compound the supply difficulties there was constant friction 
between XX Bomber Command and Chennault’s 14th Air Force (the 
successor to the “Flying Tigers”) over fuel allocation. The net result was that 
when XX Bomber Command was ordered to conduct its first raid over Japan 
on June 15, 1944, it could put only 50 B-29s over the target.62
Beginning in July, 1944, however, the supply situation began to 
improve. According to the Command’s history:
…Without any great increase in the number of 
planes under its jurisdiction over what it had in 
June, the three months following saw increases of 
two and three times what had been carried in 
June—despite a gradual stepping up of the tempo of 
operations…
The history attributes the improvement to McNamara and his 
successor because of their ability to increase the efficiency of the transport 
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operation. The improvement did not come without resistance, however, as 
demonstrated by the reaction of a forward area commander to an McNamara
directive about stockpiling. “Who the hell,” the colonel wanted to know, 
“was running his command, he or the Statistical Section?” Chengtu gave 
McNamara his first practical experience in the potential power of statistical 
analysis and of the problems in implementing the new techniques.63
McNamara’s work in the CBI earned him a Legion of Merit, a 
promotion to lieutenant colonel after only six months as a major and, above 
all, the recognition of his superiors both in the Statistical Division and Air 
Forces Headquarters. Learned, characterized his work in the CBI as “the best 
logistical data of the war for the Air Service Command ….”64
It was all in vain, however. McNamara’s brilliance, and the new 
energy brought to the Command by Curtis LeMay could do little to improve 
the performance of XX Bomber Command. LeMay recommended that no 
more bombers be sent after November, 1944 and the Command ended its 
missions over Japan in January, 1945. It had flown only 49 missions of 
which just 15 were “against Japanese industries in the home islands….”65
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The logistical problems were just too great. McNamara along with LeMay
was reassigned to XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas. He would 
complete his military service at the Pentagon and at Wright Field where he 
assisted in the phasedown of aircraft production.
What had McNamara gained from his wartime experiences? It was 
not the sort of question McNamara liked to answer, and he declined to 
respond when his biographer, Shapley, posed it during one of their 
interviews. Apparently, its generality made him uncomfortable.66
Nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions. First, he had learned how to 
prosper in a large organization. Time and again he would return to the theme 
that there was no reason to fear large organizations; with appropriate 
management and leadership, individuals could reach their personal potential 
within large institutions. Second, as seen from the remarks of the anonymous 
colonel, he had learned that statistical data, appropriately analyzed and 
persuasively presented, could be a source of authority. He also came to 
appreciate that the lessons that Walker and Learned had taught at the 
Harvard Business School could have life and death consequences for 
individuals and institutions. Finally, McNamara had begun to build a 
reputation beyond the confines of the B-school. Men such as Lovett and 
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Thornton had recognized his ability. He had demonstrated the capacity to 
perform at the highest level and had developed confidence that he could hold 
his own even in the most competitive circumstances.
Ford Motor Company
At the end of the war, McNamara intended to return to the HBS as an 
academic, but illness intervened. When he was at Wright Air Force Base he 
developed a mild case of polio from which he quickly recovered. Margy was 
not so fortunate. She contracted a severe case that paralyzed her lower body 
and most of her right side. McNamara recognized that whatever the 
prognosis, Margy’s recovery would involve thousands of dollars annually 
and that an academic salary, even at Harvard, would scarcely be sufficient. 67
As McNamara was coping with what to do after his discharge, 
Thornton and three of his fellow statistical control officers (Francis C. Reith, 
George Moore, and Ben D. Mills), considered assembling the best statistical 
control officers and offering them as a team to a business that needed 
“advanced management techniques.” Thornton and his original collaborators 
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reasoned that an individual, no matter how brilliant, could be swallowed up 
by the bureaucracy of any large organization, but “a group working as a 
team … [could] control the destiny of a great institution.”68  The group made 
up a list of the best 25 officers with Air Force Statistical Control Division 
experience and then winnowed the group down to ten.69
Thornton received a positive response to his idea from Robert R. 
Young of the Alleghany Corporation. In the meantime, Moore had learned 
from his father, an insurance broker in Detroit who counted Ford as a major 
client, that Henry Ford II, who had taken over the company, might be 
receptive to the idea.70  Accordingly, Thornton wired Ford directly asking 
for a personal meeting to “discuss a matter of management importance.” 
Presumptuous as this might have been, young Ford (he was only 28) was 
taken by the idea. After one meeting, he checked the group out with Robert 
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Lovett, who gave them high marks, and hired the group to begin work 
February 1, 1946.71
The Ford Motor Company was one of America’s major industrial 
institutions. It had accounted for almost two-thirds of the automobile market 
in 1923-24 and over one-third in 1929.72  It was “managed,” to use the term 
loosely, by its founder Henry Ford, whose views on subjects ranging from 
vegetarianism to pacifism to Judaism were widely known. It was also widely 
recognized that the company had fallen on hard times due largely to the 
senior Ford’s intransigence. He did not believe in budgets or financial 
reports, and eschewed any form of organizational chart.73 The company’s 
financial position reflected this chaotic personalized management style. Ford 
was consistently losing market share not only to GM which, in 1936, outsold 
it almost 2:1, but to Chrysler which replaced it as the number two 
automobile producer that same year. In 1936, GM earned a profit in the 
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quarter ending June 30 of more than $88 million while Ford earned less than 
$18 million for the entire year. For the previous decade, historian Allan 
Nevins has estimated that the company had lost “approximately 
$26 million.”74
World War II and cost-plus contracts had saved the company 
financially, but it was in precarious shape when Henry Ford II assumed the 
presidency late in September 1945. Young Ford needed three things above 
all — new executive talent to straighten out the company, a car that could 
tap the huge potential market that existed after a four-year drought in 
automobile sales and a new style of management.75
In the beginning, McNamara was not particularly excited by the 
prospect of working for an automobile company. Because of Margy’s
illness, he recognized the financial imperative of working in industry but 
was distinctly lukewarm about Ford. After his visit to Dearborn, however, 
“for once, even Bob McNamara seemed excited … by the prospect of 
working for Henry Ford,” according to his friend Charles Bosworth.76 It is 
difficult to imagine that McNamara had not been impressed by the Ford 
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Rouge River plant. Located on more than 1000 acres and employing at its 
peak more than 100,000 workers, it was the largest integrated production 
facility in the world and could produce all the basic components of an 
automobile. There were docks where the huge Ford 600-foot Great Lakes 
bulk carriers brought iron ore from Northern Minnesota, and coal from 
Pennsylvania. There were steel furnaces, coke ovens, rolling mills, glass 
furnaces, and plate glass rollers, a tire manufacturing plant, stamping and 
engine casting plants, and an electric power plant to service the huge facility. 
It was a wonder of the industrial age that even today, after it has shrunk 
considerably, evokes awe.  
Ford Rouge Plant circa 1950
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In addition, McNamara and his fellow whiz kids were joining what 
was perceived as one of the most glamorous post-World War II industries. 
“Detroit rivaled Hollywood as the capital of pop culture, with the car as 
celebrated as any movie star or film of the time.”77  Although McNamara
was never a true “car man” — viewing the automobile as a means of 
transportation rather than a symbol of social standing or prestige — he 
recognized that he was joining an industry international in scope, whose 
prospects were auspicious and whose prominence offered him the prospect 
of a national reputation.
Ford was also a company that needed the skills Thornton and his 
group could provide. If the Rouge complex was an industrial marvel, Ford’s 
management was rudimentary — especially as related to financial reporting. 
Henry Ford Sr. distrusted banks and bankers and relied on a financial control 
system that did not differ much from the one advocated by Luca Pacioli, the 
Renaissance mathematician, who is considered by many to be the father of 
accounting. The stories of Ford’s system are legion. One has it that Ford 
figured that it would take too many clerks to log in each invoice the 
company received. Accordingly, the accounting department piled up the 
bills, measured them and then applied a formula to determine accounts 
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payable.78  Just as revealing, is a story told by a future Ford president, Arjay 
Miller, who was given an assignment shortly after he joined the company to 
produce some kind of monthly profit figure. He approached one of the 
controllers and asked,
What do you think the profit will be this month?
What do you want it to be?  was the reply.
Well, what do you mean?  Arjay asked…
I can make profit anything you want it to be.
The man went on to explain how he would shift funds around to get 
whatever results were needed at the time.79
The chaos endemic in the financial departments was duplicated in 
many of the assembly areas as well. In production, for example, there were 
no property records or uniform system for labeling parts or an accurate count 
of parts on hand. Parts were merely stored in boxes beside the assembly line 
and retrieved on an “as needed” basis. In the Rouge complex the Whiz Kids 
found thousands of mislabeled parts on stopped overhead conveyor belts and 
no production schedule. 
The main problem, however, was the hemorrhaging of cash. Because 
of lucrative defense contracts, Ford finished the war with a substantial cash 
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cushion (estimated at $685 million). But by the beginning of 1946, it was 
losing an estimated $10 million a month (perhaps more).80
The situation at Ford was in many respects similar to the one 
McNamara had faced when he had become a statistical control officer and 
had begun installing some order in the Air Force’s material inventory. After 
a three-month period during which they investigated virtually every part of 
the organization, (and acquired the group nickname, “Whiz Kids” — a 
derivative of “Quiz Kids”), the Thornton Group went to work as a group to 
develop an organizational plan for the company and to set up a proper 
financial system.81
The Group could do much to help straighten out the company’s 
organizational and financial chaos, but it could not accomplish what the 
company needed  most — that is, to produce new, competitive automobiles. 
Henry Ford II knew that the revival of the company depended on the 
development of an automobile that could compete with GM’s Chevrolet. No 
matter how brilliant, Thornton and his group had never produced an 
automobile — indeed, never had produced anything but reports. The 
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company needed experienced automobile men, preferably from its principal 
competitor, GM.82
The younger Ford’s first success was to persuade Ernest Breech, a 21-
year employee of GM, who at the time was serving as president of Bendix 
Aviation Corporation, to join Ford. Short and muscular with a pencil 
mustache, Breech was a self-made man who had been befriended by John 
Hertz, a Chicago entrepreneur who was diversifying his taxi business into 
car rental. General Motors acquired his company and with it Breech. Breech 
was known for his skill as a turn-around specialist who had helped straighten 
out North American Aviation and Frigidaire as well as Bendix. His strength 
was figures, especially cost analysis.83  Breech, in turn, was able to convince 
his colleague, Lewis Crusoe, who, after a twenty-year career at GM 
culminating as controller of the Fisher Body Division, came out of 
retirement to join him at Ford. Crusoe, a former VP of the National 
Association of Cost Accountants, was “precision personified… [He] had 
                                                          
82 Alfred P. Sloan of GM was surprisingly tolerant of employees who left his company to 
join Ford. The general supposition is that he recognized a strong competitor would help
keep the Justice Department’s Anti-Trust Division at bay.
83 Breech joined Ford on July 1, 1946. See Lacey, op. cit., p. 425; Byrne, op. cit., p. 123; 
Nevins, op. cit., p. 313.
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gained immense knowledge of labor, overhead, cost accounting, tooling, 
sales and management…” during his time at GM.84
The team that Ford had assembled had two marked characteristics. 
The top level executives were all familiar with the GM structure and its 
operating procedures and were well versed in management through financial 
control. McNamara, Miller, and Lundy were up-to-date with the current 
theories of financial control and Breech and Crusoe had decades of practical 
experience.
Crusoe was put in charge of the Thornton group, which had divided 
itself into a number of subgroups: planning, classification of automotive and 
business terms (viz. a new vocabulary), financial reporting, and planning. 
McNamara, along with Miller and Lundy, worked directly with Crusoe on 
financial reporting. The product of these labors was a series of reports to the 
Policy Committee (the highest decision-making body of the company at that 
time) presented in August and September of 1946. Unsurprisingly, the 
                                                          
84 Nevins, op. cit., pp. 317-318, 338, 351. Other members of the “Breech team” were: 
Harold T. Youngren, former chief engineer at Borg-Warner; Delman S. Harder, 
production supervisor at GM; Albert T. Browning, former director of the War 
Department’s purchasing activities and previously a Montgomery Ward executive. John 
Dykstra, another GM executive and future Ford president would join the group in 1947. 
One by-product of hiring Breech was the departure in 1948 of Tex Thornton who 
resented both Breech and Crusoe. In addition to these senior executives, Ford hired over 
150 executives off the “bonus list” from GM.” Peter Collier & David Horowitz, The 
Fords: An American Epic (NY: Summit Books, 1987), p. 222.
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organizational plan looked very much like a GM model. Initially, there were 
to be five divisions: Light Car (soon abandoned), Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, 
Rouge, and Export. 85  Each division was, in theory, to be managed 
independently as a profit center, subject to appropriate financial reporting 
and budgeting. As one would expect, the financial controls were initially 
modeled on Donaldson Brown’s GM system. Additionally, in a pale 
imitation of the GM system, Ford initiated regular “management meetings” 
that brought together company officials to hear top management discuss 
current policy issues, answer questions, and receive feedback.
The new system may have looked like GM on paper but there were 
major differences in practice. Ford’s divisional structure was lopsided. GM 
had as many as thirty divisions, and while some were very small, others, like 
Chevrolet and Fisher Body, were very large. All were managed to contribute 
individually to the company’s overall financial strength. The Ford division, 
on the other hand, overshadowed all others, selling more than three times the 
number of cars as Lincoln and Mercury combined; in reality many of the 
other divisions existed only to service Ford. When J.R. Davis, the head of 
sales and advertising for the entire company, learned that the Ford division 
                                                          
85 Later expanded by three: General Products, Parts and Equipment and Ford Assembly. 
See Nevins, op. cit., p. 332.
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was to have its own sales manager, he asked plaintively, “What are you 
going to leave me?”86
Alfred P. Sloan of GM emphasized that the primary responsibility for 
the operation of each business belonged to the operating divisions and their 
staffs and that central management would act only as advisors or 
coordinators. 87  In reality, as Arthur Kuhn has persuasively argued, GM was 
far more centralized than Sloan would admit, and as the years passed more 
and more decisions, like product styling, were taken from the divisions and 
made the responsibility of central management.88  Nevertheless, Sloan had 
raised the concept of decentralization to the level of ideology. 89  
While there was real doubt whether Ford was truly diversified, there 
was no doubt about the Ford division’s autonomy as long as Crusoe and 
McNamara were in charge. Lewis Crusoe, its first head, told his bosses Ford 
and Breech that “he would welcome advice … but intended to ‘guard [the] 
independent thinking of the division as though it was an entirely independent 
                                                          
86 Ibid., p. 330.
87 Alfred P. Sloan, My Years with General Motors (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc.,1964), p. 433.
88 See Arthur J. Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, 1918-1938: Designing the General Motors 
Performance Control System (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 
1986).
89 “Decentralization was analogous to free enterprise,” Sloan declared “centralization to 
regimentation.” Alfred P. Sloan, Adventures of a White-Collar Man (NY: Doubleday, 
Doran and Company, Inc., 1941), p. 134.
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company.’”90  McNamara was no less forceful in maintaining the 
independence of the division when he became its head. When Ford 
attempted to increase its share of the mid-priced market by redesigning its 
Mercury models and introducing the ill-fated Edsel, he resisted any attempts 
at “putting a lid” on specifications for Ford models that might be viewed as, 
and indeed were, competitive with the company’s mid-priced range.91
It is difficult to imagine such issues arising at GM because of its 
committee system. GM had evolved an elaborate committee system so that 
the divisions and central management could present ideas, discuss mutual 
problems, and smooth over potential conflicts. The avoidance of destructive 
conflict was a central tenant of Sloan’s management style for, as Peter 
Drucker writes, he “…was a master at working with and managing people, 
[and] was personally exceedingly ‘people focused’….”  
This did not mean that Sloan did not appreciate the value of vigorous 
debate. He believed that the best decisions were the result of proposals 
brought to one of GM’s committees “…that can be defended against well-
informed and sympathetic criticism….The group will not always make a 
better decision,” he would write, “there is even the possibility of some 
                                                          
90 Collier & Horowitz, op. cit., p. 240.
91 Nevins, op. cit., p.380; Collier & Horowitz, op. cit., p 272. The result was the Ford 
Fairlane that was fully competitive with the Edsel and the antithesis of what McNamara 
believed the public should drive. See Lacey, op. cit., p. 492.
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averaging down. But in General Motors I think the record shows we have 
averaged up.”
One such example occurred when the head of GM’s Public Relations 
staff proposed a major PR campaign. The proposal was so well prepared and 
presented that it provoked immediate and unanimous approval. The 
committee was prepared to move on to the next item on the agenda when 
Sloan intervened. “‘I take it you gentlemen are in favor?’ he asked. ‘Yes, 
Mr. Sloan’ the chorus came back. ‘Then I move we defer action on this to 
give ourselves a chance to think,’” he replied, and a month later the proposal 
was either scuttled or drastically revised.”92
The same could not be said of the younger Ford. He appeared to 
manage by pitting persons against each other. According to many observers 
                                                          
92  Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, (New York: John Day Company, Inc., 1975), p. 
249, 287; Alfred P. Sloan, My Years with General Motors (Garden City: Doubleday 
Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 433, 435. According to Drucker, Sloan practiced the Douglas 
McGregor style of management long before The Human Side of Enterprise became 
popular. There is a revealing colloquy in Drucker’s Adventures of a Bystander. Drucker 
was struck by the amount of time spent on discussing the work assignment of a master 
mechanic at a small accessory division. He asked Sloan,” Mr. Sloan, how can you afford 
to spend four hours on a minor job like this?’’  Sloan replied, “This corporation pays me 
a pretty good salary…for making important decisions, and for making them right.…Some 
of us up here at the fourteenth floor may be very bright; but if that master mechanic in 
Dayton is the wrong man, our decisions might as well be written on water. He converts 
them into performance…. If we didn’t spend four hours on placing a man and placing 
him right, we’d spend four hundred hours cleaning up after our mistake” Peter F. 
Drucker, Adventures of a Bystander (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 280-281. 
Drucker’s extremely sympathetic description of Sloan should be contrasted with that of 
David Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2002).
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Ford who was “anxious to maintain his own primacy in the corporation, 
unconsciously encouraged the situation which blurred the lines of authority 
and set his executives in conflict.”93  Whatever the motivation, one is struck 
in reading the histories of Ford at the executives’ competitiveness and the 
meetings contentiousness. McNamara admitted to his biographer that his 
tenure at Ford was “stressful.”94  There were serious personal rivalries at the 
top levels, initially between Breech and Thornton and subsequently between 
Breech and Crusoe after the latter became head of the Ford division. At least 
one author has suggested that Breech “adopted” McNamara to restrain 
Crusoe who was gaining more and more power as head of the Ford division. 
That was unlikely, but there is no doubt that McNamara’s career developed 
within a highly politicized atmosphere.
Finally, the relationship between the financial staff and other parts of 
the company, especially production, was also markedly different from GM. 
David Halberstam described in detail the deep split between finance and 
production. “Anytime [McNamara] and his disciples wanted to, they could 
make a product man feel inadequate, make him feel he had failed.” This was 
                                                          
93 Collier & Horowitz, op. cit., p. 238. In this regard the younger Ford’s style was not that 
far removed from his grandfather’s. As Douglas Brinkley has written, “A certain degree 
of unrest had always circled through management ranks of the Ford Motor Company. 
Insecurity fostered achievement in Henry Ford’s view.” Brinkley, op. cit., p. 290.
94 McNamara required “extensive dental work to relieve [his] head pain from bruxism.” 
Shapley, op. cit., p. 59.
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an attitude widely held by the finance staff. Donald Frey, a Ford engineer 
who later became chief executive of Bell & Howell, recalled that “with few 
exceptions, operational types — the people in sales, manufacturing and 
engineering — were considered dummies, inarticulate and not very 
bright.”95
The Thornton group disbanded shortly after the arrival of Breech and 
Crusoe; it had never made sense to establish a small cadre, especially one so 
talented, within a larger executive group.96  McNamara then began his 
individual career on the finance staff: first, as senior financial analyst, then 
Assistant Director of the Planning Office, and ultimately as Director of 
Financial Analysis from 1946 until 1949. During these three years 
McNamara, along with Miller and Lundy, worked under the direction of 
Crusoe to develop a financial reporting system that could answer three basic 
questions: how much did a Ford car cost? How did these costs compare with 
Ford’s competitors, especially Chevrolet? And how could production costs 
be reduced? 
                                                          
95 David Halberstam, op. cit., p. 213; most of his evidence is anecdotal, but consistent 
with what we know about McNamara; see also, Byrne, op. cit., p. 367.
96 The policy committee of the company decided to disband the Thornton group in June, 
1946 but delayed implementation until the reorganization plan was complete in the fall of 
that year.
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Amazingly, these were new questions for the company. At the “old” 
Ford, costs were not considered since Henry senior took total responsibility 
for the financial aspects of any decision. Early in his tenure, Crusoe received 
a proposal from an executive and asked “How much is that going to cost?” 
“Mr. Crusoe,” replied the official, “we don’t talk about costs around here.” 
“I have news for you,” replied Crusoe, “From now on you’ll begin talking 
about them.”97  With his knowledge of cost control Crusoe was a first-class 
mentor for the three whiz kids. He was a bear on costs well known for his 
description of the automobile business as a “nickel and dime business…a 
dime on a million units is a $100,000,” he would say. “We’ll practically cut 
your throat around here for a quarter.”98  One of Crusoe’s major 
accomplishments was to introduce the concept of “project control” that 
required an extended financial analysis of the cost of any initiative that 
extended beyond a year. McNamara, Miller, and especially Lundy — who 
remained in Finance during his more than 30 years with the company —
continued working on the financial reporting and control system that dealt 
with issues far more complicated than the basic cost questions they initially 
                                                          
97 Nevins, op. cit., p. 328.
98 Collier & Horowitz, op. cit., p. 241.
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faced. By 1960, Miller could boast that Ford’s system was better than 
GM’s.99
The Whiz Kids: McNamara front row extreme right, Tex Thornton in middle
When Crusoe moved to head of the Ford Division in 1949, McNamara
became the Controller of the company. The position of controller in 
American industry had gradually changed in the 1930s and 40s acquiring 
considerable authority. Before World War II, controllers were principally 
charged with ensuring that the company’s financial records were complete 
                                                          
99 Interview Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill with Arjay Miller, January 11, 1960, 
Ford Archives Acc 975, Box 1, p. 5.
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and accurate for the annual audit. In addition, the controller might help with 
the preparation of the company’s budget. After the war, however, the 
financial departments of large corporations were increasingly populated by 
graduates of business schools who had been exposed to advanced accounting 
techniques and the value of statistical collection and analysis — as 
McNamara himself had been by Ross Walker at Harvard. Furthermore, the 
war itself had demonstrated, not only to professional soldiers but to 
businessmen, the value of statistical control. Brehan B. Somervell, head of 
the Army Service Forces, for example, was using statistical control 
techniques to “manage the enormously complex problem of supplying an 
army spread around the world.”100 As Thornton Bradshaw would write, 
“Controllership represents one of the most important organizational 
developments in American business during the past half-century.101
The importance of the controller was reflected in a noticeable trend 
beginning in the 1960s to promote individuals from the financial side of 
companies to the position of chief executive officer. This was especially true 
in the automobile industry e.g., Ford: McNamara (1960); Arjay Miller 
                                                          
100 Charles R. Shrader, History of Operations Research in the United States Army, Vol. 
II: 1961-1973 (Washington D. C.: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for 
Operations Research, 2008), p.18.
101 Thornton F. Bradshaw and Charles C. Hull, eds., Controllership in Modern 
Management (Chicago: Richard  D. Irwin, 1949) p.11; see also Dudley E. Brown, “The 
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(1963-69); GM: James Roche (1967-71); Richard Gerstenberg (1972-74); 
Thomas Murphy (1974-80); Roger B. Smith (1981-90); Chrysler: Lynn 
Townsend (1962-70); John Ricardo (1970-79). Coincidentally, the 
ascendancy of financial executives as heads of the country’s major 
automobile companies, coincided with the overall decline of the American 
automobile industry.
McNamara recognized the potential power of his new position and 
used the authority he had to its full extent. He locked horns with his old 
boss, Crusoe, over several issues. For example, the Finance department 
under McNamara had determined that “for reasons of economy” the 
company should scrap its long-established V-8 engine and offer only V-6s 
like GM’s Chevrolet. It would allegedly save an estimated $16 per engine. 
Crusoe objected strongly, polled many of the Ford dealers, who had not been 
included in the finance division’s calculations, and found out that if the V-8 
cost them no more than an additional $100, it was an important sales tool. 
McNamara’s recommendation did not pass.102
Crusoe’s struggle with McNamara to modernize more of the 
company’s plants was of even greater significance. Although the ’49 Ford 
had sold well and was instrumental in the revitalization of the company, it 
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had significant quality problems. Ernest Breech, whose project it was, had 
been told by one of his close friends that the car was a “piece of junk.” 
Allegedly it had close to 8000 defects, the most serious of which was the 
poor fit of the body shell onto the chassis. This permitted dirt and moisture 
to enter the passenger compartment.103  Crusoe knew that the only way to 
improve quality was to modernize the plants, but McNamara and his staff 
kept delaying. Finally, after a three-year struggle, the issue came up for a 
final decision; Crusoe recommended modernization and McNamara
recommended further study. The younger Ford finally decided in favor of 
modernization. According to Halberstam’s account, Ford stated, “Bob, the 
problem with you is you always want to study things. You never want to do 
anything.”104 This ploy was clearly tactical, however, because throughout 
McNamara’s career, first at Ford and then later in government, he was a 
decisive executive.
Although McNamara became known as “Mr. No” when he was 
controller, he was not exclusively a negative voice. He developed the 
                                                          
103 Nevins, op. cit., pp. 343, 351; According to Lacey, “Ford cars were notorious rust 
traps and rattlers in the 1950s, and this was reflected in their secondhand value. New 
Fords might sell around the same price as a new Chevrolet, but on the used-car lot they 
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cit., p. 511. 
104 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 238. Unfortunately, Halberstam gives no citation for the quote. 
He did not interview McNamara, Breech, or Crusoe but did interview Ford. The quote 
has an air of authenticity, however. See also Collier & Horowitz, op. cit., p. 244.
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concept of “revenue control.” The financial controls that Donaldson Brown 
had installed at GM concentrated on the earnings efficiency of fixed and 
working capital. McNamara’s analytical mind probed the components of 
working capital more deeply to identify the items that made the greatest 
contribution to gross profit. What he discovered was that some of the highest 
grossing items were accessories like heaters and radios (now standard in all 
vehicles) that were becoming increasingly popular. The goal became how to 
increase the sales of those items, essentially a promotional issue, while 
integrating their manufacture and installation in the most efficient manner, 
essentially a systems analysis issue. 
In 1953, McNamara left his staff position and assumed line 
responsibility as Assistant General Manager of the Ford division under his 
old boss, Lewis Crusoe.  It was a major move and clearly indicated he was a 
contender for top leadership. When Crusoe was promoted in 1955 to Group 
Vice-president of the Car and Truck Group, McNamara took his old job as 
head of the Ford Division, and when Crusoe suffered a serious heart attack 
in 1956 (aggravated if not caused by the combination of the Edsel debacle 
and the disappointing performance of the Mercury division), McNamara
became Group Vice-president. Thus, McNamara had had both staff and line 
responsibility when he was named president of the company on 
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November 9, 1960. However, at heart, he remained a “financial man,” for 
even as he rose higher in the hierarchy at Ford and his responsibilities 
increased in scope, he maintained his analytical, numbers-driven approach to 
problem solving.
As head of the Ford Division and Group Vice-president, McNamara’s 
most important contribution was finding distinct niches of purchasers within 
the automobile market.105  GM had built its line of automobiles by 
segmenting the car market on the basis of “price and product.”106  Basically, 
it presupposed that as customers ascended the financial ladder, there would 
be a GM vehicle appropriate for their new financial status. In other words, 
“start with a Chevy, end with a Caddy.” Ford could not offer the same range 
of vehicles, but McNamara reasoned that within the financial boundaries of 
the Ford division’s models, there were subgroups that valued different 
qualities in an automobile. If such groups could be identified and were of a 
sufficient size, it made sense to design a specific model for the group. The 
younger Ford gave credit to McNamara for Ford’s progress in this area; “the 
whole growth of the automobile industry over the last [twenty] years is due 
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to some thinking of McNamara’s with respect to the proliferation of car lines 
… [that] have given a broader choice in the market place.”107
The most conspicuous example of segmentation during McNamara’s 
time at Ford was the development of the Falcon. Stimulated in large measure 
by the success of the Volkswagen “Beetle,” McNamara was convinced that 
there was a market for an inexpensive, reliable, sturdy, economical, no frills 
automobile that provided basic transportation. After all, he reasoned, market 
research showed that many Beetle purchasers were lawyers, doctors, and 
other relatively affluent customers who could afford more expensive cars, 
but rejected the big, powerful tail-finned gas guzzlers of the 1950s. Such an 
automobile may have reflected his conviction that cars were primarily 
methods of transportation, but it also distilled the results of thousands of 
product research interviews with foreign car owners, dealers, and 
prospective customers.108
                                                          
107 Henry Ford II interview with David Lewis, April 18, 1980, p. 57, as quoted in 
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After a three-year struggle, McNamara was given the green light. As 
it turned out, the Falcon was light as a result of its unitized body, economical 
to operate, and had simple lines along with an absence of chrome or 
expensive options. It sold for less than $2,000. Although the automobile 
critic, Charles Barnard, derided McNamara and the car (“he wore granny 
glasses and he put out a granny car”), it sold well from its introduction with 
total sales just under 1.5 million before it was retired.109  The car had found a 
niche as McNamara intended.110
What was the core of McNamara’s management style? 111  Essentially, 
it was based on a highly disciplined, hyper-rational approach to the 
manufacture and sale of automobiles — an approach that relied heavily on 
                                                          
109 White, op. cit., pp. 296-306; Brinkley, op. cit., p. 595; Byrne, op. cit.,, p. 343.
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much help in his one memoir or his reflections in the film Fog of War. Virtually all the 
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quantitative analysis to achieve efficiency and made full use of intellectual 
intimidation to gain acceptance for his positions. John Byrne recalled: 
He demanded numbers for everything from the capacity 
of Ford’s network of dealers to the effectiveness of advertising. 
‘I know what the capacity of the assembly system is, but I don’t 
know what our dealer capacity is’, Bob complained.
‘The dealer body doesn’t have a capacity’ one of his executives 
told him. ‘Oh, yes it does’ Bob would insist.112
McNamara reinforced the advantages of his superior analytical mind 
and retentive memory by an intimidating personal style. The “treatment” 
would begin at the first interview. According to Fred Secrest, who worked in 
finance under McNamara, he would give potential recruits “exactly two and 
a half minutes for a job interview. If the candidate talked too long, failed to 
come straight to the point, or tried to chat, McNamara refused to see him 
again, even if he was hired by someone else in the company.”113
This was not only an interviewing technique, for McNamara was 
aloof from his professional colleagues throughout his career. At Ford he 
seldom socialized with other executives apart from occasional gatherings 
with his fellow Whiz Kids. This sense of distance from his colleagues was 
accentuated by his decision to live in Ann Arbor, about 35 miles from his 
office at Dearborn, rather than in the automobile communities of Bloomfield 
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Hills and Grosse Point. He maintained the same pattern when he was 
Secretary of Defense. With few exceptions, he interacted with other 
department of defense colleagues, all of whom he had personally chosen, 
only during working hours. And he made no effort to encourage office 
events that might create a collegial spirit that is so common in industry and 
government.114
McNamara exhibited a social awkwardness on ceremonial occasions 
as he climbed the leadership ladder. He was noticeably uncomfortable with 
Ford dealers when they gathered with the top executives either at Dearborn 
or other locations to learn about new developments in the company. 
Similarly, as Secretary of Defense he was called upon to make ceremonial 
appearances before a variety of groups. As one of his colleagues described 
such a visit, “he would enter the room, scout where the exits were located 
and then make sure there was always a clear line between himself and the 
exit.”115
It was not as if he were unaware of this trait. He once had an 
uncharacteristic exchange with his assistant, Gerry Lynch, during which he 
asked Lynch’s opinion about his future at Ford. Lynch told him he could go 
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to the top except for two qualities, “First, you don’t have sensitivity to 
people as people. Second, you’re never wrong.” McNamara responded, 
“With respect to people I agree that I don’t have the rapport that some of the 
backslappers do. I can’t help it. With respect to never being wrong, I just 
analyze every situation with all the tools at my command. When the decision 
is made that’s it.”116
Yet, McNamara was not entirely anti-social or withdrawn. He and 
Margy had a strong circle of friends in Ann Arbor, mostly academic and 
professional, that they saw regularly. During his tenure as Secretary, he was 
one of the two cabinet officers who were part of the Kennedy entourage that 
regularly attended events like Robert Kennedy’s group discussions at 
Hickory Hill.117  After he left the Pentagon, he widened his circle of friends 
to include journalists, former government officials, and some who had 
served with him at Defense. With no work-created barriers, he was able to 
accept them as companions and lower his guard. 
It is difficult to know what drove this quite conscious behavior. It may 
have been a corollary of the principle that he espoused in his Millsap speech 
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that “vital decision making must remain at the top” and that anything that 
breaks down the barrier between the decision maker and those who must 
carry out his decisions can compromise his authority.118  It may be, as a 
number of observers have suggested, that his behavior was a further attempt 
at “control” that personal interaction with subordinates might weaken.  
McNamara was probably most intimidating at meetings. In the first 
place he was superbly prepared. “He prepared for [Executive Committee] 
meetings,” Collier and Horowitz have written, “as if cramming for PhD 
orals, pouring over minutes of previous meetings to see who had said what 
and arming himself with arguments for the forthcoming debates.”119  In 
addition, McNamara had a marvelously organized mind that broke down 
issues systematically and permitted him to argue, even off-the-cuff, as if he 
were following an outline. At the end, the conclusion seemed ineluctable. 
This intellectual discipline was reflected in his personal habits. He started 
the business day promptly at 7:30 after his 35-mile drive from Ann Arbor 
and worked steadily until he left the office at 6:30 pm. He would seldom 
                                                          
118 cf. Alfred P. Sloan. Sloan once told Drucker, “Some people like to be alone…I don’t. 
I have always liked good company. But I have a duty not to have friends at the work 
place. I have to be impartial and must not give the impression of having favorites. How 
people perform, that is my job; whether I approve of them and the way they get their 
achievement done is not.” Peter Drucker, Adventures of a Bystander, (NY: Harper & 
Row1979), p. 284. Unlike McNamara, however, Sloan was not awkward with dealers or 
employees at GM for whom he had no direct responsibility
119 Collier & Horowitz, op. cit., p. 248.
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visit the executive dining room in headquarters, the so-called “Glass House.” 
McNamara was also a bear for punctuality. One time before a meeting, his 
staff advanced the hands on a wall clock by ten minutes and then gently 
suggested that he might be late. McNamara did not bite. Without looking up 
from his papers, he simply said, “It’s wrong.”
At work, McNamara had little use for the give-and-take of 
brainstorming sessions or similar problem solving techniques. Meetings 
were called to receive recommendations on how to solve problems and to 
receive instructions. Any proposal was to be reduced to writing, and he 
insisted on at least two alternative suggestions for any but the most routine 
recommendations.120
He was no less disciplined about recreation. If he were preparing for a 
camping trip, Shapley has recorded, he would compute “how many ounces 
and which kinds of food and drink the vacationing group would need and the 
weight and volume of each item. From these figures, he derived charts of the 
goods each man, woman, and child should carry in their backpack … 
[recomputing] the numbers several ways to get the optimal mix.” He would 
                                                          
120 “[McNamara] taught me never to make a major decision without having a choice of at 
least vanilla or chocolate. And if more than a hundred million dollars were at stake, it was 
a good idea to have strawberry too,” in Lee Iacocca, Iacocca (NY: Bantam Books, 1984), 
p. 46.
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then go out to the supermarket to try to match his figures to what was 
available.121  There was very little impromptu in McNamara’s life. 
It was evident that McNamara had a superior will to prevail in any 
debate he chose to conduct. If he decided that the issue was important to 
him, he would, in his own words, bring “all the tools at his command” to 
win the argument. They were formidable tools, and he usually prevailed. He 
was careful to choose his issues, however, because he was highly deferential 
to superiors — not only in manner but in the issues he chose to pursue. If 
Ford and, at least in the beginning, Breech had a firm opinion there is no 
record of McNamara challenging their positions. The most prominent 
example of this deference was his reaction to the decision to build the Edsel. 
McNamara was against the program from the beginning, but rather than 
argue against it, he absented himself from Edsel meetings and sent a 
subordinate with instructions to vote “present” on any issue that came to a 
vote. Today, one can experience that same deference by listening to his 
recorded conversations with President Johnson.
How should one evaluate McNamara as a manager during his 14 years 
at Ford?  For some, the answer is easy. Charles E. Beck, former director of 
business planning at the company, believes “ he…was one of the poorest 
                                                          
121 Shapley, op. cit., p. 138.
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managers of people I ever knew in my life. Bob never reached out to people. 
He felt that once he analyzed a problem and reached a logical conclusion, 
that was it. He forgot that it takes people to make a solution work.”122
A more nuanced analysis suggests a more balanced verdict. A 
manager’s effectiveness must be judged by whether his skills matched the 
needs of the organization he was managing. When McNamara joined Ford, it 
was, in the words of J.R. Davis, long-term chief of sales, “already dead, and 
rigor mortis was setting in.”123  It became profitable in 1947 and remained 
so during McNamara’s entire tenure.
No one would suggest that McNamara was chiefly responsible for this 
record. The main credit should go to Ford himself, who, in McNamara’s 
words, “gave people the opportunity to excel,” as well as Ernest Breech and 
Lewis Crusoe. McNamara, however, along with his fellow Whiz Kids and 
other executives whom Ford and Breech had recruited, were important 
members of the supporting cast. McNamara played an essential role in 
developing the Ford financial control system. He had introduced revenue 
control and refined the concept of “market segmentation” that contributed 
significantly to the company’s success. He had recognized the threat of 
                                                          
122 Byrne, op. cit., p. 248.
123 Nevins, op. cit., p. 294.
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foreign competition and introduced the Falcon as a counter strategy. He had 
not accomplished these initiatives by himself, but he had taken the lead in 
establishing them as company policy.
McNamara was also highly conscious of the responsibility of large 
institutions to society-at-large. In what turned out to be his farewell address 
to Ford executives, he emphasized that it was Ford’s responsibility to engage 
in a “customer-satisfying process rather than a goods producing process.”124
Segmentation was one aspect of that process, but so were other socially 
desirable goals like safety. McNamara was an early leader in encouraging 
greater safety in automobiles. He commissioned the Cornell Aeronautical 
Laboratory to do research on crashes that eventually demonstrated the 
effectiveness of seat belts, padded dashboards, and safety glass. He made 
safety one of the main themes in advertisements promoting the ’56 Ford. 
McNamara was also unhappy about the emphasis on speed promoted by the 
industry through its racing programs. He approached Ed Cole, then head of 
GM’s Chevrolet Division, to try to convince him to join Ford and abandon 
competitive racing. GM refused. 
The picture is not uniformly positive, however. There is little evidence 
that he appreciated the value of quality in automobiles and substantial 
                                                          
124 Greenbriar Speech, November  21, 1960, Shapley, op. cit., p.72-73.
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evidence that he undervalued it. He seemed to consider quality a secondary 
consideration.125  He did little to counter the prevailing market strategy of 
“replacement demand [where] there is always great incentives to try to speed 
up the replacement cycle.”126
Issues like speed, safety, or even customer satisfaction were large, 
abstract concepts that McNamara could embrace without emotional 
involvement. It is in the more elusive areas of “leadership” that McNamara
could be found wanting. He did virtually nothing to build a sense of shared 
purpose and team spirit with those under his supervision. This was in 
marked contrast to Lewis Crusoe who took great pride in his “team” and 
arranged all manner of social and other bonding occasions to develop a 
congenial and cooperative spirit. McNamara would have none of it. We have 
already noted his disregard, bordering on disdain, for the production side of 
the company. His attitude was exemplified by an incident described by 
Charles E. Beck. Beck was charged with eliminating a critical bottleneck in 
a number of stamping plants that could not deliver enough deck lids and 
                                                          
125 One oft-repeated incident involves the slowness of the paint drying ovens. Crusoe 
thought the answer was new larger ovens. McNamara countered with the suggestion that 
that cars be cut in half and then welded together betraying a complete lack of 
appreciation for the stresses on an automobile body. It is surprising that McNamara did 
not appreciate the consequences of Ford’s lack of quality, for although new Ford cars 
were competitively priced with comparable GM models, they brought far less in the used-
car market. 
126 White, op. cit., p. 189.
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fenders for the newly-designed Falcon. With the help of production 
managers who worked sometimes 18 hours a day, Beck and his colleagues 
were able to straighten things out in ten days. He reported back to 
McNamara and asked him “to telephone the divisional manager to thank him 
and his people.” McNamara refused. “No, Charlie … you really have done 
the job. Do you know how many millions it will save the company. You did 
it.” Beck remonstrated and insisted that his contribution had less to do with 
the resolution of the problem than the work of the production crews.  But 
McNamara would not budge.127
Even when he was in charge of the financial staff, there was an 
absence of camaraderie or shared purpose. When they would meet later as 
Ford alumni, having moved on to other companies, they would profess a 
bond that shared adversity inevitably encourages (“McNamara’s boot 
camp,” as one expressed it). Shepard Pollack, a Phillip Morris Vice 
President-Finance, reflected on the 70-80 hour weeks that they experienced 
at Ford, “of the 80 hours, one third were productive. The rest were spent 
protecting your job and politicking.”128
                                                          
127 Byrne, op. cit., p. 249.
128 Marylin Bender, “Ford Alumni Meet,” New York Times, March 27, 1975, pp. 41, 47.
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As he assumed the presidency of Ford, McNamara faced a number of 
significant challenges.129 Some were industry-wide like the generally poor 
quality of American automobiles and the effects of foreign competition. 
Some were company-specific, like the younger Ford’s drinking problem and 
deteriorating marriage. One must also wonder how he would have gotten 
along with his protégé, Lee Iacocca, who was promoted to president of the 
Ford division when McNamara became company president. In the event, 
these would soon become the responsibility of someone else.
                                                          
129 McNamara was very proud of being in his words “…the first president of the 
Company in the history of the Company that had ever been president other than a 
member of the Ford family…” Errol Morris, dir., The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from 
the Life of Robert S. McNamara (Culver City, CA, TriStar Home Entertainment, 2004) 
Lesson #6 “Get the Data”. In fact, McNamara was not the first. That honor belongs to 
John S. Gray, a Detroit banker, who was the Company’s first president 1903-1906; see 
Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, Ford: the times, the man, the company (NY: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1954) pp. 236, 331.
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CHAPTER 2  
THE NEW SECRETARY
I consider the budget nothing more and nothing less than the quantitative 
expression of a plan or a policy. So in developing the budget I propose to 
start with the plan or the policy and translate it into quantitative terms, terms
of benefit and cost.” ~ Robert S. McNamara130
Taking Charge
Only thirty days after being named president of the Ford Motor 
Company, McNamara received a call from Robert Kennedy asking him to 
see his brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver who was in charge of the President-
elect’s personnel recruitment team. Shriver showed up that afternoon in 
Detroit and, according to McNamara, began by offering him Secretary of 
Treasury and when he refused, because he was “unqualified,” offered him 
Secretary of Defense instead. He also declined that post. Shriver then asked 
                                                          
130 Testimony of McNamara before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of 
the Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate August 7, 1961, as quoted in 
Samuel A. Tucker, ed., A Modern Design for Defense Decision: A McNamara-Hitch-
Enthoven Anthology (Washington, D.C. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966), p. 
28.
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him to at least have the courtesy of meeting the President-elect, a request 
McNamara could hardly have declined.131
                                                          
131 The manner in which McNamara was offered a cabinet post by Shriver tells us much 
about the haphazard way the newly-elected administration approached certain matters. 
Kennedy had decided early in the transition that he wanted Robert Lovett, a former 
Defense Secretary and Under Secretary of State, to be his Defense Secretary, Kennedy 
dispatched Clark Clifford, who was working both as his liaison to the Eisenhower 
Administration and as his adviser on personnel matters, to try and persuade Lovett to join 
his administration. Clifford knew Lovett was in poor health because of bleeding ulcers 
and told the President-elect who in turn told him to offer Lovett Treasury if he would not 
accept Defense since the latter position would not be as strenuous. After consulting with 
his doctors, Lovett declined either post but agreed to come to Washington and discuss the 
positions of State, Defense and Treasury with Kennedy. The meeting took place on 
December 1, 1960. During that meeting Lovett strongly recommended McNamara for 
Defense based on his experiences with him during World War II when Lovett was 
Assistant Secretary of War for Air. He also suggested to Kennedy that for Treasury he 
should appoint someone of “national reputation” and mentioned Henry Alexander of 
Morgan Guaranty, John J. McCloy, the head of Chase and Eugene Black of the World 
Bank. A few days later Lovett received a visit from Shriver at his home in Locust Valley, 
New York to go over the names for State and Defense. He recalled that, “On the list for 
Defense were three of the names that I had mentioned to the President, including 
McNamara…I thought McNamara was outstanding among the group and said so….”
Aside from Lovett’s strong recommendation we know that Kennedy had asked Richard 
Neustadt of Columbia, to prepare a memorandum on the qualities necessary for his 
cabinet from an historical perspective. Neustadt’s memorandum dated November 3, 1960 
entitled “Cabinet Departments: Some Things To Keep In Mind” was discussed by 
Kennedy at Hyannisport on November 10; it had little to say about Defense and State 
except that Kennedy should pick someone with whom he could work easily. As for 
Treasury, Neustadt was more emphatic. He pointed out that the Secretary inevitably 
became the spokesman for “banks, investors, their colleagues overseas and their friends 
on the Hill.” Accordingly he argued that the President should select someone who could 
be “an effective spokesman to them. You can gain advantage from that.” (emphasis in 
original) He went on to write:
“But you can scarcely stand to gain unless the man is widely known and 
much respected in those circles. Truman got no mileage out of Snyder’s 
reputation, such as it was….Your chance for net advantage seems to lie in 
a man who both fits the description and transcends it: a Lovett, a McCloy, 
a Dillon; a “Wall Street internationalist,” sophisticated in foreign affairs 
and prepared for “positive government.” Since Treasury is actually a 
major foreign policy post, you would be advantaged further if your man 
had a previous experience in State.” 
(Continued…)
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McNamara had two meetings with Kennedy in early December; 
Robert Kennedy joined the second one. Both Kennedys were clearly 
impressed with McNamara although he had the audacity to proffer the 
President-elect a draft agreement, complete with signature line, which gave 
him authority to pick all of the civilian appointees in the department. It was,
even without a prenuptial agreement, understood by all parties that 
McNamara would have complete authority over the civilian staffing of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(…Continued)
One should also bear in mind that one of the key issues facing the new administration 
was the balance of payments problem and the serious outflow of gold from the United 
States. Kennedy knew that his appointment to Treasury should be someone who had the 
confidence of foreign bankers and government officials. To appoint a totally unknown 
young inexperienced auto executive with no international experience would have been a 
grave mistake.
Apparently, the offer of either of two cabinet positions came from Shriver. According to 
Shriver’s biographer,  “Shriver knew that getting McNamara to express serious interest 
was a long shot…[so] why not expand McNamara’s options—and flatter his ego—by 
offering him the choice of two positions, both defense and treasury?” Shriver allegedly 
ran the idea by the president-elect from a pay phone in the Detroit airport.  Kennedy 
approved it, potentially jeopardizing the careful work that had gone into the vetting of 
two of the cabinets most important positions.(Scott Stossel, Sarge: The Life and Times of 
Sargent Shriver (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2004) pp183-184). Robert Dallek 
argues that it did not make much difference to Kennedy which position McNamara 
accepted since he “…would be of small consequence.” The president-elect was much 
more concerned with finding a nominal Republican who would convey the signal that the 
new administration would not be “radical” in its policies. Robert Dallek, Camelot’s 
Court: Inside the Kennedy White House, (NY: HarperCollins, 2013), pp.85, 88.  The
other sources for this footnote are: Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President (NY: Random 
House, 1991),  pp. 327-339; Interviews with Robert A. Lovett on July 20 and August 17, 
1964; Oral History Project, John, F. Kennedy Presidential Library,  JFK Library records, 
pp. 6-9, 14-16, 23-25; Richard E. Neustadt: Memorandum on “Cabinet Departments: 
Some Things to Keep in Mind,” November 3,1960, John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential 
Papers, John K. Kennedy Presidential Library, Transition Files, Box 1072.
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department.132  At the conclusion of the second meeting McNamara agreed 
to become Secretary of Defense and was immediately introduced to the press 
corps that was waiting outside Kennedy’s Georgetown home.133  Editorial 
comment was favorable, if tentative, as the press knew little about him or his 
approach to defense matters.134
There were many reasons to be tentative. He was the least known of 
all Kennedy’s cabinet picks. Compared to previous secretaries he was very 
young, only 44. He came from an industry that had sent two executives to 
Washington and their experiences in high government positions had been 
problematic.135  He had not served the apprenticeship in the department that 
all but two of his predecessors had, and his communication and political 
skills were untested. In addition, there was little evidence of his thinking 
beyond issues relating to the automobile industry. He may have read 
                                                          
132 McNamara would use this authority to reject two names suggested by the White 
House: Franklin D. Roosevelt as Secretary of the Navy and Joseph Keenan, an AFL-CIO 
Vice-President as Assistant Secretary for Manpower. The first rejection the President-
elect accepted philosophically, (“I guess I’ll have to take care of him some other way”) 
McNamara, In Retrospect p.19. The second caused Kennedy more problems and required 
the intervention of the new Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg, to placate the angry 
AFL-CIO President, George Meany.
133 Kennedy was the first President-elect personally to introduce his cabinet nominees 
although without the elaborate staging that is the current custom. Previously, nominees 
had been announced by press release. See Arthur Krock,  “The Grand Inquisitor had a 
Song for It” NY T Dec. 27, 1960 p. 28.
134 See: NYT, Dec. 14,1960,  p.38 and Dec. 31,1960, p.16; Washington Post, Dec. 14, 
1960, p.14, Chicago Tribune, Dec.16, 1960, p. 14.
135 viz. William Knudsen and Charles E. Wilson, both from GM.
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Kierkegaard, but there was no indication of how he felt about the position of 
the U.S. in the world, the military-industrial complex and similar issues 
relevant to his new position; nor were these issues explored in his 
confirmation hearing. He appeared to be a businessman selected to bring 
greater efficiency and “a businesslike approach” to the federal government’s 
largest department. Would his admitted analytical abilities and brilliance be 
up to the task? 
McNamara began to prepare for his new post immediately. There was 
no leave-taking from his former associates at Ford. As he expressed it, “I 
never went back to Ann Arbor, except to get a shirt.”136  McNamara had 
only 37 days before assuming office, and if one makes allowance for the 
family winter skiing trip to Colorado, what he accomplished in that short 
time was remarkable and set the tone for his entire tenure as Secretary. He 
had to assemble a staff, familiarize himself with the department and prepare 
for his own confirmation without the aid of an office, secretary, staff, or 
transition funds. 
He moved into the Ford Motor Company suite at the Shoreham and 
began calling on his contacts, members of the defense establishment, to 
provide names of potential senior staff. He also relied heavily on the services 
                                                          
136 Shapley, op. cit., p. 87.
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of a group of talent scouts whom Shriver had assembled. According to 
Harris Wofford, Shriver’s deputy, the group offered its services to each of 
the incoming cabinet appointees. Most attended one session and took down a 
few names. Not so in the case of McNamara. He badgered the group 
relentlessly, asking for more and more names, more and more and 
information. Finally, to allow them to focus on their other responsibilities, 
they assigned Adam Yarmolinsky to help McNamara. By the date of the 
Inauguration McNamara had chosen virtually all his senior staff, and even 
more remarkable by contemporary standards, most had been confirmed. It 
was certainly the most talented group hitherto assembled at DoD and 
arguably at any other federal department. As the authors of the Department’s 
official history note, “It turned out to be a group remarkable both for its 
compatibility with the secretary’s leadership style and for the quality of its 
individual administrative talents. They were a mixture of experienced
officials [Nitze and Gilpatric] and pragmatic intellectuals [Hitch and 
Brown]…”137
                                                          
137 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa and Edward J. Drea, The McNamara 
Ascendancy, Vol. V. of The History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Series, 
(Washington, D.C., Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), p.7; The 
group included inter alia: future secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Health, 
Education, and Welfare.
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Equally impressive was the speed with which McNamara grasped the 
principal national security issues facing the new Administration. He clearly 
was reading and absorbing everything that he could get his hands on about 
defense policy and the problems facing the department. His deputy Roz 
Gilpatric told interviewers that toward the end of December McNamara had 
suggested that they independently draw up a list of major issues facing the 
department and then exchange them. Gilpatric, who had served on Senator 
Stuart Symington’s Committee on the Defense Establishment, and as 
assistant secretary and then undersecretary of the Air Force in the Truman 
Administration, as well as on the 1958 committee assembled by The 
Rockefeller Brothers to report on the shortcomings of U.S. defenses, “felt 
confident that [he] could bring to McNamara’s attention matters that he 
would not have known about during his years at Ford.” Gilpatric handed 
McNamara a list of about forty items, but McNamara handed him a list that 
contained most of Gilpatric’s “and many more.”138
Eugene Zuckert, the Secretary of the Air Force designate, reported 
that at McNamara’s first staff conference on January 18, 1961, two days 
                                                          
138 Letter Roswell I. Gilpatric to Thomas Morris dated January 16, 1978. Thomas Morris, 
a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics solicited the views 
of 36 individuals who had worked with McNamara about his management style for a 
paper he was to deliver at the Academy of Management. Their responses are in the OSD 
Historical Office and will henceforth be referred as “Morris Project” see p. 119, footnote 
190. 
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before he was to assume office, he “had achieved such a grasp of the job at 
hand and had organized his conclusions so thoroughly that at a meeting with 
most of his incoming team, he was able to delineate many of the initiatives 
which would command major attention during the coming months.” Two of 
those initiatives were “his desire to integrate the Service Secretaries into the 
Defense operation as an arm of the Secretary of Defense rather than having 
the Service Secretaries function only as advocates of their own Military 
Departments” and the need for “systematic [budget] programming activity 
within OSD.”139
The effort paid off. Twelve days later in his State of the Union, 
President Kennedy instructed McNamara:
[t]o reappraise our entire defense strategy—our 
ability to fulfill our commitments---the 
effectiveness, vulnerability and dispersal of our 
strategic bases, forces and warning systems---the 
efficiency and economy of our operation and 
organization—the elimination of obsolete bases and 
installations—and the adequacy, modernization and 
mobility of our present conventional and nuclear 
forces and weapon systems in the light of present 
and future dangers.
140
                                                          
139 Recd. of meeting. Brig. Gen. George S. Brown, January 18, 1961, folder SecDef Staff 
Meetings Feb-April 1961, Box 10, AFPC & SecDef Meetings file, ACC 77-0062; 
Kaplan, op. cit., p. 536.
140 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John f. Kennedy, Vol. 1 
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 24.
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In other words, Kennedy wanted a complete review of the nation’s defense 
posture and he wanted preliminary answers by the end of the next month. 
McNamara was ready. He had established four task forces to examine major 
problems of the department with very short deadlines and had issued any 
number of specific questions directed at specific officials (the so-called “96 
trombones”) also with specific deadlines. These were military-economic or 
cost-effectiveness studies comparing ways of achieving a wide range of 
national security objectives, involving costs as well as objectives and 
anticipating the kind of analysis called for by the future PPBS.141  When 
asked by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, whether he 
would be able to meet the President’s deadline, Carl Vinson on February 23 
offered a crisp “Yes Sir” which evoked both awe and disbelief.142
From the outset, McNamara made it clear by his actions that he had 
decided, possibly even before he assumed office, that DoD was too 
decentralized and that he needed to establish centralized control and 
authority over the Department in the Office of the Secretary.  Even though 
                                                          
141 The task forces were:  (1) requirements for strategic forces and continental defense; 
(2) the conduct of limited war; (3) a review of the entire field of research and 
development; and (4) the effectiveness and usefulness of foreign and domestic bases and 
installations. The time tables for the studies were February 13 for the first two and 
February 20 for the other two. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 14, 79.
142 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 12, Stewart Alsop, “Master of the Pentagon” Sat. Eve Post, August 
5, 1961, p. 21.
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he had spent his entire business career implementing the M-form business 
model developed by General Motors, right from the beginning he rejected 
the practice of his predecessor, Charles E. Wilson, who had “looked at the 
service secretaries as the head of operating divisions, just like the Chevrolet 
Division of G.M. with OSD staff being the corporate headquarters, like the 
General Motors corporate staff.”143  McNamara never spelled out what 
business model he considered appropriate for the Department.  This was 
probably wise since it would have given critics a target to shoot at.  Instead 
we must look at how he actually managed the Department.  As we shall see,
that meant his personal involvement in a huge number of decisions which he 
usually made on his own.
This new centralized decision-making style occasioned a good deal of 
grumbling from the military services, but McNamara was able to deflect it, at 
least in the beginning, by his many requests for information coupled with 
short deadlines. They had the effect of throwing potential adversaries off 
balance. It made it much more difficult for coalitions to form in opposition.
The Joint Chiefs (hereafter JCS or Chiefs) got the message quickly. The Chief 
                                                          
143 Two of McNamara’s predecessors, Charles E. Wilson and Neil H. McElroy, who had 
served as heads of GM and Proctor and Gamble respectively, were familiar, as was 
McNamara, with Sloan’s M-form of business structure. To a certain extent, each of them 
had managed DoD with this model in mind; McNamara followed a distinctly different 
model.
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of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke, was particularly impressed. He was,
however, set to retire in August, 1961 and viewed the new Secretary with 
more equanimity than its Chairman, General Lyman Lemnitzer, who resented 
the extent to which McNamara and his civilian aides “with no military 
experience at all” became involved in what had hitherto been strictly military 
judgments.144
In addition to centralizing authority, McNamara made it clear that 
unlike his predecessors he intended to become personally involved in 
developing a common defense strategy. This was not an opportunity 
available to his immediate predecessors who served under a president whose 
military experience was unrivaled in American history; no previous 
Commander-in-Chief could match the breadth and depth of Eisenhower’s 
military experience. It included staff service in Washington, field command 
of multi-national forces during WWII and later NATO. “His Army career 
had afforded him extraordinary insight into the problems of military 
planning at the highest level and of the relationship between military and 
other elements in the formulation of national policy.”145 He needed no 
advice on strategy from his secretary of defense.
                                                          
144 Kaplan, op. cit., p 11.
145 Ibid., p. 6.
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Kennedy’s experience, on the other hand, was only as a junior naval
officer. He assumed office during a period when there was a general bi-
partisan dissatisfaction with the current strategy of “massive retaliation” 
which was the Eisenhower administration’s stated policy and was generally 
accepted by the military. Accordingly, Kennedy expected his secretary of 
defense to provide advice on military strategy as well as to manage the 
Pentagon. 
McNamara benefited from this opportunity. But, even had his 
predecessors had this opportunity, it is unlikely that they would have seized 
it as McNamara did. McNamara became much more involved in the 
deliberations of the JCS. Wilson and McElroy met informally with the 
Chiefs as a body. McNamara’s immediate predecessor, Gates, began the 
practice of meeting regularly with the Chiefs but “did not involve himself in 
details.”146  Involving himself in the details was precisely what McNamara
routinely did in virtually anything he undertook.
McNamara immediately tried to capture some kind of control over a 
department that he referred to as a “jungle.”147 Wisely, he chose not to 
attack the problem by making fundamental structural changes. During the 
                                                          
146 Ibid., p.11.
147 Shapley, op. cit., p. 103 citing T. H. White, “Revolution in the Pentagon,” Look 
Magazine, April 23, 1963; Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 314.
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presidential campaign Kennedy had drawn together a blue ribbon panel 
headed by Senator W. Stuart Symington to study the management of DoD
and offer recommendations.148 The committee’s report would have 
constituted a fundamental change in the entire defense establishment.149  
Recognizing that such dramatic change would involve an extended struggle 
with Congress, McNamara did not pursue the issue. Instead, he publicly 
stated that the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 gave him sufficient 
authority to manage the Department.150  He was able to accomplish much of 
what the Symington Report recommended through the adoption of the 
Planning, Programming and Budget System he installed — an innovation we 
will consider below.151
                                                          
148 NYT, September 15, 1960, p.25.  The panel included Symington, a former Secretary 
of the Air Force, and establishment figures like Clark M. Clifford, Thomas K. Finletter, 
Marx Leva, Fowler Hamilton and Roswell L. Gilpatric. All of them, except Hamilton,
had extensive experience in defense matters.
149 To name just two: they recommended that all appropriations be made to the Secretary 
of Defense rather than the services and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be abolished and 
replaced by a chairman of a new military council composed of  “senior military officers  
permanently separated from their services.” See Kaplan, op. cit., p.18.
150 The Act was an initiative of President Dwight Eisenhower who felt strongly that the 
Secretary of Defense needed increased authority and that the authority of the service 
secretaries with their parochial interests should be curtailed. The president viewed the 
Act as a major legislative achievement of his second term, see Robert J. Watson, Into the 
Missile Age, Vol. IV, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (Washington DC, 
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), Chapter IX.
151 “…once he had the Planning, Programming, and  Budgeting machinery in place…he 
moved control of the service programs into his [McNamara’s] office without having to 
merge the services into OSD, as recommended by the Symington Committee.” Glass 
OSD Interview, Oct. 28, 1987, p. 52.
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McNamara moved quickly to consolidate some operations that could 
be organized to serve all services. He consolidated the department’s 
intelligence activities into a new office called the Defense Intelligence 
Agency which reported directly to him. Several months later he established 
the Defense Supply Agency, which also reported directly to him, to “take 
over wholesale management of common supplies.” Although this initiative 
had some support in the Senate, especially from Senator Paul Douglas of 
Illinois, it provoked considerable congressional opposition, especially in the 
House.152  Critics charged that McNamara was initiating a master plan to 
unite all defense activities in the office of the Secretary. In the end, he 
prevailed and the Agency became a reality in 1962.
McNamara’s influence would eventually be felt in virtually every 
defense-related issue that arose during the Kennedy-Johnson 
administrations.  There were many of them: recasting of the nation’s nuclear 
policy — so-called “massive retaliation” - development of an enhanced 
capacity to wage non-nuclear war at graduated levels of intensity (“flexible 
response”), development of policies and techniques to give the Secretary 
greater control over the department’s activities, including military operations 
( e.g., the Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP); consolidation of 
                                                          
152 Morris OSD Interview, p. 6.
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responsibilities for department-wide activities like intelligence and supply, 
reshaping the budget process, initiating a cost reduction program, and of 
course, dealing with international crises that arose during his tenure — Laos, 
Bay of Pigs, Berlin, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam.
We begin with his first major venture — a new budget process.
The Budget and the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS)
Consistent with his prior experience McNamara knew that the most 
effective way to assert control over a large, diversified organization was 
through the budgetary system.153 The sprawling defense establishment at the 
time comprised 3.7 million military and civilian personnel and consumed 
almost 50% of the federal budget. His first order of business was to 
determine what changes to make to the Eisenhower Fiscal Year 62 budget 
that was before Congress. The Bureau of the Budget had given him a very 
short timeline as all changes had to be submitted by February 20 only a 
month after he had taken over. Based in large measure on the 
                                                          
153 Although the most significant consequence of PPBS was the control it gave the 
secretary over the services and their force structures, the system helped mitigate another 
problem. As Harold Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering under 
McNamara and a future secretary of defense told OSD historians, “It was already 
foreseeable in Gates’s day that if you projected the costs of all the programs that had been 
started, there wasn’t going to be enough money to do them.” Brown OSD Interview, 
April 4, 1990, p. 3.
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recommendations of the four task forces he had established, the new 
administration would eventually increase the Eisenhower budget by $5.6 
billion, a 12% increase. Although the greater part of the increase was 
prompted by the Berlin crisis, the new administration signaled its differences 
from its predecessor by speeding up construction of Polaris submarines, 
increasing funds for conventional non-nuclear forces, including increased 
airlift capacity, and coming down squarely in favor of missiles as the 
nation’s primary offensive weapon instead of manned bombers. These initial 
steps were not, however, part of any systematic review of the budget. It was 
a “quick and dirty look” without the benefit of systems analysis or program 
budgeting. 
When McNamara assumed his position there was already considerable 
dissatisfaction with the defense budgeting process. Congressman George H. 
Mahon, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriation, 
had been complaining for years and had urged then Secretary McElroy to 
look at the defense budget in terms of military missions. The former Army 
Chief of Staff, Maxwell D. Taylor, echoed that suggestion. Because each 
service prepared its budget in isolation, with no side-by-side comparison, the 
budget did not keep “fiscal emphasis in phase with military priorities…[so 
that] It is not an exaggeration to say that nobody knows what we are actually 
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buying with any specific budget.”154 As McNamara would subsequently
write:
…the three military departments had been 
establishing their requirements independently of 
each other. The results can fairly be described as 
chaotic: Army planning, for example, was based 
primarily on a long war of attrition; Air Force 
planning was based, largely on a short war of 
nuclear bombardment. Consequently, the Army was 
stating a requirement for stocking months of 
fighting supplies…while the Air Force stock 
requirements for such a war had to be measured in 
days, and not very many days at that.155
How had the situation come about? It was the product of two basic 
policy decisions of the previous administration. Eisenhower believed that the 
strongest weapon the U.S. had in its defense arsenal was a strong economy. 
“We must achieve both security and solvency. In fact, the foundation of 
military strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is more the 
Soviet goal than an America conquered on the battlefield.”156  Alarmed by 
rapidly escalating defense costs, Eisenhower, like Truman, placed an 
absolute ceiling on defense expenditures — in his case 10% of GDP.157  
Merely imposing a ceiling did not reduce costs, however. How could 
expenditures be reduced?  That led the Administration to develop what it 
                                                          
154 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (NY: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 70.
155  Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (NY: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 90.
156 As quoted in Glen H. Snyder, “The New Look of 1953” in Schilling, Hammond, and 
Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961), p. 
469.
157 In Truman’s case the ceiling was one-third of the federal budget.
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termed “The New Look,” a strategy that relied on the use of nuclear 
weapons in a wide range of circumstances, decreasing the need for 
manpower. The budget ceiling and the New Look had the perverse effect of 
encouraging each of the armed services to emphasize their strategic 
missions, whether it be retaliation or defense against a Soviet attack. The Air 
Force and Army were in competition for the air defense missions and the 
procurement and deployment of the air defense system. The Air Force and 
Navy were in competition for the retaliatory missions. Each of the services 
was promoting programs that were duplicatory of or even inconsistent with 
those of the other services. 
This rivalry was exacerbated by the way the services prepared their 
budgets. Each service prepared its budget using a so-called “requirements 
approach.” The essence of such an approach is “…that there are certain 
absolute needs, stated in terms of military hardware and manpower, which 
must be met regardless of cost, if the security of the United States is to be 
guaranteed in some absolute sense.”158  It would be a bold Secretary who 
                                                          
158 Enthoven and  Rowan, “Defense Planning and Organization,” Public Finance: Needs, 
Sources, and Utilization (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), as quoted in Clark A. 
Murdock, Defense Policy Formation: A Comparative Analysis of the McNamara Era
(Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1974), p. 48; see also Paul Y. Hammond, “A 
Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision-Making in the McNamara 
Administration,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1968, pp. 57-
69.
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would flatly contradict a military service if the “requirements approach” 
were the frame of reference. Indeed, at one point when testifying before the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary McElroy virtually invited 
Congress to decide the competition between the Bomarc (Air Force) and 
Nike-Hercules (Army) missile systems.159  From a political standpoint it was 
much easier to allocate a given dollar amount to each of the services and 
permit the service to decide how to spend the money. This is what the 
Eisenhower administration did.
Kennedy had made it clear that he wanted to scrap the arbitrary limits 
placed on the military budget by his two predecessors. He instructed 
McNamara to develop whatever force structure was required to meet U.S. 
military requirements but at the lowest possible cost. It was an open-ended 
charge that required a highly-disciplined programming and budgetary 
approach to successfully counter the “requirements approach” favored by the 
services. Fortunately, McNamara had hired an individual who had been 
thinking for years about the problem and thought he had the answer.
                                                          
159 The following colloquy took place: “Senator Stennis: “… I am beginning to think that 
the Department of Defense would welcome a congressional decision on this matter and 
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time.” Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
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Charles J. Hitch, the DoD Comptroller, was a 51-year old former 
Rhodes scholar who had been the first American Rhodes to be asked to join 
the Oxford faculty.160  During the war he had done “operations research” on 
the effects of British bombing raids over Germany in an Anglo-American 
section of the OSS called Research and Experiments Department No. 8. 
Invited to a conference in 1947 by the recently-established RAND 
Corporation, he was recruited and persuaded to head its new economics 
section. There he pioneered a systematic interdisciplinary approach to help 
understand the implications for a national defense policy of new, rapidly 
changing, and very expensive technologies. Hitch was an example of a new 
breed of defense intellectuals who possessed impeccable academic 
credentials and were employed by defense-funded nonprofit organizations to 
analyze military issues. RAND was the best known of such institutions but 
there were many others such as The Center for Naval Analysis or The 
Institute for Defense Analysis.161
                                                          
160 Clark Kerr, former President of the California university system told the following 
story. When Hitch entered the room prepared to answer questions for his doctorate 
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Hitch had co-authored a book in which he argued that the new defense 
technologies had become so expensive that it was necessary to adopt an 
entirely new approach to defense planning that involved a far greater 
emphasis on the efficient allocation of the nation’s resources. The first step 
in such a system was to develop a budget “in terms of programs that perform 
tasks and yield end products… rather than actions that yield objects or 
intermediate products. In other words, rather than argue about funding for a 
B-70 bomber or an Atlas missile (“intermediate products”) on the basis of 
the properties each possesses — as was the current practice — DoD should 
focus on the task each was designed to accomplish, i.e., deter a Soviet 
nuclear strike. In light of that mission, the second step was to compare “all 
the relevant alternatives from the point of view of the objectives each can 
accomplish and the cost which it involves.”162  In the words of Lawrence 
Kaplan, “it represented not only a different way at looking at budgets but a 
different way of thinking about the functioning of the military 
establishment”; from the standpoint of the military services it was what 
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Galambos, The Creative Society and the Price Americans Paid for It (NY: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2012).
162 Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics Of Defense In The Nuclear 
Age (NY: Athaneum, 1969), pp. 49, 118, see, in general 133-158. McNamara was 
acquainted with Hitch’s work and referred favorably to “program budgeting” at his first 
staff conference on January 18, 1961.
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Andy Grove of Intel would call a Strategic Inflection Point, “…a major 
change takes place in the competitive environment.”163  For an executive 
such as McNamara who had spent his professional life weighing such issues 
as the trade-off between weight and fuel efficiency, the argument had 
immediate appeal. 
McNamara told Hitch to prepare a new budgeting program that would 
redress the problems of the existing system and Hitch did so in the spring of 
1961. Since the new system would require a substantial revision of existing 
procedures, Hitch confined his presentation to only one program for the 
FY63 budget — strategic forces — on the assumption that it could be 
gradually phased in for the entire DoD budget over an eighteen-month 
period. “At the end of the presentation McNamara, who had remained 
unusually quiet, banged his fist down on the table and announced, ‘That’s 
exactly what I want,’ [but] one change ‘do it for the entire defense program. 
And in less than a year.’”164
                                                          
163 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 72; Andrew Grove address before the 1998 Annual Meeting of the 
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Analytical Framework
Conceptually, the new system, PPBS, was not difficult to understand.
The first step was to break down the nation’s defense activities into mission 
areas and support systems called “program packages.” “A “program 
package” was an interrelated group of “program elements” that must be 
considered together because they support each other or are close substitutes 
for each other. The unifying element was a common mission or set of 
purposes.”165   There were initially ten such programs (subsequently reduced 
to eight): e.g., Strategic Retaliatory Forces, Continental Defense Forces, 
General Purpose Forces, Airlift, and Sealift and so forth. 
These program packages were, in turn, broken down into “program 
elements” which were the basic building blocks of each package. They were 
either commonly recognized military units (e.g., Army battalions or Air 
Force wings) or their modern missile equivalents. For example, the program 
elements for the Strategic Retaliatory Force, whose mission was to deter a 
Soviet attack against the U.S. and retaliate in the event of one, had the 
following program elements: Aircraft (B-52, B-58, B-47 and RB-47, KC-
135, RC-135, KC-97, B-70), Land-based ballistic missiles (Atlas, Titan, 
                                                          
165 C.J. Hitch, “A Proposed Programming and Budgeting Process for FY 1963,” April 17, 
1961 Historical Office OSD.
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Minuteman H&D, Minuteman mobile, Thor, Jupiter) sea-launched ballistic 
missiles (Polaris, Poseidon, Trident). The program package also included 
command, control, and communication and headquarters and command 
support elements. There were at least 1000 program elements in the U.S. 
defense system.
Comparing the cost effectiveness of each of the program elements in 
the defense system required a tremendous amount of information, including: 
a description of each element’s mission, equipment command and control 
system, manning requirements, force structure, delivery schedule for major 
equipment, activity rates (e.g., flying hours), communication requirements, 
training, basing and alert “concepts,” and service-wide support. Since the 
purpose of the exercise was not just to produce a one-year budget but to 
generate a five-year defense plan (FYDP), the information needed to cover 
this time period needed to be included.166  It was not readily available as the 
services had not kept cost figures by program elements and this required
estimations in many cases.167  The attempt to provide data and studies in a 
timely and accurate manner to satisfy the insatiable demands of the Office of 
                                                          
166 See memoranda from Charles Hitch, dated May 13, 19, and June 6, 1961 Historical 
Office, OSD.
167 For the difficulties in determining “cost” see G. H. Fisher, “Costing Methods” in 
Analysis for Military Decisions, E. S. Quade ed., (Santa Monica, CA, The Rand 
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117
the Secretary of Defense virtually overwhelmed the services and was 
certainly one of the reasons that McNamara turned to personnel in his own 
office for appropriate studies.
Determining “effectiveness” was even trickier than determining cost. 
There was, of course, a large element of judgment in determining 
effectiveness in any system, but it was especially difficult in military 
matters. As Hitch himself pointed out, “reliable quantitative data are often 
not available, and even where such data are available there is usually no 
common standard for measuring military worth.”168  What was required was 
a new analytical technique, and that was supplied by systems analysis. 
There is a wide perception that McNamara brought quantitative 
analysis into the Pentagon and military planning. Actually, the military 
services had been using some quantitative techniques since WWII in the 
form of “operations research.” Operations research, in general, “accepted 
specified objectives and given assumptions about the circumstances and 
attempted to compute an optimum solution, for example the optimum level 
of spare parts for a weapon system or the optimum number of ships in a 
convoy and optimum spacing.” It emphasized applied mathematics such as 
                                                          
168 Shrader, op. cit., p.; on McNamara’s dissatisfaction with the information and briefings 
supplied by the services see Clark A. Murdock, op. cit., pp.77-84.
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linear programming, queuing theory, search theory, and inventory theory —
a collection of mathematical techniques that maximized or minimized 
something subject to constraints.169
Systems analysis was different; it asked different questions and used 
different quantitative techniques familiar to economists like marginal 
product and marginal cost. Systems analysis analyzed alternative objectives 
and explored their implications. It was concerned with giving the decision-
maker a menu of choices representing different mixes of effectiveness and 
cost so that he could make his choice. Systems analysis questioned 
objectives:
The operations-research analyst is usually trying to 
use mathematics, or logical analysis, to help a client 
improve his efficiency in a situation in which 
everyone has a fairly good idea of what “more 
efficient” means. The systems analyst, on the other 
hand, is likely to be forced to deal with problems in 
which the difficulty lies in deciding what ought to 
be done, not simply in how to do it.
170
Lt. General Dwight E. Beach expressed the thought more colloquially:
Operations Research seeks to find better ways of 
using existing mouse traps, while systems analysis 
is concerned with whether to build mouse traps or 
to use some other method of mouse destruction and 
how many mouse traps or other mouse destruction 
devices of what type should be acquired.171
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In theory, systems analysis provided the secretary of defense with the 
information he needed to compare the cost and effectiveness of one program 
element (e.g., a B-52 wing) with another program element (e.g., Titan 
missiles) designed to perform the same or similar missions. On an even 
higher scale, the system would permit a comparison of the cost and 
effectiveness of an entire program package (e.g., strategic offensive forces) 
with another major mission (e.g., strategic defensive forces), although 
comparisons on such a scale presented a formidable array of intangibles and 
uncertainties.172
No previous secretary of defense had demanded information in such 
detail on a department-wide basis. The military chiefs must have known that 
what had previously been a rivalry between services would become in part a 
rivalry between program elements and that the Secretary would have 
information about costs and effectiveness for each program element far 
exceeding the information any other Secretary ever had and in some cases 
more than the services had themselves. An energetic Secretary — and the 
entire defense establishment knew that McNamara was energy personified 
— had the tools to make decisions about weapon systems and force 
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120
structures at a micro level. For a turf-conscious organization like DoD, and 
for its services, it must have been unnerving.
In a certain sense, systems analysis was not only a new analytical 
technique but a new language. 
When “the standard economic model of efficient 
allocation” employed in cost effectiveness studies 
was defined as “the maximization of a quasi-
concave ordinal function of variables constrained to 
lie within a convex region,” a communications gap 
opened between the systems analysts and those 
combat veteran officers unfamiliar with the 
language.173
Until the services were able to catch up, as they eventually did, the 
Office of the Secretary had a virtual monopoly on personnel who understood 
the system. Hitch had hired as his deputy to run the Office of Systems 
Analysis, Alain C. Enthoven, another Rhodes Scholar, who was recognized 
for his brilliance as well as his abrasiveness. Enthoven filled his office with 
personalities similar to himself — many of them young, inexperienced, 
intellectually arrogant young men who were dismissive of military 
experience and protocol. It was natural that the military came to resent these 
young “Whiz Kids.”
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The office grew quickly. Originally, it had six analysts, and they were 
not part of the decision-making process but engaged in a few broad 
theoretical studies. Because of McNamara’s dissatisfaction with the studies 
and briefings he received from the military services, he turned increasingly 
to Enthoven’s office, which grew to some 50 analysts by 1964 and over 200 
by 1968. Even more significant, it became a central player in the 
determination of force structures and weapons systems in the department.174  
In many respects the relationship between the system analysts in the 
Secretary’s office and the military came to resemble the tension that existed 
between the financial and production departments when McNamara was at 
Ford.175
Procedure
PPBS encompassed not only a new analytical technique but new 
procedures, and as Hitch once remarked, in a bureaucracy “…it is much 
easier to change policy than to change procedures.”176  As we have seen, 
during the Eisenhower administration each service would prepare its own 
budget based on the amount it was allocated by the Secretary. Those 
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budgets, in theory, should have been based on two documents:  the Basic 
National Security Plan (BNSP) prepared by the National Security Council)
which “defined the basic objectives of U.S. policy and indicated the military, 
diplomatic, political and economic courses of action needed to advance 
those objectives.” The second document was a Joint Strategic Objective Plan 
(JSOP) prepared by the Chiefs that established the strategic and logistic 
plans to implement the BNSP. In practice it did not work effectively because 
the BNSP was written so broadly that it did not resolve the most important 
contested strategic issues.177  The services could, and did, interpret the BNSP 
to enhance their own positions, and the result was not a coherent plan but 
“three separate plans added together and called a joint plan [so that] there 
was in effect no definitive guidance on how to structure the armed 
forces.”178
When Hitch began to implement PPBS he believed that general policy 
guidance would still be provided by a revised BNSP that was in 
preparation.179 That was not to be. The Kennedy administration decided to 
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scrap the BNSP, and diminish the role of the National Security Council as 
well as other aspects of Eisenhower’s institutional approach to defense 
policy formation. Neither the President, McNamara, nor the Chiefs wanted 
to be tied down to predetermined policies when dealing with the many 
potential military contingencies they hypothesized. 
This created a void that McNamara quickly filled by becoming, apart 
from the president, the major voice of the administration on matters of 
foreign policy relating to military issues. The vehicle was an annual “posture 
statement” he prepared along with Henry Glass that he sent to Congress each 
year with the department’s budget requests. It was McNamara’s sweeping 
view of the international scene and its military implications. What had 
previously been the product of the deliberations of the president and the 
heads of the relevant major departments and agencies was now the product 
of the Secretary of Defense and his staff. McNamara ran his statements by 
Rusk for comment, but there is little indication that the State Department 
made a serious effort to shape the document. 
For budgetary purposes, the posture statements took concrete shape in 
a foundational document called the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). It 
contained the programs approved by the Office of the Secretary with 
estimated costs projected over a five-year period. In theory, the FYDP was a 
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document that could be revised at any time. PPBS contemplated an iterative 
process in which the services could suggest changes to any program at any 
time and, if approved, the FYDP would be modified accordingly. In practice, 
however, these changes occurred overwhelmingly during the annual 
budgetary process.  
That process began almost two years before the budget was to be 
submitted to Congress with the JCS and the Secretary’s office independently 
preparing their submissions. In May, the Chiefs would begin preparation of a 
JSOP based on their own assessment of the military threats facing the 
country and the force levels required to meet them. It would appear ten 
months later, but McNamara paid little attention to it because he did not 
share the Chiefs’ pessimistic assessments of the threats to the country. 
While the Chiefs were preparing their document, McNamara’s own 
office was preparing its Major Program Memorandum (MPM) for each 
mission area, or program package.180  Although the MPM was theoretically a 
planning document, it actually became the programming document setting 
forth the Secretary’s position on major force levels, the rationale for choices 
among alternatives and recommended force levels and budgets. Not 
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unexpectedly, the Planning and Programming phases of the PPBS had been 
conjoined because it was difficult to separate programming from planning 
since the two were so interdependent.181
Around February, McNamara would review the JSOP and MPMs and 
provide guidance to the services for preparing Program Change Requests 
(PCR) to the FYDP. The services usually submitted about 300 Change 
Requests virtually all of which were turned down by the Office of Systems 
Analysis. 
In the meantime, the Chiefs were reviewing the MPM; their 
comments were sent to McNamara in July and resulted in a series of 
meetings between them and McNamara to discuss their objections. But, as 
Korb suggests, “McNamara was not interested in the JSC opinions…he used 
these meetings to attempt to persuade the Chiefs to accept his position or 
divide the JSC.”182 McNamara was not interested in Sloan’s “averaging up;” 
he wanted to win. It was a technique he had used successfully at Ford and 
would continue at DoD.  
This process, which had now lasted approximately 16 months, was 
only preliminary to the actual preparation of the budget. The formal budget 
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process began in September when the services were asked to prepare their 
budgets in traditional categories (i.e., military personnel, operations, and 
maintenance, and so on, and not by program packages). In his budget 
directives McNamara would emphasize that the services were not bound by 
any arbitrary ceilings; the nation could afford whatever was necessary for its 
defense. The services obliged. Presumably, in order not to “lose face,” each 
service submitted budget proposals far in excess of what was called for by 
the MPMs; on average Korb estimated that the services submitted budgets 
that exceeded by 30% what was eventually approved. During October and 
November, the Comptroller’s office would review these budgets and issue 
some 600 suggestions of possible savings which McNamara would review 
along with the budgets. The process ended in December, when the Secretary 
and the Chiefs met with the President, and the Chiefs had a final opportunity 
to persuade the President to overrule McNamara’s decision. They seldom 
succeeded.
PPBS never worked precisely as designed. Under the time pressure of 
the budgetary process slippages occurred in the planning and programming 
phases and in Program Change Decisions. Decisions which should have 
been made before the budgets were prepared were frequently made only 
after. Such a procedure naturally gave rise to the suspicion that McNamara’s 
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budgets only reflected preconceived notions rather than products of a new 
and rational process.183  All in all, however, the new system had a major 
impact not only on how the budget was prepared but on the entire 
management of the department.
Consequences
What were the consequences of PPBS?
First, the system went a long way towards solving the long-standing 
problem of aligning strategy, plans and programs with the annual budget so 
that the costs of each mission could be determined and funds could be 
allocated in accordance with military priorities. General Maxwell Taylor had 
complained that under the old system, “we didn’t know what we were 
paying for.” Under PPBS the administration knew what it was paying for. 
Many in the military services disagreed with the priorities, and how they had 
been determined, but they were out in the open.
Second, the new system gave an additional impetus to service 
unification. Since the Department of Defense had been established in 1947, 
the Secretary had struggled to resist the centrifugal forces that drove each 
service to pursue its own priorities. The Defense Reorganization Act of 
                                                          
183 Shrader, op. cit., p. 65.
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1958, enacted during the second Eisenhower administration, provided the 
institutional structure to bring the services into a more cooperative 
relationship. PPBS provided the mortar to hold that structure together. As 
McNamara would write:
…the new planning system allowed us the achieve a 
true unification of effort within the Department 
without having to undergo a drastic upheaval of the 
entire organizational structure.
184
Third, the new system provided the Secretary and his immediate staff 
with a formidable amount of information that gave them unprecedented 
knowledge of the department’s workings. McNamara unquestionably knew 
more about how DoD functioned than any of his predecessors. Initially, his 
deep knowledge made a favorable impression on Congress, the media, and 
other members of the executive branch. Carl Vinson, chair of the House 
Armed Services Committee, was lavish in his praise.185
But superior knowledge, and the attitude that frequently accompanies 
it, can be a double-edged sword, especially when dealing with Congress. 
The author had a personal experience with that phenomenon when he was a 
young attorney in Washington. His assignment was to brief McGeorge 
                                                          
184  McNamara, The Essence of Security, op. cit., p. 95.
185 Although he disagreed with him on a number of issues, Carl Vinson the Chairman of 
the Senate Armed Forces Committee would say on his retirement, “Robert S. McNamara
is not just a good Secretary of Defense, he’s the best we’ve had’” Washington Post, Jan 
1, 1965 p. A4.
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Bundy, then the head of the Ford Foundation, on what had previously 
occurred in hearings Wright Patman (D-TX) was conducting on possible 
changes to the Internal Revenue Code relating to private foundations, like 
the Ford Foundation. The Foundation had made some questionable grants, 
and the feeling in Congress was that there should be some restrictions on the 
hitherto virtually unfettered discretion of such organizations to support 
grantees. Bundy, whose mind and demeanor were not unlike McNamara’s, 
was ready. He had answers to every question even before the interrogator 
had finished. He created the impression that the issues raised were not 
worthy of congressional attention and that the issue did not respect the 
proper role of tax-exempt institutions like the Ford Foundation in a 
democratic society. As a spectator, the author could sense the atmosphere in 
the hearing room change from respect, to skepticism, and finally to alarm. 
The witness was just too quick, too sure of himself.186
Superior knowledge also makes it difficult for officials to equivocate. 
“I don’t know” or “I’ll have to look into that” are useful phrases in 
Washington. That was, of course, not the style of the Kennedy 
administration. When McNamara did equivocate, even if it was in the 
                                                          
186 Congress did impose some restrictions on private foundations in the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969, but they were far less severe than originally proposed.
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national interest for security purposes, many in the media thought he was 
lying. This destroyed trust.
Fourth, PPBS gave McNamara and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense unprecedented control over the composition and missions of the 
armed services. McNamara’s office could make decisions at as low a level 
as a battalion, although there is no evidence that it ever did.187 The new 
system shifted authority from the services and the JSC to McNamara and his 
office. Many decisions that had been formerly made on the basis of military 
experience and judgment were under McNamara now subject to a new 
standard of cost-effectiveness and were made by civilians using analytical 
techniques which the military had not yet mastered. Understandably, this 
caused considerable resentment. It was also not good management. As 
Secretary Melvin R. Laird would write in his 1971 Military Posture 
Statement:
Over centralization of decision making in so large 
an organization … leads to a kind of paralysis. 
Many decisions are not made at all, or, if they are 
made, lack full coordination and commitment by 
those who must implement the decisions.188
                                                          
187 A battalion is composed of 500-1200 military personnel usually commanded by a Lt. 
Col.
188 FY 1971 Military Posture Statement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1970), p.8.
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Probably the most important criticism of McNamara’s centralized system 
was “lack of coordination and commitment.” Initially, the military resisted 
systems analysis because it was new and denigrated their experience. To a 
large extent, this can be explained by the rapidity with which McNamara
required its implementation. Eventually, as the services added their own 
systems analysis sections and the Secretary’s office had a chance to work 
more closely with their military counterparts, what was initially rejected 
became accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Although particular 
aspects of PPBS were challenged, the military came to accept the principles 
of quantitative analysis and applied the technique not only to weapons 
procurement but even to tactics.189
One consequence of PPBS that has not received much comment, is 
how much of McNamara’s time it took. McNamara was an extremely hard 
worker leaving the house at 6:45 each morning and frequently not returning 
till eight in the evening, often with work to do at home. He was also able to 
process figures and arguments very quickly. Nevertheless, as he participated 
in the PPBS process, he found himself increasingly involved in minutia. He 
was actively involved in the MPM process, Program Change Decisions, and 
                                                          
189 Shrader, op. cit., p.56. For example, the Navy established an OP 96 office under 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to conduct systems analysis studies for the service. For the 
easing of tensions, see Richard Fryklund, “‘Whiz Kids’ are Mellowing,” Washington 
Star, October 19, 1962, p. 7F.
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Budget Savings suggestions of the Comptroller’s office. Korb estimated that 
McNamara made “about 700 budgetary decisions annually.” Was this a good 
use of his time?  In his memoir, In Retrospect, McNamara would write:
One reason the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations failed to take an orderly, rational 
approach to the basic questions underlying Vietnam 
was the staggering variety and complexity of other 
issues we faced. Simply put, we faced a blizzard of 
problems, there were only twenty-four hours in a 
day, and we often did not have time to think 
straight.190 (emphasis supplied)
We shall turn to the Vietnam War in the final chapter. It is unlikely 
that if McNamara had spent less time on the budget it would have materially 
altered the course of that conflict because, as we shall see, he had no firm 
grasp of the situation in that distant country and never developed a strategy 
that had any chance of success. But at the very least we might have expected 
the author of the annual “posture statement” reflecting basic U.S. 
foreign/military policy to have devoted substantial time to reflecting on the 
role of the U.S. in Southeast Asia and on the implications of the new 
doctrine of “flexible response”. That he did not do so was at least in part due 
to his decision to become so deeply involved in the budgetary process. 
What happened to PPBS?  Initially, it became a rage in the Johnson 
administration. At a news conference on August 25, 1965 the President 
                                                          
190 Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect (NY: Random House, 1995), p. xxi.
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announced “a very new, very revolutionary system of planning and 
programming and budgeting throughout the vast federal government.” 
Shortly thereafter, the Budget Director, Charles Schultze, issued instructions 
directing all major departments and agencies to establish a “Central Staff for 
Programming and Policy Planning accountable directly… [to the 
department/agency head].” The new system never took hold, however, for 
reasons Hitch himself identified: lack of trained personnel, the difficulty of 
defining objectives, the problem of interdependencies, and, finally, political 
considerations.191
Matters have been different at DoD. Fifty years later, PPBS still 
remains the framework for developing the budget and for the acquisition of 
weapon systems. It has been modified, of course. For example, the Nixon 
administration gave the Chiefs the responsibility to design force levels and 
limited the Office of Systems Analysis to evaluation and review of those 
plans. No longer could they initiate their own.192 The system has also 
                                                          
191 Notes of Charles J. Hitch entitled “Management and Economic Analysis in Large 
Organizations,” prepared for a seminar, March 9, 1977, in the files of Deborah Shapley. 
For a highly critical view of PPBS, especially in nonmilitary agencies and departments 
see, Leonard Merewitz, The Budget’s New Clothes: A Critique of Planning-
Programming-Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 
1971).
192 Enthoven, How Much is Enough, p.334; John I. Moore, “Defense Report/Military 
Planners Muscle in on the role of the Defense Department’s ‘Whiz Kids’”, 1970 CPR 
National Journal, p. 2643.
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become much more decentralized. The Secretary can still intervene when 
appropriate, but does not generally do so in the ordinary budget process. In 
part, this is because many of the more successful Secretaries have recruited 
experienced managers as their deputies to manage the department, like 
David Packard (HP), Donald Atwood (GM), and Charles Duncan (Coke), so 
that he can focus more directly on policy. All in all, however, PPBS has 
proved to be one of McNamara’s lasting achievements.
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CHAPTER 3  
WORKING FOR MCNAMARA
I figured that I worked a year and 
a half for a year’s pay. ~ Henry Glass, Special Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense (1965-1969)
In his Millsaps speech near the end of his tenure as Defense Secretary, 
Robert McNamara reflected on the fruits of “successful management.” He 
concluded that it was “a mechanism whereby free men can most efficiently
exercise their reason, initiative, creativity, and personal responsibility.” That 
is a large claim and one wishes that at one time he might have articulated in 
some comprehensive fashion the factors he considered essential to 
managerial success.  He did not do so, but on various occasions he suggested 
three elements he considered important. 
First, there is activism. Soon after he became Secretary, and 
frequently thereafter, he was fond of espousing his activist impulses. He 
would tell interviewers:
The role of public manager is very similar to the 
role of a private manager; in each case he has the 
option of following one of two major alternative 
courses of action. He can either act as a judge or a 
leader . . . I have always believed in and endeavored 
to follow the active leadership role as opposed to 
the passive judicial role.
193
                                                          
193 McNamara, op. cit., p. 23.
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Second, good managers develop a skill that can be applied to any 
organization. Management requires no special sensitivities, or experience 
presumably because it deals with general principles that are valid across the 
board and are not dependent on time or place.   In an interview with Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. in April, 1964 he told the historian:
Whether one is administering a large religious body 
such as the Catholic Church, or a large industrial 
organization such as Ford Motor Company, or a 
large educational institution such as Harvard, or a 
governmental department such as the Defense 
Department, the administrative problems are very 
much the same. They are simply the problem of 
organizing a group of people to move toward a 
common objective, and to continue to move toward 
it and not away from it.
194
This lumping together of the Catholic church, Ford, Harvard and The 
Defense Department is quite remarkable. It demonstrated an insensitivity to 
history, organizational culture and psychology and is the apotheosis of 
managerialism.
Finally good management is hierarchical, very much top down. As he 
expressed it in his Millsaps speech, “[v]ital. decision making must remain at 
the top”195
                                                          
194 Papers of Robert S. McNamara, Library of Congress Part I, folder 110, interview with 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., April 4, 1964, p. 16.
195 See pp. 3, 79, supra.
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McNamara’s managerial philosophy did not take into account the 
need in all large institutions not only for “vital” decisions at the top but mid
and low-level decisions as well. In McNamara’s Pentagon a huge number of 
decisions had to be funneled through the Secretary’s office for approval, and 
as a result the majority of Defense Department personnel were not given 
personal responsibility for substantive decision making. Even McNamara’s 
top aides worked within a formalized communications system which stifled
creativity and offered few opportunities for seizing initiative. McNamara’s 
centralization of authority may have been an appropriate response to the 
Defense Department he inherited, an organization debilitated by the 
uncoordinated, redundant and competitive programs adopted by the three 
services. On the other hand, his inability to delegate, or even respect those 
who did, made it impossible for him to institutionalize the very principles he 
held up as a managerial ideal.
In addition, his insistence that managerial competence does not 
require an appreciation of the particular values, traditions and training of 
others who are part of the institution created a difficult working environment 
for many of his subordinates and nurtured continuing hostility between 
military and civilian personnel of the Department.
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This chapter explores McNamara’s management primarily through the 
eyes of his subordinates and colleagues, many of whom recorded their 
impressions in retrospective interviews collected by the historians from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office. Thomas Morris, a 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, 
collected further recollections for a paper he delivered on McNamara at an 
annual meeting of the Academy of Management. In preparing his paper, 
Morris wrote to 36 of McNamara’s colleagues, soliciting their views on his 
managerial style; most responded.196  Many of the individual respondents 
were laudatory in their accounts of McNamara’s leadership, which is 
unsurprising given that they were civilians whom McNamara had selected 
for their positions; they owed their careers to him in some respects. Morris 
as a result wrote a glowing assessment of McNamara’s managerial skill, 
which we will examine more closely at the close of this dissertation. Yet, 
relying on the same sources — while also leavening them with more critical 
testimony — this chapter considers McNamara’s stated managerial goals 
                                                          
196 Thomas Morris’s paper entitled “Robert S. McNamara, A Giant in Management” is 
referred to hereafter as “Morris Presentation.” The letters he received that supported his 
presentation are identified as “Morris Project”. Both sources are in Box 27, Biographical 
Files, Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD Historical Office), Washington, 
DC. 
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and models and contrasts them with his actual practices in organizing the 
Department’s work and communication routines. 
Centralization
In considering McNamara’s tenure as the chief civilian officer of the 
Defense Department, it is important to recall that his predecessors in the 
secretaryship had not done much to develop the power, authority or 
influence of the position. The Defense Department itself was quite young as 
an organization in January 1961, having been established only 14 years 
before. It had existed under two presidential administrations and been led by 
seven secretaries, five of whom had served less than two years, and another 
for only a few months longer. Only Charles E. Wilson had served a more 
substantial period of 4½ years. None of the secretaries, with the exception of 
Marshall (who served only one year), had national prominence.197  The Joint 
Chiefs, on the other hand, included many men with national or even 
international reputations:  men like Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins and 
Ridgeway (Army), Nimitz and Burke (Navy), Spatz, Vandenberg and 
LeMay (Air Force). They had earned their reputations during World War II 
                                                          
197 The department had been headed by three investment bankers: Forrestal, Lovett and 
Gates, two businessmen: Wilson and McElroy, one lawyer, Johnson and one soldier, 
Marshall. As to Wilson’s management, see Watson. op. cit., p. 7.
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and constituted a formidable force. The balance of power in setting policy 
and running the Defense Department’s budget lay with the Joint Chiefs.198
The military service branches retained very distinct identities and 
priorities, and for most of this period their senior representatives governed 
the Defense Department as, at best, a loosely-coordinated conglomerate, and 
at worst a chaotic assortment of rivals. The services operated more or less 
independently with the Secretary of Defense as a mediator or referee when 
disputes arose. Previous secretaries achieved only indifferent success in their 
attempts at refereeing conflicts. 
Superficially, the department appeared to be operating along the lines 
of a modern M-form business corporation, based on the GM model we have 
described in Chapter 1. It decentralized certain elements of management 
while retaining top-down coordination. In substance, the Department lacked 
almost all the model’s key characteristics. The overall goal of the M-form
system was to free top personnel from lower-level management 
responsibilities in order to allow them to focus on long-range corporate 
goals, coordination between divisions and overall efficiency. This involved 
delegation to division managers who became responsible for implementation 
                                                          
198 Of course, when Dwight Eisenhower was elected president an entirely new dynamic 
developed. For an overview of strategic planning during the Eisenhower administration, 
see: Raymond Millen, “Cultivating Strategic Thinking: The Eisenhower Model” 42 
Parameters Journal, No. 2 (Summer 2012) pp. 56-70.
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of general corporate strategy and managed day-to-day operations. It had 
become, by 1950, the standard form of corporate governance for twentieth 
century U.S. industrial enterprises. 199 The M-form had replaced an older U-
form in which tasks like sales, procurement, personnel, and production were 
managed in a central office operating on a corporate-wide basis. 
Some in the Department, like Henry Glass, thought that previous 
Secretaries had tried to manage the Department on the M-form model with 
the service secretaries acting like division heads.200 In practice, however, the 
service secretaries and chiefs of the armed forces were not actually 
comparable to division heads or corporate staff. Instead, these military 
leaders maintained divergent strategic and procedural priorities, and 
delegating management responsibilities to them did not result in 
coordination or in common standards of accountability or measures of 
progress.  In addition, each of the services had a formidable support group in 
Congress and among the general public, making them a powerful political 
force.
                                                          
199 See in general Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand; The Managerial Revolution In 
American Business (Cambridge: Belnap Press, 1977); Abraham Zaleznik, The 
Managerial Mystique: Restoring Leadership In Business (NY: Harper & Row, 1989), Ch. 
6.
200 See footnote 140, p. 88, supra .
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In fact, the M-form would not have been a good fit for the Defense 
Department’s managerial needs. That system worked at GM and other 
profit-oriented businesses because each segment of the organization was 
focused on and judged by how it contributed to the same goal—overall 
profitability. At Defense the success of each component was not judged by 
an overall single standard, but rather by how successful each service was in 
acquiring funds. More money meant more personnel, newer and more 
sophisticated equipment, and higher status in the Defense establishment. 
Such a reward system encouraged rivalry between the services and 
frequently unnecessary duplication as, for example, in the pursuit by each 
service of its own missile program independent of the other services.  
Neither did the pre-1961 Defense Department match the older U-form 
model which avoided redundancies and reduced conflicts by handing over 
control to a small, relatively coherent decision-making hierarchy. Because of 
objections from the services, the Defense Department had been unable to 
consolidate activities that in a profit-oriented enterprise would have been the 
responsibility of a corporate headquarters. For example, the Defense 
Department had four intelligence agencies, one for each branch of the armed 
services, and each had its own estimates of the force levels and intentions of 
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the Soviet Union as well as other potential enemies.201  The services 
campaigned for funding based on the divergent predictions of their 
intelligence systems, which made it very difficult to allocate resources 
amongst them rationally. 
The Defense Department which McNamara inherited, then, was 
inefficiently decentralized and its policy and procedural decision-making 
powers lay chiefly in the hands of military personnel who were managing 
them poorly; the situation would have encouraged any trained and 
experienced business manager to attempt centralization, and McNamara
needed little encouragement. It was clear from the outset of his secretaryship 
that “…he ran the business himself. He was the spark plug and lynch pin of 
the whole operation.”202  
He demonstrated his determination to take the lead in project 
management even before he took office. In early January 1961 he and the 
more experienced Henry Glass were considering what amendments to the 
Eisenhower defense budget the Department should recommend to Congress. 
McNamara decided that he would appoint three task forces (subsequently 
expanded to four) with short deadlines to examine major issues like strategic 
                                                          
201 Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 298-302.
202 Glass OSD Interview, Oct. 28, 1987, p. 16.
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forces, limited war forces, and research and development which we have 
mentioned in the previous chapter. These task forces would make 
recommendations to him within the parameters laid out by their guiding 
work statements. Glass volunteered to go back to his office and prepare a 
statement of work for each of the task forces, as would have been the 
customary way to proceed in the DoD at the time. “Let’s do it now,” 
McNamara said. Glass “was stunned for [he] could not think that fast,” as he 
later told interviewers.   McNamara called in a secretary and, with 
department deputy Gilpatric and Glass present, dictated drafts of the
statements of work. The three then polished the drafts and the directives 
were issued the next day. The incident, trivial in itself, revealed a new 
management style had arrived at the Pentagon characterized by McNamara’s 
speed, decisiveness and willingness—or even impatience—to master the 
details personally and to ensure that his office would immediately take 
primary responsibility for dictating directives.203
That new style of fast, inquisitive, hyper-detailed management was 
even more forcibly apparent in the flurry of specific questions that 
McNamara sent to individual officials about defense policy — the so-called 
96 trombones. These queries served notice to the defense bureaucracy that 
                                                          
203 Ibid., Oct. 23, 1987, pp. 45-46.
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there was a new management team in place, that it was conducting a 
fundamental review of national defense policy and that the central figure in 
that review would be the secretary himself. For example, he asked the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Lyman Lemnitzer, to provide by May 15 “a 
statement of the quantitative requirements for strategic nuclear weapon 
delivery vehicles based on target analysis and survivability factors.” Dubbed 
the “76 trombones” after a popular song in the musical “Music Man”, 
McNamara’s list would eventually exceed 100 inquiries.204 The derisive 
nickname did not mean that Department personnel didn’t take the list 
seriously. CNO Arleigh Burke understood its implications. He told his staff 
that McNamara “is going to be very decisive and he is going to be very 
quick. He catches on very fast…He is going to get impatient.”205
It was quickly clear that McNamara would have no hesitation about 
reordering the Department of Defense to better meet his ideals of efficient 
management, but it was less clear what elements of his business education 
and previous work experience would guide the Department’s new form:  
would McNamara try to centralize according to older U-form business 
                                                          
204 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 14; McNamara’s inquiries should not be confused with his 
successor, Donald Rumsfeld’s notorious “snowflakes”, a potpourri of musings, thoughts, 
and directions. 522 of them can be found at 
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205 Ibid., p. 11.
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models, or attempt the coordinated delegation of M-model management, or 
combine elements of both systems into some hybrid organizational 
approach? We have seen that neither the U- or M-forms seemed likely to 
transfer smoothly onto the unique landscape of the Defense Department. 
Nonetheless, McNamara himself gave the impression that the M-form had 
won his allegiance and liked to portray his Defense Department as either 
based upon or progressing toward that model. 
There may have been a political element to this characterization, with 
McNamara deliberately downplaying the real levels of centralization he 
sought and seeking to convince hostile subordinates, particularly alienated 
military officers, that they had a continuing role in M-form management that 
would not be so different from their services’ traditional management. Paul 
Ignatius, then Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and 
Logistics, tells of the time that McNamara was trying to persuade the army 
to abandon its traditional structure of technical services (Ordnance, Signal, 
Engineers, etc.) in favor of a unified Army Material Command. The move 
was controversial within the Army and strongly opposed by the powerful 
Ordnance Corps. Unexpectedly, McNamara showed up one day at a 
conference of the top military and civilian leadership that was considering 
the issue. As Ignatius tells it:
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The officers were surprised, if not astonished, by his 
unexpected presence because he was a remote 
figure who typically stayed behind closed doors in 
his office. He quickly disarmed the officers by 
telling them that his organization at Ford, and at 
GM and other large corporations, was based on the 
line and staff concept pioneered by the Army. The 
rigid backs began to relax and McNamara said the 
new command was needed and that he hoped the 
Army would support it.
206
In the above example, McNamara’s equation of the military services’ 
line and staff system with the delegated responsibilities of automotive 
company divisions may be viewed as a ploy, but politics alone does not 
explain McNamara’s invocation of the Ford and GM model as his ideal. 
Long after his tenure as secretary was over, he continued to claim that the 
M-form had influenced his DoD management. He told OSD historians that 
he had studied that system when he was at the Harvard Business School and 
“…had applied portions of it in the U.S. Army Air Force…[and] after the 
war, I went to Ford…[where] I applied the general concepts of planning as a 
major tool of management. I then came down to the Defense Department to 
do the same thing.” 207
However, despite his admiration for the M-form and his seeming 
ideological or at least rhetorical commitment to it, McNamara in fact 
                                                          
206 Paul R. Ignatius, The Other McNamara, (unpublished ms), courtesy of the author.
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adopted a highly-centralized management system which was the antithesis of 
the M-form model. Whereas the M-form decentralized decision making to 
the lowest practical operating level, the entire thrust of McNamara’s 
management was to centralize decision making in the office of the secretary. 
This was reflected, for example, in the consolidation of intelligence 
activities in the Defense Intelligence Agency and a similar consolidation of 
common purchasing activities in the Defense Supply Agency, both of which 
reported to the secretary. 
Indeed, McNamara’s Defense Department operated more like a U-
form corporation than a newer M-form, with, however, a significant 
innovation: as we have seen, PPBS tremendously expanded the Secretary’s 
ability to make budget decisions even down to the battalion level, and the 
establishment of the Systems Analysis office expanded his ability to make 
operational decisions at a volume that would have been inconceivable either 
to his predecessors at DoD or to the corporate headquarters of traditional U-
form businesses. McNamara could use the new methods of information 
gathering and systems analysis developed for M-form corporations and 
taught at Harvard Business School, not to create efficiently coordinated 
delegation as they were intended to do, but rather to centralize decision-
making at the top of the Department to an unprecedented degree. He himself 
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could and did control decision-making at both the macro- and the micro-
levels, using the tools of his business education.
Several of his peers noted the gap between the way McNamara said he 
wanted to run the Department and the way he actually did, although 
McNamara denied that he was departing from the modern organizational 
tenets which he had previously studied. William Proxmire, a senator from 
Wisconsin, met McNamara one evening at a White House dinner; they had 
been together at the Harvard Business School, and they reminisced about 
what a marvelous educational experience it had been. Proxmire then asked 
him, “how he [McNamara] was able to master such an infinite variety of 
complicated details” in his new job. According to Proxmire, “His answer 
was very simply, ‘I do my own work.’ He explained that because he put 
together the budget literally dollar by dollar, he understood it, he understood 
the justification for it and was prepared to defend the budget in detail.” 
Later, in thinking about McNamara’s answer, Proxmire wondered why 
“…he didn’t put into effect one fundamental principal (sic) that was stressed 
way back in our mutual experience at Harvard Business School, to wit, the 
vital importance of executive delegation of authority.”208 Similarly, 
McNamara told Congressman Porter Hardy in 1963 that he didn’t enjoy 
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working 14 hours a day six days a week and was trying to decentralize 
decision making in the department but that he had “…to take charge during 
this transition period.” The congressman was dubious, and decentralization 
had not been implemented by the time McNamara had left in 1968.209
In summary, when he took over the Defense Department, McNamara
developed a management organization and style which combined U-form 
breadth with M-form depth in decision-making, enabling him to centralize 
power and responsibility at the top of the DoD and to transfer the 
preponderance of power back from military to civilian hands. In doing so, 
McNamara corrected some of the earlier inefficiencies and imbalances he 
had inherited with the Department, but created a new set of problems of his 
own. The following sections will use the testimony of DoD employees and 
other of McNamara’s professional colleagues to explore what McNamara’s 
broad and deep centralization of authority looked like in practice and 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of his managerial approach, analyzing 
the extent to which it fit the needs and culture of the DoD.
Isolation at the Top: McNamara and His Chief Aides
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McNamara and his small cadre of top aides became isolated at the top 
of their Department long before the Vietnam War would bring McNamara’s 
secretaryship to crisis. Though his relentless work ethic kept the overly-
centralized system running, McNamara’s leadership was breaking down 
even without the war, largely due to his problematic management of both 
time and talent. In examining the details of McNamara’s “all or nothing” 
approach to delegation, it becomes clear why his Department was a 
personally fulfilling place to work for a handful of young, well-educated, 
ambitious civilian and military officers, and a demotivating and alienating 
environment for the majority who remained outside his delegation circle.
The breadth of McNamara’s involvement was such that he directed 
most of the Department’s activities himself. He devoted a great deal of time 
to the areas one would expect a civilian head of the Defense Department to 
oversee, such as the budget, cost containment, procurement issues, base 
closings, reserve and national guard issues. By nature of his office one 
would also have expected him to be involved in the major military 
confrontations during his tenure, including those in Cuba, Berlin and 
Southeast Asia. More than any of his predecessors, however, he immersed 
himself in the most intractable issues facing the department, including the 
intricacies of the nation’s strategic defense policies, especially its nuclear 
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policy: finite deliverance, flexible response, graduated response, controlled 
response, counterforce, counter-cities, no cities, full first strike, first strike, 
second strike, negotiating pause, assured destruction and damage limiting. 
The debates surrounding these issues produced an immense volume of paper 
and, of course, consumed a great deal of time.210 In addition, he was deeply 
involved in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, NATO relations, the Multilateral 
Force, weapon acquisitions, the Military Assistance Program, and civil 
defense - not to mention the totally unrelated issues the President would call 
upon him to help resolve from time to time like the development of the SST 
or steel and aluminum price increases. 
McNamara maintained these wide-ranging responsibilities while 
simultaneously delving into their details with unprecedented depth. He was 
determined not simply to sign off on the large volume of decisions funneled 
through his office, but to evaluate all of them to his own satisfaction by 
learning intricacies which his predecessors had left to qualified staff. It was 
by personally delving into the details that McNamara came to understand an 
issue. For example, William Bundy, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs, was assigned to help McNamara
                                                          
210 McNamara’s predecessors, Wilson and McElroy, viewed their function as 
administrators and “…left to others the formation of strategy.” Watson, op. cit., p. 130.
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prepare for his first appearance before the authorizing committees for the 
military assistance programs. The outgoing administration had requested 
$2.8 billion; the program was popular, and no one anticipated any problems. 
Previous secretaries had given pro forma statements and if any questions 
were asked that required more than a superficial knowledge, would refer the 
question to an accompanying military aide. According to Bundy, 
“McNamara would have none of that. ‘I am going to understand this 
program’,” he declared. By the end of the exercise he did, having gone over 
each line item bit by bit. As for Bundy, “I had not worked as hard as that 
since some cases in my lawyer’s experience,” he said.211
McNamara’s involvement with the budget was even more probing. 
We have already seen that he made in the neighborhood of 700 decisions a 
year regarding the budget. Yet he sought ever increasing control. For 
example, he assumed responsibility for all reprogramming reports to 
Congress. Such reports were required when the DoD wanted to move 
authorized funds from one program to another. In some cases prior 
authorization was required; in others after-the-fact reporting was sufficient, 
and in still others, sums could be lumped together. It was a complicated task 
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that had been smoothly handled by the comptroller’s office for many years, 
but McNamara took it over and personally signed each request.
More significant was his directive that any change in a major program 
over $25 million or in a minor program over $2 million required his 
approval. Bear in mind that he was dealing with a total budget exceeding 
$49 billion. Henry Glass once asked him, 
If the Air Force was to take $5 million from the B-
52 program where they have surplus funds and 
apply it to a fighter program where they are short, 
do you want them to come back for your specific 
approval in writing; i.e., a program change action?
[He replied,] That’s precisely what I mean.212
McNamara was just as concerned when the DoD underspent a budget 
estimate. For example, according to Glass, in FY 1965 the department 
underspent the budget estimate by some $2 billion. Glass thought that 
McNamara would be delighted, but on the contrary he wanted to know what 
had happened.
Something didn’t go according to plan, and he 
wanted to know what, in detail. He told Joe Hoover, 
the chief budget officer, to give him a complete 
analysis of the discrepancy. Joe was fit to be tied 
because he thought McNamara should be happy we 
were under budget. But McNamara wanted to know 
whether it was planning…or was it saving.
213
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Some colleagues questioned whether McNamara was properly 
prioritizing his responsibilities. McNamara’s deep intrusion into the 
budgetary process and the responsibilities of the Comptroller and the 
services led Glass to conclude that he “…was an accountant, not an 
economist.”214 The comment intimates that, given McNamara’s self-
appointed micro- and macro-level responsibilities, it was micro- rather than 
macro-level issues which were commandeering overlarge shares of his 
attention and time, perhaps because he had a personal affinity for the 
mastery of detail. To Glass, thinking like an accountant (for example, toting 
up itemized expenses) excluded thinking like an economist (for example, 
broadly analyzing best investments and balancing budgetary priorities); for 
McNamara, however, the roles were not mutually exclusive — he 
committed to wearing both hats. In illustrating the combined breadth and 
depth of McNamara’s managerial interventions, the above examples hint at 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of his overall approach.
McNamara’s incredible work ethic could be a strength, enabling him 
to make vast numbers of decisions and winning the loyalty of some of his 
closest aides, but it could also generate resentment amongst subordinates and 
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colleagues, some of whom felt overwhelmed with unreasonable demands 
and others of whom felt excluded from meaningful participation and power. 
McNamara held himself to a rigorous schedule - 12-14 hours a day on 
weekdays and 8-9 hours on Saturday - but many on his staff were forced to 
work even longer hours and over the weekend. His military aide, Bob 
Pursley, described a not-infrequent occurrence:
He’d [McNamara] come out of his office at 3:00 or 
4:00 on a Saturday afternoon, after a pretty full day 
of work…and say, “A couple of things here I would 
like to have Monday morning, but I don’t want you 
spending the weekend on this.” Between now and 
Monday morning there is one day. It was a nice 
expression of consideration, but you damned well 
better have it there on Monday morning. 
215
Pursley apparently had no difficulty coping with the pressure, but 
others did. Eugene Zuckert, the Secretary of the Air Force, had difficulty 
standing up to the demands from McNamara’s office. 
“We…were just peppered with directives…It was 
very hard to try and get things done in the Air Force 
when you were spending most of your time fighting 
with the third floor.”
216
Zuckert left no doubt that he found it difficult working with 
McNamara, although the two had been colleagues at the Harvard Business 
School. When asked point blank, “Did you enjoy working with him?” his 
                                                          
215 Pursely OSD Interview, Sept. 6, 1995, p. 32.
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response was a succinct, “No.” Zuckert, who was fond of sports metaphors, 
said he felt “…like a goalie on a bad hockey team that always had two men 
in the penalty box---you were getting things shot at you from all sides.” 
Switching sports, he told interviewers “putting the burden of proof on you, 
he [McNamara] always kicked the ball deep in your territory” or, switching 
yet again, “every pitcher should have a change of pace, and McNamara just 
had that high hard one.”217 Frank Sander, a veteran of the House Committee 
on Appropriations and subsequent Undersecretary of the Navy, sympathized 
with Zuckert. “It was the Secretary of Defense and his assistants…who 
poured out minutiae in directives …hundreds of directives…from the 
hallowed halls of OSD, frequently from the hands of the entrenched 
bureaucrat to the military and inexperienced system analyst…”218
McNamara was well aware of how demanding a boss he was and that 
the speed of information-gathering he mandated was not fully achievable. 
Phil Goulding, his Public Affairs officer, once asked him why he made 
ridiculous demands that could not be met. “I know I have asked for the 
impossible,” he replied, “But I am going to get much more by asking for 
more than possible in that time period than I would if I had asked for half as 
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much.”219 The pace, however, could exact its toll. Paul Nitze, who had 
moved from Assistant Secretary ISA to the Secretary of the Navy, was 
forced to check himself into the Naval hospital in Bethesda with a perforated 
ulcer. A long-term friend, Charles Burton Marshall, visited and asked “how 
on earth one perforates an ulcer.” “I’ve never said this before and I’ll never 
say it again” replied Nitze, “But the answer is ‘McNamara.’”220
Yet despite the punishing pace, most of McNamara’s top staff, 
including Nitze, remained with him during his tenure; they were a 
remarkably cohesive group. Excluding the service secretaries, only 17 
different men occupied the top nine civilian positions in the department 
during McNamara’s seven-plus years on the job. They were extremely loyal, 
accepting McNamara’s leadership without question and avoiding turf battles 
and other disruptive actions that are common in large bureaucracies. He was 
able to inspire them with a sense of mission that made the sacrifices 
worthwhile. Indeed, many of McNamara’s colleagues seemed to take pride 
in the long hours and demands that McNamara put upon them. Ignatius, for 
example, confessed to a “sense of fulfillment.” In a You Tube video he 
relates that even though McNamara seldom praised work well done, “…if 
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you turned in a piece of work and he got his old left hand (sic) and pen and 
initialed it “RSM”, that was reward enough.…”221
Many of his colleagues stressed the high value McNamara placed on 
loyalty. He was loyal to his subordinates and expected them to be loyal to 
him. A frequently cited example of his loyalty to his staff involved a 
confrontation with the Senate over the extent to which the Defense 
Department reviewed the public remarks of senior military officials. In order 
to make sure that the speeches of such officials reflected administration 
policy, the department established a “review” system to vet them prior to 
delivery. Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke was the first victim of the 
new system when one of his speeches was “mutilated” by reviewers, 
infuriating him. As the program expanded, Congress became increasingly 
concerned that McNamara was “muzzling” the military and scheduled 
hearings on the issue. The Congressional panel went so far as to demand 
copies of more than 1500 speeches given by military men that had been 
reviewed. The department complied, but the committee went further and 
attempted to link specific speeches with individual reviewers. McNamara
refused to allow such an inquiry, invoking executive privilege and claiming 
                                                          
221 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghHMWdAqHhy; regrettably the web address 
produces the message: “This video is unavailable”. One can view the video by Googling 
“LMI, Ignatius”.
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that “the responsibility was his and no one else’s.” McNamara’s actions sent 
a signal throughout the department that he would protect those working for 
him.222
Many of his subordinates, especially younger ones, remained loyal not 
because McNamara shielded their anonymity, but quite the opposite; he 
offered some of his subordinates extraordinary opportunities for autonomy 
after he had green-lighted a policy and entrusted them with its execution. For 
example, in 1966 Morton Halperin sent him a memo arguing that the United 
States should begin the process of returning Okinawa to Japan. He asked for 
a meeting to discuss how the process should begin. McNamara read the 
memo and “Scrawled on the margin of the first page were the words ‘No 
need for meeting. Give it back. R McNamara.’” As his biographer, Shapley, 
notes:
From then on, Halperin knew he was free to call 
meetings with State and CIA and other agencies, 
and to make up agendas, hand out papers. He could 
sit in a room and negotiate Defense’s positions 
freely, and McNamara would always back him up, 
even after the fact…Halperin and his colleagues had 
real power, deriving from McNamara.
223
What Shapley did not note is that Halperin was 28 years old at the 
time. It is little wonder that this method of decision-making and the authority 
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given very junior civilian employees rankled senior military officials. At the 
same time it could not help but increase the self-esteem of youthful, 
inexperienced but highly-intelligent young men who were aware that their 
status in the defense hierarchy depended on their relationship to McNamara.
McNamara’s circumscribed circle of opportunity at the top of the 
Department, much of it directed at those educated in systems analysis, helps 
explain how McNamara and his senior staff were able to attract a talented 
group. The Secretary was fond of bragging about the members of his staff 
that went on to cabinet positions like Vance, Califano, and Brown, but junior 
members of his staff, especially in Enthoven’s Systems Analysis office, had 
similarly distinguished careers. For example, Stansfield Turner and Charles 
Di Bona, junior naval officers, became part of the Enthoven group. Turner 
would go on to head the CIA and Di Bona the American Petroleum Institute, 
one of the most powerful trade associations in Washington. On the civilian 
side, there was Les Aspin, a future Defense Secretary and a group consisting 
of Ivan Selin, Charles Rossotti, Pat Gross, Jan Lodel, and Frank Nicolai 
who, not unlike Tex Thornton and the whiz kids, would leave government 
service and establish American Management Systems, a highly successful 
consulting firm that specialized in developing customized software for 
businesses and governmental agencies. After their business careers, Rossotti 
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would return to government service as the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue and Selin as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
There were other future leaders not associated with Enthoven, like Norman 
Augustine, who joined Harold Brown’s Office of Defense Research and 
Engineering when he was 30. He would eventually become Chairman of the 
Board of Lockheed Martin and renew his government service as Under 
Secretary of the Army and serve on numerous governmental commissions. 
Yet, just like the department as a whole, each of McNamara’s aides 
was subject to central direction from McNamara. For example, McNamara
told OSD historians how he handled his relationship with his Deputy 
Secretaries: “I would discuss the matter; I would come to a conclusion, and 
I would expect them to follow it, whether they recommended it or not. It 
worked very well; it was superb.”224 This was how he managed virtually all 
his subordinates — one-on-one discussions, followed by a decision, 
sometimes with specific directions as to how to implement it. As Peter 
Drucker explained, each member of the Department’s civilian leadership 
was “truly distinguished” and “outstanding”, but McNamara “…had not the 
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faintest idea how to make use of his team, or even how to make a team out 
of them.”225
This problem was far more pronounced outside of McNamara’s top 
circle; the larger civilian DoD staff were alienated by the lack of 
institutionalized opportunities to make any significant decisions for 
themselves, either in setting their own objectives or even in determining the 
best procedures by which to achieve objectives handed down to them.  The 
military was particularly resentful that McNamara respected neither their 
substantive decisions nor the traditions and experience which guided them. 
McNamara jettisoned established procedures, devalued wisdom born of 
experience, installed new systems and even a new language. Indeed, for Air 
Force General Curtis Lemay the Department had been turned on its head 
because of McNamara’s inability to respect any style of working that did not 
reflect his own. “[I]t was Bob’s view that higher echelons should be capable 
of doing original work themselves and should not have to rely on completed 
staff work.”226 Not only did McNamara create a micro- and macro-level 
double burden of responsibilities for himself, but he pressured his senior 
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colleagues to do the same, to take responsibility away from their staff and to 
work without relying on their continuing participation. This lack of 
collegiality had a demoralizing effect, especially on the military personnel in 
the department as they appeared to be mere executors of one person’s 
decisions — the Secretary’s.
For many senior officers, whether civilian or military, the McNamara
years were frustrating, but for a small group of young talents the McNamara
administration offered an unparalleled opportunity. Here was a management 
team that put a premium on brains—analytical ability, articulateness and 
energy—as opposed to time in grade. True, the hours could be brutal, but the 
excitement of applying new analytical tools, of influencing major decisions 
involving the security of the free world, of being at the edge of history more 
than compensated. In the service branches as well, McNamara and the 
President promoted a number of younger general officers — Westmoreland, 
Johnson and Abrams in the Army, and Zumwalt in the Navy — to choice 
billets. The majority of civil and military officers, however, were less 
engaged; some resigned, others merely served out their time.
Terry Williams, a former McKinsey & Company officer who had 
consulted with DoD during the McNamara era, developed a terminology of 
“system specifications” versus “specified systems” to capture McNamara’s 
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managerial flaws in more analytical terms. Williams told the author that “a
specified system is one that explicitly says what you do, how you do it, when 
you do it, and there are no options….[Alternatively,] an approach that uses a 
systems specifications would say: here are specifications that we have for 
whatever system you choose to use and, as long as your system design does 
and achieves what we want in terms of specifications, then you can do 
anything you want….Those are very different points of view and, with the 
first one, that’s micromanaging, and invading other people’s space, and the 
second approach is leaving much more solutions space and degrees of 
freedom to the individual.”227
Peter Drucker agreed, reflecting that “McNamara's greatest strength as 
a manager was his realization of the need for objectives and his willingness 
to think through objectives and altogether to think through strategy.” 
However, McNamara could not leave it at that and failed to see the 
importance in giving his subordinates their own stake holds by leaving them 
institutionalized areas of responsibility for guiding projects to their 
conclusion. “His greatest weakness was that he always lost the objective 
over procedures....McNamara lost one objective after the other…by dictating 
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how something should be done instead of saying “This is what we are going 
to do, you work out how to get there.”228
The Challenge of Cooperative Communication
We have seen that existing corporate business models would not have 
been easy to map onto the Defense Department’s needs, and that 
McNamara’s hybrid U- and M- style had particular pitfalls; the unique 
challenge of coordinating the diverse cultures and priorities of the armed 
service branches required a style of management that placed a premium on 
building voluntary teamwork and informal cooperation. Such a style was 
certainly not unprecedented in the business sector and guidelines for 
developing cooperative systems were available in the management literature 
of the 1960s.
Although McNamara extolled management as “the most creative of 
all the arts,” there is little evidence that he read many books about business 
or organizational theory. One book he could have read with profit, although 
appalled by its obscurantist style, was Chester Barnard’s The Functions of 
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the Executive. Barnard, the president of New Jersey Bell Telephone 
Company, was a student of organizations and spent decades developing a 
theory of how successful ones operated and were managed. He began with 
the premise that organizations exist because two or more individuals 
recognize that if they cooperate they can accomplish substantially more than 
a single individual can by himself. The key concept is cooperation, and the 
function of the manager is to foster cooperation among those individuals for 
whom he is responsible. 
Barnard goes on to argue that the survival of any organization 
depends on two principle attributes. The first is what he calls 
“effectiveness”, or in more colloquial terms, the accomplishment of 
whatever the institution was created to do. The second attribute is 
“efficiency”. The term is not used in its commonly-accepted meaning, but 
rather as an expression of the “non-economic inducements” that encourage 
individuals within an organization to cooperate.”229 Cooperation depends, in 
turn on establishing a system of communication, and it is “…the first 
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executive function…to develop and maintain a system of communication” 
both formal and informal.230
The function of such a system of communication is to encourage the 
members of any organization to cooperate by accepting the authority of the 
person who directs it. That authority does not depend on the position of the 
person giving the order, Barnard maintains, but on the willingness of the 
person receiving the order to accept it as authoritative. As Barnard writes in 
one of his most innovative observations:
…the decision as to whether an order has authority 
or not lies with the persons to whom it is addressed, 
and does not reside in “persons of authority” or 
those who issue these orders.
231
Barnard uses the term “authority” in a broader sense than mere 
obedience to an order. It means, of course, that the individual must 
understand and be able to comply with the directive, but it also means that at 
the time of decision that directive must be compatible with the individual’s 
personal interest and consistent with the purposes of the organization. The 
function of the networks of communication is to maintain this authority and 
they do so by employing both formal and informal systems. Formal systems 
involve formal communications—orders from the top-- and although 
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important, are not as important in Barnard’s eyes as informal systems. 
Informal systems, according to Barnard, permit an “expansion of the means 
of communication with reduction in the necessity for formal decisions, the 
minimizing of undesirable influences, and the promotion of desirable 
influences concordant with the scheme of formal responsibilities.”232 The 
executive needs to develop what might more colloquially be called a sense 
of teamwork where those reporting to him understand the mission and 
operate with a minimum amount of formal direction but cooperate with each 
other through an informal system of communication. 
The absence of an informal system of communication in McNamara’s 
Pentagon was especially noticeable. It did not make much difference in his 
relationship with the top civilian staff, who remained devoted. However, 
McNamara’s relationship with the military, especially the Joint Chiefs, was 
another matter. In general, these men were older, relied on procedures that 
had existed for years based on thorough planning and judgments born of 
experience.233 McNamara’s management practices disrupted their customary 
procedures and created serious resentment. An informal system of 
communication would have helped to increase “efficiency” in the 
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department, but McNamara did little to cultivate such a system. He 
eschewed many of the practices which could have supported it. 
He gave no heed to the rich traditions of the services. A small but 
telling example was the issue of the Marine belt. In order to demonstrate the 
advantages of standardization, one day he held a fashion show for his 
civilian and military deputies. He hung from a peg board the various aprons, 
jackets, boots and belts worn by the different services. He would display 
each item and then “decide on the spot which of the versions would 
henceforth be used by all the services.” McNamara gave the assembled 
group a little lecture on the importance of making decisions quickly. “What 
mattered was that he had decided the question and moved on, and not wasted 
any more precious time on the subject.”234 When it came to belts the Army 
and Navy accepted the black metal buckle McNamara had chosen, but not 
the Marines. They had their own distinctive buckle which had deep 
significance to the Corps which believed, however erroneously, that its 
uniform, including the belt buckle, was directly linked to its heritage and 
combat legacy. The Marines put up a fuss and eventually McNamara
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acceded “reluctantly”. How much time he saved is questionable; that the 
decision caused resentment is unquestionable.235
More significant was McNamara’s failure to observe some of the 
elementary practices any leader, especially a military leader, was expected to 
follow. He did not address the future young officers at the military 
academies; he did not visit troops in the field except occasionally in Vietnam 
in the later stages of his tenure. His military assistant, George Brown, who 
would eventually rise to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, urged him 
“…to get out of the Pentagon more frequently, visit military units in the field 
and see for himself how they handled their equipment.” McNamara appeared 
to treat Brown’s suggestion as an opportunity to evaluate ordnance rather 
than to demonstrate leadership to the troops and told him “…others could do 
that who would better understand what they saw and could better judge the 
professionalism of the performance of the troops whereas he could better 
serve the common interest by staying at his desk and doing those chores 
which he could best do …”236
McNamara was frequently advised to arrange informal meetings with 
members of the Joint Chiefs, but he demurred. His three predecessors had 
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participated in a “Secretary’s Conference,” initiated by Secretary Wilson, to 
which the top 100 civilian and military administrators were invited annually 
to “foster a spirit of cooperation” between the military and their civilian 
leaders. The conference was a combination of briefings and recreational 
activities, and followed a pattern long practiced in private industry; it was a 
popular event. McNamara did not continue the practice.237
One reason McNamara probably did not make a greater effort at 
developing informal relations with the military side of the department was 
that he wasn’t naturally good at it and did not want to make the effort to 
become so. When he first assumed his duties he was persuaded by Arleigh 
Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations and a World War II hero, to join a stag 
party of senior military and civilian officials so that they could get to know 
each other better. According to Henry Trewitt, a reporter for the Baltimore 
Sun and Newsweek:
It was a minor disaster. McNamara obviously made 
a genuine effort, as participants recalled later, but he 
was incapable of instant camaraderie… He had one 
drink and stood around uncomfortably for an hour 
or so in the Officers’ Club at Fort Meyer…and 
everyone else carefully remained sober. Burke left 
the Department convinced that McNamara lacked 
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the human qualities necessary for outstanding 
leadership.
238
Yet McNamara was not anti-social nor did he lack charm. The 
Kennedys, especially Bobby and Ethel, were fond of him and invited him 
often to their home at Hickory Hill.  He was a prominent participant in the 
“seminars” they held there featuring luminaries like the economist Barbara 
Ward and the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. as well as some of their less 
intellectual activities. We have seen his reluctance to fraternize with his 
professional colleagues when he was at Ford. It probably had something to 
do with his strong feelings of hierarchy, his distaste for unstructured 
conversation and finally, the pride he expressed in not being a “socializing” 
Secretary.239
McNamara also made little effort with Congress. John Blandford, 
Chief Counsel to the House Armed Services Committee (1963-1972), 
described the Defense Secretary’s relations with that important committee:
His congressional relations, at least with our 
committee, particularly after Vinson left as 
chairman, deteriorated rapidly. I remember that 
many of the members felt that he had a very low 
regard for Congress, and one even remarked that 
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McNamara thought that Congress was an 
unnecessary evil.
240
McNamara did not like big meetings, and privileged the exchange of 
information (preferably in writing) over discussion and the informal 
exchange of ideas. He told his colleague Eugene Zuckert, “If it takes a lot of 
people, it probably can’t be done.”241 He would hold weekly staff meetings 
for top civilian and military personnel on Monday mornings, but these were 
designed to deliver department-wide information, plug an initiative like his 
“cost reduction” program or hear a presentation that might be of general 
interest. They were not a medium for the exchange of ideas. His style 
contrasted markedly from that of his successor, Clark Clifford. Clifford 
would assemble a group of five individuals with whom he would consult 
frequently, sometimes on a daily basis, called the “8:30 group” because that 
was when it met.242 Clifford would raise an issue that concerned him, giving 
the pros and cons and then, without disclosing his tentative decision, ask 
each of the members of the group for his opinion. That was the antithesis of 
a McNamara meeting. 
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McNamara’s preferred method of communication was weekly 
personal meetings with his top aides. Virtually everyone on McNamara’s 
staff who was subsequently interviewed about their experience has pointed 
to these weekly meetings as one of the most effective ways in which 
McNamara imposed his personality on the management of the department. 
Why did they have such an impact? First, they were regularly scheduled on 
the same day at the same time and McNamara almost never postponed or 
cancelled them. Second, they were strictly limited in time. Anyone who has 
argued before a court or any other body with enforced time limitations 
knows how a strict time limit forces one to focus on essentials. Third, the 
sessions were strictly one-on-one. Except in rare instances, the briefer was 
not permitted to bring assistants. Accordingly, he had to master the details of 
every item on the agenda because, as Ignatius put it, “He always wanted an 
informed and reasoned defense of what was being proposed, not simply a 
loose judgment based on personal experience. With McNamara there was no 
such thing as an opinion that was not cross-examined.”243
This communications approach limited discussion to what was of 
immediate concern and within the briefer’s direct area of responsibility. It 
discouraged, virtually prohibited, tentative thoughts, spontaneity, or 
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speculation. Such an intense interrogation required preparation and 
according to Ignatius he would prepare “a tightly written eight-to-ten-page 
agenda” to guide the discussion. McNamara would read and quickly digest 
each item, commenting on the details and frequently placing the item in a 
larger context. He was also quick to make decisions. Indeed, the word 
circulating around the Pentagon was, “Be careful about asking for a 
decision, cause you’ll get one.”244 After the meeting was over Ignatius 
would return to his office, dictate a memorandum of what had transpired, 
meet with his staff to bring them up to date and by the beginning of the next 
week start thinking about next Friday’s meeting. As Alfred Fitt, who served 
in a number of high positions in the DoD between 1961 and 1969, 
characterized it, “We did our business with him and no more than that; his 
manner and style precluded our offering advice or expressing doubts about 
matters beyond our charter.”245
His close associate, Alain Enthoven wistfully echoed the sentiment, 
“Sometimes you felt that you would like just to sit down and kick something 
around  and think it out together, but I learned that that just wasn’t his style. 
…once when I was trying to feel him out as to where his thinking was going 
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in a particular area, he said to me something like, ‘I hired you to figure that 
out. You figure it out and tell me, and then I’ll decide whether or not I agree 
with you.’”246
Although the weekly meetings were important, the principal way 
McNamara liked to communicate was in writing. “He would wade quite 
happily through a 50 to 100-page cover memo” in his office, scribbling his 
responses in the margins.247 As he told William Kaufmann just prior to 
being briefed on counter-force doctrine in his first month in office, “Give me 
something in writing; I hate to be briefed.”248 To a certain extent this was 
understandable, as a conventional military briefing consisted of three parts:
this is what I am going to tell you; now I’m telling it to you; this is what I 
have told you. Repetition is not a bad technique when instructing troops, 
whose minds can wander easily, but it was an anathema to McNamara. In 
addition, military briefers not infrequently would begin at the most 
elementary level.249 McNamara’s usual reaction to this kind of presentation 
was to interrupt and go directly to the issue that interested him or to 
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terminate the briefing. Subjecting a junior officer or official to such behavior 
was one thing, but McNamara would treat senior officials the same way. 
Paul Nitze, an experienced senior government official who had briefed 
presidents and prime ministers, recounted to his biographer being subjected 
to such treatment.  It obviously still rankled.
Nitze claimed that McNamara’s problem was his 
relentless need to prove his brilliance and 
decisiveness. He would demand papers for early the 
next morning, expect you to stay up all night 
preparing them, and then cut you off halfway
through your presentation. He would proclaim that 
you had now told him all he needed to know—
maybe because you had, and maybe because he was 
so caught up in the image of mountain-climbing, 
decision making, problem-solving.
250
On the other hand, McNamara’s communications with, and on behalf 
of, his superior, the President, carried informal cooperation so far that the act 
of communication itself was complicated and politicized. McNamara was 
willing to obfuscate his own ideas in order to fully support and carry out the 
decisions of his commander, again reflecting his firm ideas about a system 
of delegation which accepted directives from above as sacrosanct. When 
McNamara would make recommendations to either of the two presidents he 
served, he labeled each document a “Draft Presidential Memorandum.” He 
denominated them as “drafts so that I could submit my recommendations 
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and if they didn’t choose to follow it, I could withdraw it, and there would 
be no way that the press or anybody else could drive a wedge between the 
President and me.”251
Mirroring his all or nothing approach to delegation in general, 
McNamara found it difficult to strike a balance of clear communication and 
cooperative respect; extremes of respect (minimal for the military, maximal 
for the President) could equally interfere with the effective exchange of 
ideas. We have already seen McNamara’s strong hierarchical bent in his 
Millsaps speech. That trait had been evident as he worked up the ladder at 
Ford. There is no record of him disagreeing, for example, with Henry Ford, 
even when he felt strongly about an issue as he did in the case of the Edsel. 
He carried that attitude with him into his government service and was proud 
of it. As he would write in In Retrospect: “…it was the same with Kennedy 
and Johnson as it had been with Henry Ford II.…they knew that my loyalty 
was unwavering, and that my goals were consistent with theirs.”252
McNamara claimed that he told President Johnson, “…what I believed rather 
than what I thought he wanted to hear, but also once he, as the president, 
                                                          
251 McNamara, OSD Interview, May 22, 1986, p. 20.
252 McNamara, op. cit., p. 99.
180
made a decision, I would do all in my power to carry it out.”253 However, 
his associate Gene Zuckert noted that McNamara’s determination to fully 
cooperate with Presidential authority led to what he called 
“overcompensation” in burying any difference of opinion. “[W]e always 
used to say in the building that he was never more vigorous in defending a 
position than the one his boss had told him to take which he really didn’t 
believe in, and he always overcompensated to make sure that his boss’s 
position was the one that prevailed.”254
That attitude is exemplified by an incident reported by President 
Kennedy’s assistant, Theodore Sorenson. In July, 1961, the Soviets were 
threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany that would 
have altered the status of Berlin. It was a very serious challenge to the new 
administration, second only to the Cuban missile crisis that would develop 
the next year. Kennedy and his advisers were considering what steps to take 
to convince the Soviets of the determination of the United States to retain 
their hold in Berlin, including the possibility of armed conflict. One 
important issue on which there was “sharp disagreement within the 
administration” was whether the president should declare a national 
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emergency. According to Sorenson, when called upon by Kennedy for his 
views McNamara:
…extemporaneously presented a brilliant, logical, 
clear-cut argument in favor of an emergency 
declaration, speaking in well-structured paragraphs 
supported by facts. After the President decided 
against the declaration, we all filed into the Cabinet 
Room for the formal meeting of the NSC, and the 
President called on the Secretary of Defense to open 
the discussion. McNamara then proceeded to 
deliver, again without notes, a brilliant, logical, 
clear-cut argument against the issuance of an 
emergency order.” 
255
In many ways McNamara had formidable communication skills — he 
was eloquent, organized, and overbearingly persuasive — yet managing 
cooperative communication effectively with both subordinates and 
superiors, shirking neither the cooperation nor the communication, was a 
key necessity for Defense Department management and a weak link in 
McNamara’s training, experience and personal temperament. 
Conclusion
McNamara’s managerial method was to centralize DoD decision-
making and to assume personal responsibility both for setting macro-level 
objectives and for specifying micro-level procedures to implement them, a 
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strategy which had certain strengths but more significant weaknesses. His 
micro-macro double load was a burden he created for himself that generated 
negative consequences as time went on, but it did not always prove 
unmanageable in practice. As noted in the previous chapter, his PPBS 
success showed his ability to reorganize department budgeting rationally so 
as to coordinate the strategies and capabilities of the service branches — he 
institutionalized a new and effective methodology for setting budgetary 
investment goals, and he carried those goals into practice through exhaustive 
procedural micro-management. As Charles Rosotti observed: “For the first 3 
or so years of his term, his system was so new and there was so much ‘low 
hanging fruit’ that he was able to make it work pretty well….in the sense 
that he produced a lot more capability [in the services] for not a lot more 
money.”256 He generated resentment along the way, which was not an 
insignificant cost, but he did make better investments with DoD money, both 
setting initial budgetary goals and implementing them effectively. The DoD
as he inherited it was badly in need of institutional reform, and any incoming 
manager might have felt an understandable temptation to centralize; the 
existing system was counterproductively decentralized, lacking in 
cooperation and coordination between the services, and decision-making 
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was weighted towards senior military officials rather than the Department’s 
civilian secretaries. McNamara corrected many of those pre-existing 
problems. 
However, the micro-macro double burden which his over-centralized 
approach created was ultimately unsustainable for him and unhealthy for the 
DoD as a whole. One colleague observed that even his PPBS success 
contained the seeds of failure, because what McNamara created failed to 
institutionalize decision-making itself anywhere but at the isolated top of the 
Department: 
The inherent weakness was that this process depended on one 
individual, McNamara, making a huge number of decisions and making 
them all stick, with no real commitment from almost anyone else throughout 
the organization to these decisions. Eventually, that broke down. If 
McNamara had paid some attention to institutionalizing and organizing the 
decision process, it would have been more stable.  
McNamara too often engaged in the wrong kind of 
institutionalization, demanding military and departmental changes in 
procedure without soliciting military or departmental involvement in 
substantive decision-making. Furthermore, his all or nothing style of 
delegation, while earning him the loyalty of his small cadre of top aides, left 
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him exposed to opposite types of mismanagement at a wider level. He
institutionalized his own responsibility for macro and micro decisions, but 
when he mishandled procedural, micro-level decisions through unproductive 
over-management, he sabotaged his prospects for building cooperation 
among alienated subordinates and colleagues. Without broad investment and 
support it was difficult achieve the DoD’s main objectives, as this chapter 
and the following chapter on the TFX project will argue. Alternatively, when 
he faltered at the macro level none of his subordinates had any institutional 
mandate to fill that gap and the result was under-management, which proved 
particularly detrimental to the DoD’s policies regarding Vietnam. Thus the 
flaws in McNamara’s general management style, which this chapter has 
explored, will help to explain how the different types of specific 
mismanagement highlighted in the case studies of the following chapters 
occurred. Additionally, setting McNamara’s management style in 
comparison with the M- and U- models of his previous business schooling 
and work experience challenges us to consider what elements of business 
management can be mapped onto the needs of the Department of Defense 
and gives us further insight into the unique level of centralization which 
contributed to McNamara’s greatest failures as secretary.
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CHAPTER 4  
A PLANE GONE AWRY
“If you build it; 
[they] will come,” ~ Kevin Costner, Field of Dreams
On Saturday November 24, 1962 McNamara announced his decision 
in the hotly-contested, year-long competition to produce a new multipurpose 
fighter-bomber. A team of General Dynamics and Grumman Aircraft would 
build the new plane named the TFX that had been designed to meet the 
requirements of both the Air Force and the Navy. The contract was 
estimated to be worth around $7 billion and was the largest single aircraft 
order since World War II. It represented well over 12% of the entire military 
budget for FY63, and over 7% of the entire federal budget for that same 
fiscal year.257  
It was a very large contract but more was at stake than a large 
weapons procurement contract. The TFX project gave McNamara the 
opportunity to demonstrate the cost effectiveness of two initiatives that he 
considered important for holding down defense expenditures —
“commonality” and “program definition.”258
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For anyone who had spent time in the automobile industry 
commonality was a familiar concept. Automobile manufacturers used it all 
the time. For example, an Oldsmobile and Buick, both General Motors 
vehicles, might appear quite distinct when one stepped into the car but, in all 
likelihood, they shared a number of common components, including chassis 
and motor. The principle was widely accepted in the industry, but not in the 
defense establishment. For example, when McNamara became Secretary in 
1961, each service continued to order separately items that were common to 
each. McNamara was convinced that by centralizing the procurement of 
common items the Department would realize substantial savings. 
Accordingly, he established early in his administration the Defense Supply 
Agency “to take over wholesale management of common [defense] supplies 
within the continental United States.” Centralized purchasing was only an 
initial step and fairly simple conceptually, but it stirred up considerable 
resistance in both the military and Congress. It should have served as a 
warning about similar efforts. 259
Designing a weapon system to meet the requirements of both the Air 
Force and Navy, especially one as complex as a supersonic fighter-bomber, 
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sourcing, and encouraged the use of fixed-price and incentive instead of “cost plus fixed 
fee” contracts.
259Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 24 ff; Quote at p. 25.
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was a considerably more formidable task than centralized purchasing. It 
entailed significant risks because both services would resist the effort, and, 
to be successful, the final product would require a number of performance 
trade-offs by each service. Yet, McNamara judged the risk acceptable 
because, as he stated in his affidavit to the Senate Committee investigating 
the award in the case of the TFX “…we would save at least a billion dollars 
in development production, maintenance and operating costs.”260
The other McNamara innovation was program definition. It was 
intended as “an attempt to protect the government from committing large 
amounts of money to a project before it was fully defined.”261  As the costs 
of weapon systems had escalated, it became impractical for bidders to 
produce actual prototypes of the weapon to compete against each other. 
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Under the new system, the procurement of any weapon system costing more 
than $25 million would be divided into two phases. Phase I was the program 
definition phase during which bidders would submit preliminary bids “…not 
on the basis of detailed designs, but…their ability to prove their competence 
to undertake and manage the contemplated program.”262  At least two 
bidders would then be selected to participate in Phase II of the process 
during which the Department would assign technical experts and military-
service personnel to work with the remaining bidders as if they were a prime 
contractor to compete “on paper” for the project by describing in detail how 
they proposed to build the aircraft to design specifications. The TFX was 
one of the first projects to which this new technique was applied. McNamara
hoped that it would reduce the costs of preparing bids which, in theory, 
would reduce the overall cost of the project. Ideally, it would also reduce the 
chance of “surprises” during the development stages of the project because 
bidders would address the greatest uncertainties in their proposals. There 
were, however, two unintended consequences that should have been 
anticipated:  it brought the military services and contractors closer together 
and narrowed the differences between the two final bids.263
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The TFX project began with two interlocking events — a 
technological breakthrough and a change in Air Force command. In the late 
summer of 1959, General F. F. (“Hank”) Everest, a hard charging fighter 
pilot, became the head of Tactical Air Command. Although his command 
had just begun receiving the final production model of the F-105D — a 
nuclear strike fighter-bomber that could also carry a conventional bomb load 
and would become the workhorse of the Vietnam War — Everest wanted a 
new aircraft to overcome a major tactical flaw. The F-105 required a long, 
conventional runway to take off and land. Everest estimated that there were 
only 44 such runways within the operational radius of the plane and the 
battlefields in which it would most likely see action. These airfields would 
be well known to the nation’s most likely enemy, the Soviet Union, and 
could be easily neutralized in the event of a surprise attack imperiling the 
mission of TAC. To overcome this problem, Everest wanted a plane that 
could take off and land on unimproved terrain within 3,000 feet, as opposed 
to the 10,500 feet runway required by the F-105. The new plane also needed 
to be capable of travelling extremely long distances without refueling, for 
example across the Atlantic Ocean (“ferrying capacity”). Of course, the new 
plane would have to be capable of fulfilling the three principal missions of 
the Tactical Air Command, including an expanded conception of 
190
“interdiction” to encompass the delivery of a nuclear weapon deep into 
enemy territory.264
The preferred method for a fighter-bomber to deliver a nuclear strike 
deep in enemy territory was for the bomber: (1) to descend from cruising 
altitude before enemy radar could detect it; (2) fly at low subsonic speeds 
close to the ground (“on the deck”) to avoid radar detection; (3) make a 
faster but still subsonic dash also on the deck to the target (Everest wanted a 
so-called “dash range” of 400 miles); (4) drop its load and return at 
supersonic speeds to a friendly base. The problem was that no one had been 
able to design such an aircraft. 
The central problem was that TAC’s requirements 
were aerodynamically contradictory. The TAC 
desire for transoceanic range, as well as its need for 
short take-off and landing capability from semi-
prepared fields, required a relatively long, upswept 
wing for the proposed aircraft. However, its desire 
for high speed dictated a relatively short, sharply 
swept wing.
265
Early in 1960, John Stack, a respected NASA aeronautical engineer, 
told Everest that he believed he had solved the problem by designing a new 
wing. Previously, designers had assumed that to overcome the aerodynamic 
problem outlined above, the entire wing had to pivot. Since the wing was 
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attached to the plane inside the fuselage, this presented an insuperable 
problem. Stack’s new wing would be divided into two sections so that the 
outer section required for subsonic long distance travel would pivot on the 
wing itself.
The design was promising enough for the Air Force to move ahead 
with a development program. In approving the program, however, Air Force 
Headquarters imposed an additional requirement viz., that the plane be 
capable of flying on the deck at a supersonic speed (mach 1.2) for its dash to 
the target.266 The Air Forces’ own technical staff predicted that this 
additional requirement would create size and weight problems because of 
increased drag and tremendous structural stresses that would result from 
flying so low at such high speeds. Higher drag would result in greater fuel 
consumption; greater stress would require more rigid and aerodynamically 
refined aircraft structure. Both factors would mean greater aircraft weight 
and performance deterioration. Since the Air Force recognized that the new 
aircraft might be its last chance for a manned fighter-bomber, it was not 
deterred and recommended a development program to the outgoing 
Eisenhower administration, including test aircraft, with a price tag of $2.2 
billion.
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At the same time, the Navy was also considering its aircraft 
requirements for fleet protection. It concluded that it needed a plane that 
could circle a fleet of ships at high altitude for long periods of time with the 
ability to destroy any approaching enemy aircraft at a distance of at least 20 
miles. The plane required long endurance as well as complex detection and 
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air-to-air missile systems. The plane also had to be relatively short and light 
with sufficient lift for carrier operations. The Navy had received tentative 
permission to proceed with this single mission aircraft which it named “The 
Missileer.”
The outgoing Eisenhower administration was unwilling to commit the 
new President to such expensive long-range programs, so McNamara’s 
predecessor, Thomas Gates, directed the Air Force to cease further TFX 
development and directed the Navy to delete any funding for the Missileer 
from the 1962 defense budget. In addition, because Eisenhower and Gates 
were concerned about the proliferation of weapon systems with similar 
characteristics, “it instructed the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering to begin efforts to coordinate the requirements of the services 
into a single multi-servicefighter.”267
Shortly after McNamara assumed office, both the postponed TFX 
decision and a report from one of his appointed task forces reached his desk. 
The report recommended that the Department “undertake the development 
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of a multi-service bomber for use in the limited war environment.”268 The 
TFX appeared to fit that bill. The plane’s projected ferrying capacity, ability 
to operate from unimproved terrain, supersonic speed, and conventional 
bomb-carrying capacity fit many of the characteristics that the new 
administration was looking for as it moved the nation’s defense policy away 
from “massive retaliation” of the Eisenhower administration towards a 
policy of “flexible response.” The new approach emphasized military 
response proportional to the military threat facing it. In the immediate 
context, that meant increasing the nation’s ability to wage conventional war. 
As he reviewed the aircraft’s capabilities, McNamara also came to the 
conclusion that the TFX satisfied many of the characteristics that the Navy 
had been looking for from the Missileer and, accordingly, directed Herbert 
York, the holdover Director of the Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E), to direct the Air Force and Navy “to study the development of a 
TFX, based on a tactical fighter then under consideration by the Air Force, 
to meet [the Navy’s] requirements for future fighter bombers [and] develop a 
coordinated specific operational requirement and technical plan for his 
[York’s] approval.”269
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York, aware of the services’ mutual antipathy towards a joint fighter, 
decided that the best way to achieve consensus was to convene a committee 
with an expanded agenda to include not only the TFX but the Navy’s 
Missileer and the close-support air requirements for the Army and Marines. 
The Committee on Tactical Air met for four months and produced one 
recommendation that McNamara accepted — close-support missions 
required an aircraft other than the TFX; it was unable to resolve the 
divergent views of the Air Force and Navy on the specifications of the TFX. 
McNamara then asked the Air Force Secretary, Eugene Zuckert, to convince 
the Navy to accept the Air Force’s specifications as the basis for a joint 
aircraft with modifications, of course, to accommodate carrier operations. 
Zuckert was unsuccessful because in the services’ views. “…the 
performance requirement of their respective missions were so different that 
to design one aircraft to perform both missions would compromise each of 
them.”270
McNamara was not persuaded. “I believe that the development of a 
single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both services in the projected time 
frame is technically feasible,” he wrote. Accordingly, on September 1 he 
ordered, “A single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the 
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Navy fleet air defense mission will be undertaken. The Air Force shall 
proceed with the development of such an aircraft.” McNamara’s 
memorandum made a number of concessions to the Navy involving weight, 
aircraft length, ability to carry air-to-air missiles, but significantly provided, 
“Changes to the Air Force tactical version of the basic aircraft to achieve the 
Navy mission shall be held to a minimum.” A request for proposal to 
industry (RFP) was to be ready on October 1 with a signed contract set for 
February 1, 1962.271
McNamara’s belief in the feasibility of a single plane may have been 
strengthened because the Air Force had recently agreed to accept a version 
of the Navy’s F-4H as its tactical fighter after he had cancelled further 
production of the F-105. He may have reasoned that, although services were 
reluctant to accept aircraft designed for another service, they would 
eventually come around. The situations were not the same, however. The Air 
Force had the opportunity to test the F-4H rather than merely assess a paper 
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requirements, see Coulam, op. cit. p. 101-102.
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design. Air Force pilots could judge for themselves whether the plane met 
their requirements. In addition, the F-4H was compatible with the missions 
that both services envisioned for the aircraft. That was not, or did not appear 
to be, the case for the TFX. One service wanted deep interdiction, the other 
fleet protection. These were distinct missions even if the requirements of the 
aircraft were somewhat similar.272
The services met the October deadline in the form of a 250-page 
Work Statement. The Statement was intended to meet the requirements of 
project definition but still  left many of the tradeoffs unresolved. Available 
information at the time suggested that no aircraft could meet all of the 
requirements in the Work Statement.273 For example, NASA pointed out to 
the Air Force that its specification for a supersonic dash “on the deck” would 
greatly increase the size and weight of the plane, an observation confirmed 
by that service’s own engineers. Such increased weight made the plane’s 
adaptability to carrier operations unlikely.
Why was such “on the deck speed” necessary, especially  in a tactical 
fighter? Did it improve the chances that the plane would reach its target? 
                                                          
272 As Alain Enthoven wrote, “The key factor [in commonality] is the compatibility of the 
proposed missions of the aircraft.” Alain Enthoven op. cit., p. 263. McNamara was still 
using the Navy F-4H argument as a justification for his decision as late as 1986. See 
Robert S. McNamara,  OSD Interview, May 22, 1986, p. 17.
273 For the definition of a Work Statement, see Art, op. cit., p. 24.
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Robert Coulam, who has written the most detailed narrative of the TFX 
project, cogently argues that the increased speed provided at best marginal 
survivability benefits, and may indeed have decreased them.274 An even 
more fundamental question is why the aircraft needed such a dash capability. 
It was only useful to deliver tactical nuclear weapons. We know why the Air 
Force wanted nuclear capability; McNamara had recently taken steps to 
cancel the F-105, a nuclear capable fighter-bomber, and the TFX was 
viewed as possibly the last manned bomber that would be built. But was 
interdiction deep into enemy territory with nuclear weapons an appropriate
Tactical Air Command mission? How did deep interdiction fit into the new 
emphasis on flexible response? Alain Enthoven, who headed Systems
Analysis subsequently questioned the value of deep interdiction in either 
Europe or Asia. But, McNamara did not consult Systems Analysis before he 
made his decision as Enthoven made clear. 275
If the TFX was to prove successful, each of these questions needed
clear answers. The principal difficulty in the development of the TFX was 
weight, and most of the questions centered on this problem. 276 Systems 
Analysis was the logical place to seek answers, but McNamara did not bring 
                                                          
274 Coulam, op. cit., pp. 42, 94.
275 Enthoven, op. cit., pp. 221, 262.
276 Coulam, op cit., p. 55, n. 48.
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it into the discussion. Various reasons have been advanced for its lack of 
involvement: the office was not adequately staffed; Enthoven, who was a 
deputy asistant secretary was not in a position to go head-to-head with his 
boss, the newly appointed assistant secretary, Harold Brown, who was a firm 
supporter of a single aircraft. Finally, McNamara may have been unwilling 
to subject his own proposals to rigorous analysis. We will return to this issue 
at the end of the chapter.
Nine companies responded to the Work Statement by the December 1 
deadline -- three individual companies and three two-company teams.277
Initially, the selection process followed established Air Force practice. 
Standard procedure was for bids to be referred to an Ad Hoc Evaluation 
Group (in this instance, 250 cost accountants, aeronautical engineers and 
experienced Air Force officers), to assess the proposals and to grade, or 
“score,” them in four areas: management, operational, technical, and 
logistical. These results were sent to an Air Force Source Selection Board 
composed of senior flag-grade officers and, since this was a bi-service 
weapons system, a Navy admiral. The Selection Board reviewed the 
                                                          
277 Individual submissions: Lockheed, North American Aviation, Boeing; Teams: 
Republic Aviation & Chance Vought, General Dynamics & Grumman, McDonnell & 
Douglas. Apparently Boeing rejected partnership feelers put out by Grumman because it 
thought it had a step up over all the other airframe bidders. See Richard Austin Smith, 
“The $7-Billion Contract That Changed the Rules,” Fortune, Vol. 67 (March, 1963) p. 
101.
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Evaluation Groups’s conclusions and voted in secret as to which company to 
recommend as the source. In turn, the Source Selection Board’s 
recommendation and the comments of the service commands that were 
directly impacted were sent to the Air Force Council, a group of eleven 
senior general-grade Air Force and Naval officers, that reviewed the 
recommendations and voted on a source to develop the weapon system. That 
decision was passed through the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the 
Chief of Naval Operations to the two service secretaries and finally to the 
Secretary of Defense for a final decision. The important point is that with a 
major decision such as the TFX, twenty-three senior generals and admirals 
had reviewed the recommendation before it reached the Secretary and his 
service secretaries.
The Evaluation Group found all of the proposals unacceptable, but 
that two of them (Boeing and General Dynamics/Grumman) were superior 
to the other four. Consistent with the new project definiton procedure, the 
Group recommended that these two be given paid study contracts to correct 
the deficiencies in their proposals.278 This recommendation was passed on to 
                                                          
278 The Evaluation Group found that Boeing’s proposal was unacceptable because it had 
designed its airframe round a new GE engine that was only “on paper;” the risk was too 
great that the engine could not be developed within the timeframe of the TFX delivery 
and the potential advantage of the GE engine was not worth the cost of delay in the 
delivery of the plane. “The problem with the General Dynamics/Grumman proposal was 
(Continued…)
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the Source Selection Board that concurred that all proposals were deficient, 
but recommended that the study contract be given exclusively to Boeing. 
The Air Force Council agreed with the Evaluation Group that there should 
be a runoff between Boeing and General Dynamics/Grumman, and this 
decision was approved by the service secretaries and McNamara.
This early split between those who favored a single source study 
contract and a runoff between the two best submissions revealed a basic 
difference in procurement philosophy between the Air Force and the Navy. 
The Air Force selected a source early in the procurement process and 
worked with it to produce an acceptable design. The Air Force considered 
this procedure more efficient because it lowered the costs of the design 
phase, reduced the cost and time for evaluation, and produced a quicker 
result. The Navy, on the other hand, was accustomed to nailing down an 
acceptable design before deciding on a source. It considered its practice 
more efficient and less costly because there were fewer surprises during the 
development phase.
                                                                                                                                                                            
(…Continued)
that the ‘wind-over-the-deck requirement was much too high for carrier operations. 
Accordingly, Boeing redesigned its plane with a new airframe to accommodate another 
engine and General Dynamics/Grumman redesigned its airframe to meet the wind-over-
the-deck requirement. See Art, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
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In the case of the TFX, the Navy believed it was vital to lock in a 
design because it intended initially to purchase only 250 planes out of a total 
estimated production run of 1,700. It knew that after it signed off on the 
design, it had very little leverage because the Air Force had been given 
overall control of the development of the aircraft, and McNamara had 
clearly stated that “Changes to the Air Force tactical version of the basic 
aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a minimum.”279
The two remaining contestants completed their revisions by the 
beginning of April 1962. After vetting by the Evaluation Group, the 
Selection Board evaluated their proposals for a second time and voted 3-1 to 
award the contract to Boeing. The Navy representative agreed that the 
Boeing design was superior but considered neither design acceptable. The 
Air Force Council basically came to the same decision. All 10 officers 
agreed that Boeing had the superior proposal, but the Navy refused to 
approve the design. For the Navy, the “wind-over-the-deck,” a Navy 
requirement for carrier operations, was a problem with both designs.280 To 
satisfy the Navy, the weight of the plane had to be reduced, or the area of the 
wing increased, or a combination of both. The difficulty was that this 
                                                          
279 See p. 172, supra.
280 Art, op. cit., p. 68. Boeing’s second proposal had increased the weight of the plane by 
4,000 pounds.
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solution degraded the plane’s supersonic dash which was a prime Air Force 
requirement. The services were at a stalemate.
The service secretaries then recommended to McNamara that the two 
competitors be given a short period, only three weeks, to try to overcome the 
Navy’s objections and that “some divergence in the airframe structure be 
permitted in the two versions.” McNamara agreed to the three-week period 
and directed, somewhat delphically, that “acceptable Navy and Air Force 
versions were not to be created by reducing the degree of commonality so 
far as to lose the savings inherent in a joint program.”281
Boeing and General Dynamics/Grumman submitted their bids to the 
Source Selection Board which found for the third time that Boeing had the 
better proposal. Boeing had increased the wing area of the plane by 15% 
reducing the wind-over-the-deck requirement and increasing loiter ability 
which pleased the Navy. Although the design reduced the supersonic dash 
capability the Air Force had obtained a longer ferry range and a larger 
ordinance capability; it considered the tradeoff acceptable.282 The Air Force 
Council unanimously supported the Board’s recommendation. There was no 
disagreement by either the Navy or the Air Force that Boeing be selected as 
                                                          
281 TFX Hearings — First Series, Part. 2: pp. 379, 513.
282 Art, op. cit., p. 72.
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the contractor. The Navy was willing to bend its preferred procurement 
policy to permit selection of the source before final design definition, but it 
was unwilling to sign off definitively on the program until the design had 
been determined. It agreed that only Boeing be selected to continue design 
studies. 
One might have thought that the project was in fairly good shape at 
this point. Although the signing of a contract was five months behind 
schedule, the services had unanimously agreed on a source; the Navy had 
shown some flexibility by agreeing to a source before the design was 
completely locked in, and the Air Force had agreed to design changes that 
improved the wind-over-the-deck requirement for the Navy even though the 
changes degraded its on the deck supersonic capability. The military services 
were unanimous that Boeing should be selected for a sole source study 
contract.283
The service secretaries disagreed and recommended that the 
competition continue between the two companies and that study contracts be 
given to each, but with two significant changes from the rules that had 
governed the three earlier competitions. 284 First, the leader of the Evaluation 
                                                          
283 Art, op. cit., p. 75.
284 TFX Hearings — First Series, Part. 6, pp. 65-66; Part 6: p. 1400.
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Group, Colonel Gayle, was permitted to assist each competitor in correcting 
the deficiencies that the Group had found. Second, Deputy Secretary 
Gilpatric wrote the presidents of each company spelling out the three 
conditions that had to be met before any contract was signed:
1) Satisfaction of both the Navy and Air Force that a significant 
improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by 
the winning design.
2) Minimum divergence from a common design compatible with 
the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the 
inherent savings of a joint program.
3) Demonstrably credible understanding of costs for both 
development and procurement of the complete TFX weapon 
system, which costs must be acceptable in view of the 
capability added to our military strength by the weapon 
system.285
The final competition began on July 1 under these new rules. The 
companies submitted their revised designs on September 1 which were then 
subjected to the standard review. The Evaluation Group found both designs 
acceptable. The Source Selection Board, the Air Force Council, and all 
relevant user commands unanimously recommended Boeing as the source. 
Those recommendations represented the views of one colonel, four major 
generals, six lieutenant generals, five generals, five rear admirals and one 
admiral. 
                                                          
285 TFX Hearings — First Series, Part. 5: p. 1195; see also Art., op. cit., p. 76.
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Then the wheels suddenly came off the cart.  McNamara and his two 
service secretaries overruled those recommendations and selected the 
General Dynamics/Grumman team to build the aircraft. DoD announced its 
decision on November 24 in a short press release that offered no clue as to 
how it had reached such a conclusion. In a memorandum for the record 
prepared three days earlier, but not released until March 3, it spelled out in 
greater detail how McNamara and the two service secretaries had reached 
their decision. They rated the two designs virtually the same in technical 
operational, management, and logistics.286The big differences were in 
commonality and cost realism which had been spelled out in Gilpatric’s 
letter of July 13, 1962. They determined that The General 
Dynamics/Grumman design had an 85% on commonality and Boeing only 
60% and even this latter figure was optimistic. As for cost realism, the three 
men also found that “It is hard to understand the optimism of the Boeing 
estimates for engineering, tooling and manufacturing…they are approaching 
the development of this aircraft on a very simple basis.” The General 
Dynamics/Grumman proposal, on the other hand, “could be considered as 
                                                          
286 DoD Press Release dated March 3, 1963, Research and Development, TFX 1961-71, 
Box 879 OSD Historical Office; TFX Hearings — First Series, Part 9: p. 2519. The 
figures used in the press release were not the same as the weighted scores developed by 
the Source Selection Board in the Fourth Competition, but the conclusion was the same.
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being conservative…[and] more likely to meet the development milestones 
and cost goals than the Boeing proposal.”287
This announcement caused, as one might suspect, uproar within 
Congress and the defense community. It is striking how unprepared 
McNamara and his colleagues were for the storm that broke. Zuckert must 
have been aware what was about to happen; he had been visited by no fewer 
than 12 members of Congress regarding the TFX. His prior service as 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in the Truman administration should 
have prepared him. Perhaps, it did, but he did not appear to have passed on 
his experience to his boss or, if he did, McNamara did not listen.
One of the early visitors to McNamara after the award had been 
announced was Senator Henry M. Jackson who was frequently referred to as 
the “Senator from Boeing” because the company’s headquarters was located 
in his state. According to Shapley “the defense secretary was shockingly 
rude…act[ing] as though congressmen had no business seeking defense 
contracts for their states and districts; such politicking was not in the 
national interest.”288 Whatever occurred, Jackson was angry and persuaded 
John L. McClellan, a populist senator from Arkansas and chairman of the 
                                                          
287 Some of the facts and figures used in the November 21 memorandum were challenged 
in the Senate hearings and appeared to be incorrect. Ibid, Part 1: pp. 230-233, Shapley, 
op. cit., p. 638 f/n 34.
288 Shapley, op. cit., p. 210.
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Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to involve himself in the 
matter. McClellan and his subcommittee had become prominent in the 1950s 
by investigating labor racketeering. His potential involvement should have 
suggested caution on the part of McNamara and the department. McClellan’s 
first act was to write McNamara a letter on December 21 requesting a delay 
in signing the TFX contract until his committee had looked into the matter. 
This was hardly a reasonable request but, in what appeared a studied insult, 
Gilpatric signed the TFX contract the afternoon that McClellan’s letter was 
received and wrote the chairman five days later, “I consider it to be in the 
national interest for the program to proceed further without delay.”289
Matters were not off to a good start.
Senate hearings on the TFX project began on February 26, 1963. 
McClellan followed the same tactics that he and his counsel, Kenneth 
Alderman, had used in investigating labor racketeering — start with bit 
players who had subordinate roles to build a case against the major targets of 
the investigation, in this case, McNamara, Gilpatric, Zuckert (Air Force) and 
Korth (Navy). DoD could probably have avoided much of the negative 
publicity surrounding the TFX award if McNamara had testified first, a 
courtesy routinely granted cabinet officers. He could have set forth, in detail, 
                                                          
289 TFX Hearings, Second Series, Part 1, p. 21.
209
why he and his service secretaries had made the award, and seized the high 
ground. As it was, the department did not even release a copy of the 
Memorandum for the Record until March 3, almost a week after the hearings 
began, and that document, dated November 21, contained a number of 
errors.290
Instead of taking the initiative, DoD allowed the case against the 
General Dynamics/Grumman award to build and was content to denigrate 
the hearings, suggesting that the committee was improperly motivated. 
DoD’s principal press spokesman, the “waspish” Arthur Sylvester, stated on 
the record, “Obviously you will hardly get a judicial rendering from a 
committee in which there are various senators with state self-interest in 
where the contract goes.” Around the same time, Gilpatric apparently told 
certain reporters that he had been “misled” by the chairman into believing 
that the hearings would be short and non-confrontational. Even Zuckert 
became involved, suggesting that committee staff had treated certain Air 
Force officers improperly during their investigation causing one of them to 
seek psychiatric help.291
                                                          
290 See TFX Hearings, First Series, Part 1, testimony of Col Gayle.
291 Shapley, op. cit., p. 213, TFX Hearings, First Series, Part 2: pp. 435 ff.
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McNamara did not present his side of the award until March 13, 1963. 
It began rather awkwardly with John McNaughton, the department’s General 
Counsel, reading a long affidavit setting forth McNamara’s side of the story. 
Since McNaughton had no personal knowledge of most of the facts in the 
case, he could not be examined on the merits of the decision, and the 
statement had very little impact. McNamara did not testify until March 23. 
In what might appear to be a retaliatory gesture, he was kept waiting all 
morning while the Committee interrogated Gilpatric. When McNamara
finally appeared, he was not questioned about the actual award and its merits 
or demerits, but about conflicts of interest and the politics of the award.
The committee hearings were recessed on November 20 because of 
the death of President Kennedy, and would not formally resume until March, 
1970, finally concluding the following month.292 By that time the 
investigation had lasted more than seven years, longer than it took to build 
the TFX — now known as the F-111A for the Air Force version and F-111B 
for the Navy model - as Harold Brown wryly noted. The 45 days of hearings 
had not uncovered any impropriety or disclosed any inappropriate political 
                                                          
292 The Committee staff resumed its investigation of how the plane was progressing 
beginning 1966, but waited until the Project was completed until holding final hearings.
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pressure. They had, however, raised suspicions that were widely circulated 
in the media.
None of the principal actors enhanced their reputations. McClellan, 
who had acquired stature as a racket buster, was injured because he and his 
counsel were seen to be conducting a vendetta against the Defense Secretary 
rather than an objective inquiry into one of the most important military 
contracts of the decade. McNamara was injured even more seriously. 
Important questions had been raised about his judgment. For the first two 
years of his administration, he had been largely immune from serious 
criticism. He had mastered so many details and he had been so forceful in 
his presentations that few dared challenge him.293 On the TFX matter, 
however, he was frequently on the defensive, not so much about the details 
of the aircraft (McClellan never questioned him about such matters), but 
about conflicts of interest and political pressures. These were subjects which 
could not be put to rest by citing numbers, but which depended on trust, and 
McNamara had not built up much trust with either the military or Congress.
                                                          
293 [Senator Ellender], for example, stated in the hearings on the 1965 DoD 
Appropriations Bill, “It has been my privilege to be in Congress for 27 years, and I do not 
know of anytime that I have been confronted with a witness who is more informed than 
you [McNamara]. Hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriations, 1965, before 
the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 
Senate, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 230.
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Both groups recognized his brilliance, analytical ability, facility with figures, 
and articulateness, but these did not automatically translate into trust.
There are probably many reasons for this impression. Foremost, was 
the distance McNamara maintained from those he worked with, especially 
the military. We have seen that during his time at Ford he was never a “car 
guy”. He was not comfortable with the Ford dealership network and 
eschewed attendance at many of the new-model rituals which were part of 
the car culture. By the same token he maintained a formal distance from the 
military except possibly with Taylor and Wheeler. As Richard Stubbing, a 
long-time expert on DoD budgets observed, “Often, he [McNamara] 
appeared to treat the chiefs as members of his staff rather than heads of the 
Military Services.”294 Despite being urged to get up to the Hill more often he 
also maintained a studied distance from Congress. In addition, McNamara
had a way of arguing that provoked resentment. He had not changed much 
from his Ford days when he brought “all the tools at his command” to win 
an argument. Zuckert put his finger on it when he observed, “that one of his 
[McNamara’s] problems was that he recognized the necessity of always 
being right because, if they once started to pick holes in the structure, the 
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structure would fall apart. Therefore, he just ran all over you. It was like 
being always on the defense.” 295
What McNamara needed after the McClellan hearings was to 
demonstrate that a bi-service plane could be built that substantially met the 
requirements of his September 1 memorandum, and was sufficiently cost 
effective to validate his claims about the savings that could be realized from 
“commonality.” Regrettably, after having made his decision as to who 
should build the plane, McNamara simply turned the project over to the Air 
Force to follow its standard procedures. He received periodic reports but 
attended no meetings relating to the TFX project, or otherwise attempted to 
shape the development/production process until the project got into trouble. 
The Air Force used a development/production practice called 
“concurrency.” It was a system that telescoped development and production 
so that certain parts of the process might be begun before all of the technical 
issues that had arisen in a previous portion had been resolved. Concurrency 
had been developed in the 1950s to reduce the lead time between the 
initiation of a weapon system and its operational readiness. Its principal 
features were: a comparatively large number of prototypes produced on 
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“hard” production tooling (rather than hand-built “soft” tooling), an 
accelerated testing phase, and the start of production before the testing phase 
was complete. Implicitly, the system assumed that problems would be few 
and easily solved and that development plans would be sufficiently detailed 
to permit “the rapid integration of complex development tasks for early 
production.”296 As a consequence, there was less time in the development 
process to resolve technical issues and a corresponding loss of flexibility 
because development efforts had to be coordinated with production 
schedules.297
Whatever the merits of concurrency, was it appropriate in fabricating 
an aircraft that neither service wanted, that involved difficult tradeoffs in 
operational capabilities, and that had been entrusted to a corporate team that 
the military services had unanimously rejected? In retrospect the answer was 
clearly no and should have been reasonably apparent at the time. To require 
the Air Force to change its standard operating procedures, however, would 
have entailed civilian officials overruling military judgments for a third time. 
Only McNamara’s close personal involvement or a specialized institutional 
arrangement similar to the one used in developing the successful Air Force 
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missile program might have produced results that vindicated McNamara’s 
initial decisions. As we have seen from his time at Ford, McNamara was not 
interested in production issues, so the TFX proceeded under standard 
operating procedures.
It was a tight schedule. To insure that the first flights took place in 
December 1964, the plane would have to be ready for ground testing in 
October and major assembly had to begin in July. In turn, that meant first 
aircraft parts had to be fabricated in December, 1963 and drawings of these 
parts substantially completed by October, only ten months after the contract 
award. Yet, none of the officials involved seemed to have any doubts about 
the plane or the schedule. Harold Brown, Assistant Secretary for Research 
and Engineering, testified “There is no question that the Air Force version 
[of the TFX] is going to be extremely successful” and Zuckert, as late as 
1966, would write, “The first flight of the TFX … may well prove to have 
been the most effective documentation of the McNamara technique of 
‘project definition.’”298  McNamara testified before the Defense
Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on February 26, 
1965 that “The flight test program [for the TFX] to date has been very 
                                                          
298 Coulam, op. cit., p. 216; see U. S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Military 
Procurement Authorizations: Fiscal Years 1966, p.489; Eugene M. Zuckert, “The Service 
Secretary: Has He a Useful Rule?” Foreign Affairs Vol. 44 (April 1966) p. 474.
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successful.” Actually, at the time, there had been very few flights and they 
had revealed substantial problems of which McNamara was probably 
unaware. At least two senators seemed to know more about the program than 
he did.299
As is true in the case of virtually every new sophisticated weapons 
system, problems arose during the development and production phases of the 
TFX. In 1963, a major issue involving the aircraft’s drag surfaced. This had 
major implications for the aircraft’s supersonic dash and its ferry capability. 
The problem was never satisfactorily resolved because the solutions 
depended on “a new aerodynamic principle” not yet discovered. 
Accordingly, the supersonic dash was reduced from a contract specification 
of 210 miles to a scant 30 miles; ferry capacity was similarly reduced from 
4,180 to 2,750 miles.300 Another significant problem was weight. At the end 
of 1966, General Dynamics estimated a weight increase in the Navy version 
of 8,000 lbs. This was a serious problem and prompted the Navy to suggest a 
redesign. McNamara rebuffed this effort, sensing that it was an attempt by 
the Navy to acquire its own plane, and instituted what was called a Super 
                                                          
299 Senator Margaret Chase Smith raised questions on whether the TFX was under-
powered and Senator Strom Thurmond raised a question about the lift-to-drag ratio. Both 
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McNamara gave assurances that there were no problems.
300 Coulam, op. cit., p. 223 f/n136; TFX Hearings, Second Series, p. 70.
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Weight Improvement Program (SWIP) that was generally ineffective. What 
he failed to do was slow down a program that was moving inexorably 
toward producing the first production models after which changes would be 
difficult and expensive.
A third serious problem was the aircraft’s susceptibility to engine 
compression stalls. The problem had been discovered while on the ground 
and during the plane’s first flight in January 1965. It continued throughout 
the testing period. The engine and the air inlet and ducts of the airframe were 
incompatible, a problem which was magnified by the fact that the F-111 was 
using a new after-burning turbofan engine instead of the more traditional 
turbojet. This was an issue that should have been addressed early in the 
development process — certainly before the department had committed 
itself to production.
In spite of these difficulties, DoD signed a letter of agreement for 
production in April 1965 upon the recommendation of Zuckert and with 
McNamara’s concurrence. That was before DoD had any flight data of its 
own or anyone knew about the stall problems. DoD would not seriously 
focus on the problem until 1966.301 It would appear as if defense officials 
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were more concerned about meeting a production schedule than producing 
an aircraft that came as close to design specifications as possible. There is 
some indication that DoD was willing to authorize production with such a 
paucity of data because it believed it could force the contractor to remedy 
any deficiencies pursuant to the “remedies of deficiencies” provisions of a 
definitive production contract.302 One of McNamara’s early initiatives had 
been to reduce the number of cost-plus fixed fee contracts in favor of fixed 
price or price incentive contracts. The new contracts put the government in a 
far stronger bargaining position when it came to remedying deficiencies in 
performance. It was not, however, a fail-safe remedy. In the case of the 
TFX, it was not clear who was responsible for the engine/airframe 
incompatibility as between the engine manufacturer and the airframe 
fabricator. It was also not clear to what extent the government’s acceptance 
of the aircraft as well as its conduct during the development and production 
phases amounted to a waiver of some or all of the deficiencies. 
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wing box. That particular issue was not discovered until late 1968 when full production 
was underway because the fatigue tests were not scheduled until late in the program. See 
Coulam, op. cit., pp. 196-197.
302 The April 12, 1965 agreement was a letter agreement authorizing production of 407 
Air Force and 24 Navy aircraft to be followed by a definitive agreement which was not to 
be signed until more than two years later on May 10, 1967. The letter agreement spelled 
out obligations in general terms; the definitive agreement was far more specific and 
detailed. Even though the letter agreement was “sketchy,” it was a binding legal 
obligation.
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McNamara had received reports but had otherwise not taken much 
interest in the project until it was clear that there were problems with the 
aircraft. Beginning in August 1966 he finally recognized that the TFX was in 
trouble. DoD had identified 16 significant deficiencies in performance in the 
three existing versions of the plane. The situation was exacerbated by 
squabbling between the airframe and engine manufacturers each of whom 
blamed the other for the problems. In addition, McClellan’s staff had revived 
its investigation.303 Accordingly, McNamara set up a series of weekend 
meetings with the Chairmen and Presidents of General Dynamics and Pratt 
& Whitney and appropriate Defense Department officials to bring the 
project back on course. Dubbed the “Icarus Project” after the mythological 
Greek figure, these meetings, initially weekly and then bi-weekly, would last 
from August 1966 until January 1968. McNamara attended at least 25 of 
them. Under McNamara’s guidance, they were able to improve cooperation 
between the airframe and engine manufacturers, but accomplished little else. 
As Shapley has described them:
The blueprints for the plane were spread out all over 
the rug in his office. The men—most of whom were 
not engineers but businessmen like himself—stood 
around awkwardly, trying to offer suggestions and 
feeling inept, when, to their amazement, McNamara
                                                          
303 The list of 16 deficiencies can be found at TFX Hearings,  Second Series, Part 3: pp. 
542-543; see also Coulam, op. cit., p. 226.
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got down on his hands and knees in his pressed 
trousers and began crawling over the plans with a 
pencil, calling out instructions that he imagined 
could force this bird to fly.304
All the while, General Dynamics was producing and the Air Force was 
accepting F-111s.
No bi-service plane was ever produced. The Navy’s version of the 
TFX project (F-111B) was cancelled in 1968. A total of seven planes were 
built for the Navy, all for purposes of research and testing.305 The Air Force 
expected to purchase 1,473 aircraft when the project was originally 
conceived. It actually purchased only 413 planes in the fighter-bomber 
series, of which only 82 (the F-111F series) substantially met the original 
specifications. In addition, the Air Force acquired 76 strategic bomber 
versions designated as FB F-111. The cost of the project was approximately 
twice its original estimate which was in line with other Air Force aircraft 
development projects in the 1950s that exceeded target costs from 100 to 
200 percent. 
McNamara continued to argue that his TFX decision was correct “in 
principle”. He would point out that the Air Force accepted the Navy’s F-4 
aircraft after he had cancelled its own F-110. The commanding general of 
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the Tactical Air Command “…was absolutely ecstatic about the F-4,” he 
would observe.306 As we have already discussed, the F-4 was a faulty 
analogy. The Air Force had a production aircraft it could evaluate. In the 
case of the TFX each service had only an aircraft design; each was called 
upon to accept on faith the performance characteristics of the final product. 
Knowing the problems inherent in producing such a technically-complicated 
product, each service was understandably skeptical. 
Although McNamara continued to argue for the benefits of 
commonality, the TFX project hardly supported his argument. Nor had 
“project definition” proved its value.307 Perhaps the greatest irony is that 
none of the versions of the F-111, which was intended to be “the sole tactical 
fighter in the Air Force in the 1970s,” had the maneuverability necessary for 
                                                          
306 McNamara OSD Interview, May 22, 1968, p. 17.
307 Concurrency also fell out of favor as a result of the 1969 report of the Defense Blue 
Ribbon Panel — Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department 
of Defense (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970); the report of the 
Comptroller General on the acquisition of major weapon systems — Report to the 
Congress: Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1971); and the testimony of Deputy Defense Secretary, David Packard 
before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Policy 
Changes in Weapon Systems Procurement. The new policy was known colloquially as 
“Fly it before you buy it,” and suggested that future procurement of major weapon 
systems would have greater flexibility. Concurrency, however, is a snake that will not die 
easily. Walter Pincus reported that the Air Force is currently using concurrency in the 
development of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter which has cost the taxpayer an 
additional $7.5 billion.  The project has been delayed almost three years. See “Slack 
Budgeting at Defense Department”, Washington Post June 7, 2012, p. A21.
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a fighter aircraft and, therefore, was not used in that capacity, but only as a 
ground attack bomber.
Probably the greatest damage from the TFX controversy was to the 
Secretary. It substantially damaged his credibility. “The press had started to 
doubt his truthfulness during the TFX hearings and this attitude had carried 
over to the Vietnam war”, his biographer concluded.308 From a management 
perspective the manner in which McNamara made the decision called into 
question the usefulness of PPBS and the Systems Analysis office. In 1967 
testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Alain 
Enthoven admitted that his then boss, Charles Hitch was not consulted about 
the TFX and that his Systems Analysis office was not involved in any way. 
He attempted to justify that omission on the grounds that PPBS was in its 
most primitive form. He stated that McNamara made his decision based on 
“common sense.”309 Well then, Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota asked, 
if McNamara’s decision was based on common sense and the military 
Evaluation Group’s decision rejecting TFX was also based on common 
sense (which Enthoven had to admit the military possessed), why didn’t the 
Secretary bring in Systems Analysis and PPBS “to overrule the common 
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Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 90th Cong., 
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sense determination of the three unanimous Evaluation Groups…?” 
Enthoven, clearly on the defensive sought refuge in the time-honored excuse 
that he was “…not acquainted in detail with the facts of the case.”310
In his testimony, Enthoven kept urging the committee not to judge 
PPBS by the TFX decision but by the decisions regarding the B-70, Skybolt 
and Nike-Zeus which had saved billions.311 Even admitting its values in 
these instances, one could easily have drawn the conclusion from his 
testimony, that when McNamara opposed a program, PPBS was useful but 
that when he supported one, it was superfluous.  That, I believe, was the 
case.
In the final analysis the test of managerial competence is whether the 
manager accomplished what he set out to do. By that standard McNamara’s 
management of the TFX project was a failure. His actions also revealed 
certain deficiencies in his managerial approach: (1) his tendency to think that 
his work was done once he had made a decision and left the job for others to 
complete: (2) his cavalier treatment of other stakeholders in the decision like 
the military and Congress (3) his maladroitness when it came to a public 
defense of a controversial decision, (4) his disinterest in matters involving 
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production, and finally, (5) his inability to prioritize. Commonality was, and 
remains a “big idea” in terms of saving defense dollars. In light of the 
magnitude of the TFX initiative, one would have expected McNamara to 
have spent much more time on the issue — consulting Congress, the 
military, industry, and above all, answering fundamental questions like why 
did the Air Force need deep interdiction into enemy territory with nuclear 
weapons.
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CHAPTER 5  
ROBERT S. MCNAMARA WAR MANAGER
I have been critical of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara. 
I was worried  about him from the beginning when they said he 
makes no small mistakes ~ Eugene McCarthy, 
Ft. Wayne, Indiana April 27, 1968312
The great captains of history drew their lessons from complex chess, 
not simple dominoes ~ George W. Ball, New York Times Magazine, 
December 21, 1969, p.33
One cannot assess McNamara’s overall performance as a manager 
without grappling with his involvement in the Vietnam War. It is a 
paradoxical narrative. In some areas, like logistics, he performed well. The 
introduction within a three-year period of more than 450,000 military 
personnel into a small country without a modern infrastructure 9,000 miles 
                                                          
312 McCarthy, a senator from Minnesota, was a Democratic candidate for president in the 
1968 primaries. His strong showing in the New Hampshire primary on an anti-war 
platform persuaded President Johnson not to seek a second term and propelled Sen. 
Robert Kennedy into the race. McCarthy went on to say:  “I think it’s probably a mistake 
to take presidents of any of the big three automobile companies and make him secretary 
of defense because on the record they’re not allowed to make any small mistakes. It’s 
kind of the Edsel complex. The Edsel and the TFX have so much in common. They were 
designed to meet all the needs of whoever was to use them. I think I should explain what 
the Edsel was conceived of providing. It wasn’t McNamara’s idea; he just programmed 
it. It was a car which was supposed to be the car a man would buy if he was on the way 
up and wasn’t sure if he was going to make it. Also, they said it was for the man who was 
on the way down and didn’t want anyone to know it; and for the man who was somewhat
unsure of which way he was going. The Ford Motor Company figured that everyman in 
his lifetime would have to have three Edsels.” Eugene McCarthy campaign speech during 
the Democratic presidential primary, Ft. Wayne, Indiana Coliseum April 27, 1968 
Pressed by Wakefield Mfg., Phoenix AZ, and distributed by McCarthy for President 
Committee, Washington, DC. Copy in author’s possession.
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away presented formidable management issues. There were glitches, of 
course, but overall McNamara, who was characteristically very much 
involved, managed the operation well.
On the larger issues, however, such as our objectives in Vietnam and 
the strategy we should pursue to reach those objectives, he failed. His 
activism and centralized management style made him appear to be managing 
the war, which I argue he was not, but by his own admission such activism 
left him with inadequate time to understand the historical factors underlying 
the conflict. His deference to superiors made him reluctant to give advice 
that he believed would be rejected. His combative intellectual attitude 
prevented him from considering alternatives to the positions he was 
advocating. Finally, his lack of professional collegiality isolated him from a 
full range of opinions on the conduct of the war.
In sum, many of the traits—analytical brilliance, quantitative facility, 
persistence, and his determination to win personal encounters—that made 
him so forceful in managing issues like force structure, weapons acquisition, 
and even nuclear strategy, failed him when it came to Vietnam. McNamara 
was an Aristotelian tragic hero—a man who fails because of  internal flaws 
colliding with  external forces which he fails to understand.
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The Image
Although the Vietnam War remains a highly contested period of 
American history, there has been wide-spread historical agreement about 
Robert McNamara’s role in it. The general portrait that has come down to us 
is that it was “his” war. As David Halberstam wrote in his popular, The Best 
and the Brightest, “In Washington the dominant figure on Vietnam was not 
Dean Rusk, but the Secretary of Defense McNamara; it was he who 
dominated the action, the play, the terms by which success in Vietnam was 
determined.”313  The maverick, Wayne Morse, Senator from Oregon, called 
it “McNamara’s War” and McNamara had accepted the appellation. “I don’t 
object to its being called McNamara’s War,” he replied to a reporter’s query, 
“I think it is a very important war and I am pleased to be identified with it 
and to do whatever I can to win it.”314
This general impression has, if anything, been amplified over the 
years since Halberstam wrote his bestseller. Major studies by journalists who 
were involved in the war portray Robert McNamara as primus inter pares
among the president’s advisers. A typical example would be the judgment of 
                                                          
313 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (NY: Random House, 1969), p. 213.
314 McNamara, In Retrospect op. cit., p. 118. Robert McNamara originally made his 
remark at a press conference on April 24, 1964; he repeated it at a press conference April 
26, 1965. Pentagon Papers (hereafter, PP) Graveled., (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) vol. 
III, p. 737.
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Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel who wrote, “McNamara more than any other 
high official, set the tone and direction of United States policy in 
Indochina.” After all, they argue, why else would President Johnson have 
sent him and General Taylor to check out the new head of state of South 
Vietnam, General Nguyen Khanh in early 1964 when a more appropriate 
choice would have been the secretary of state?  He was, they write, 
“Washington’s No. 1 expert on Vietnam.”315  High-ranking military 
personnel who participated in the conflict have reinforced this image. In 
memoirs that consistently blame civilian micromanagement for the tragic 
outcome of the conflict McNamara is singled out as a principal offender.316  
Academics are also part of the chorus. As George Herring of the University 
of Kentucky has written, “McNamara remained the key 
figure…continuing…to serve as the ‘desk officer’ for Vietnam” and 
“Johnson and McNamara saw their principal task in war management as 
maintaining tight operational control over the military…The tendency to 
                                                          
315 Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel, Roots of Involvement: The U.S. in Asia, 1784-1971 (NY: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971) pp. 165-6. See also Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A 
History (NY: Viking, 1984); A.J. Langguth, Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975 (NY: 
Simon & Schuster, 2000).
316 E.g., William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (NY: Doubleday & Co., 1976); 
Ulysses Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (NY: Presidio Press, 
1978); Admiral Sharp alleges that McNamara managed the war “down to the finest 
detail;” Letter to Thomas Morris, April 9, 1978, Morris Project, p.2.
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micromanage must also be understood in the context of the strains in civil-
military relations during the Vietnam era.”317
How accurate is this portrait?  It is not easy to disentangle the strands 
that combine to produce a tapestry of McNamara’s management of the war. 
Part of the difficulty lies in the varied nature of his responsibilities as the 
Secretary of Defense. On the one hand, he was an adviser, probably the most 
important one on the conduct of the war, to the president as Commander-in-
Chief. In that capacity he participated in virtually all the important strategic 
decisions the president made with respect to the war. His influence is evident 
on the major questions that came before the president:  troop deployments, 
bombing pauses, targets and peace negotiations. His influence was increased 
by the way in which President Johnson liked to receive advice. Adapting a 
technique he had used as majority leader of the Senate, Johnson would hold 
regular Tuesday lunches with McNamara, McGeorge (Mac) Bundy and Rusk 
to discuss the war. In such a setting McNamara, who was always superbly 
prepared and forceful in presentation, would have a distinct edge - especially 
as there was no military figure present as was the case until General Wheeler 
became a regular invitee late in 1967. 
                                                          
317 George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, TX: Univ. of 
Texas Press, 1994), pp.10, 38.
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What is important to keep in mind is that he was not in a position to 
“manage” these major issues in any meaningful sense. He was a counselor—
not a good one as it turned out - both in terms of his recommendations or the 
vigor with which he discredited those who disagreed with him - but he was 
only one of many advisers, perhaps the most important one, but still just one. 
McNamara also had responsibility for translating the president’s 
decision, insofar as they involved the Defense Department, into operational 
directives. The Vietnam War was the first conflict in which the Secretary of 
Defense was directly in the chain of command from the president to the 
theater commander. In World War II, for example, President Roosevelt dealt 
directly with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff 318
who were actually assigned to the Executive Office of the President. The 
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson played only a minor role. He “…was not 
invited to all or even most of the key conferences at which alliance strategy 
was hammered out with the British and was not even on the circulation list 
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff papers.”319  After passage of the National 
Security Act of 1947, the three services were under a single department but 
each service retained much of its previous authority, including operational 
                                                          
318 The Air Force was not yet a separate service but part of the Army.
319 Godfrey Hodgson, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson (NY: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1990), p. 228.
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authority. During the Korean War, for example, directives went from the 
president to the Joint Chiefs and from there to MacArthur. It was not until 
passage of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 that the 
service secretaries were removed from the operational chain of command, 
permitting combatant commands to communicate directly through the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff with the Secretary and the President. McNamara made full 
use of the authority given him by that legislation to reorganize the Pentagon, 
fundamentally changing the means of procuring weapon systems and 
recasting U.S. nuclear strategy. One major question remained. How would 
he use this enhanced authority when U.S. forces were in combat?  It was an 
issue no previous secretary had faced.320
                                                          
320 McNamara’s authority over operations was not accepted by all the services, however. 
Although the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 specifically provided that the 
President, “…through the Secretary of Defense shall establish unified or specified 
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The image we have of McNamara is also heavily influenced by his 
personality. As his oft-time opponent, George Ball, the Undersecretary of 
State, would write, “In any group where McNamara was present, he soon 
emerged as the dominant voice.” Ball credits him with having extraordinary 
self—confidence that was based not on bluster but “on a detailed knowledge 
of objective facts.” The accuracy and dependability of those “objective 
facts” have been questioned by some. David O. Cooke, Director of 
Administration and Management, a 45-year veteran of the Department who 
had served under twelve secretaries, for example, observed that McNamara 
“…Quite often…would give a finite number and it could not be proved true 
or untrue”. 
George Ball echoed that observation. When asked to predict the 
chances of success of an operation, he wrote, McNamara:
…would answer with apparent precision: one 
operation would have a 65 percent chance, another 
a 30 percent chance. Once I tried to tease him, 
suggesting that perhaps the chances were 64 percent 
and 29 percent, but the joke was not well taken.321
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, 99th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print, Oct. 
16, 1985, pp. 304-306.
321 David O. Cooke, OSD Interview, Oct. 23, 1989, pp. 6, 8.
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The McNamara Pentagon, Cooke suggests, was frequently gripped by 
the “fundamental fallacy of concrete numbers.” 322
Accordingly, in any discussion of Vietnam strategy, McNamara 
would be a forceful voice. He did not always prevail but his advice was 
followed more often than not. In addition, as pointed out above, he was in 
the direct chain of command from the president to the area and theater 
commanders. The orders would pass through the Joint Chiefs, but they came 
from McNamara. No wonder then that he has been singled out as the most 
important figure, apart from the president, in setting Vietnam policy. 
Complicating the picture is the virtually unanimous agreement that he 
revolutionized the defense department through transformative managerial 
techniques. “The term ‘revolution’ is often too loosely applied to political or 
bureaucratic change,” writes Lawrence Kaplan, “but it aptly describes the 
transformation that McNamara wrought in the Department of Defense… In 
his first years in office he shook up the Pentagon, bringing to it an energy 
and intelligence that would make him the most successful manager in the 
history of the department up to that time as well as its most controversial 
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1982),  p.173-174. Re “facts.”
234
secretary.”323  Not only did McNamara “revolutionize” the defense
department, he made sure that the frame of reference through which he 
orchestrated this revolution — the PPBS and the closely related analytical 
discipline of systems analysis — “would permeate every area of Defense 
responsibilities, from the preparation of the budget to conceptions of 
strategy, from the composition of military forces to choices of offensive and 
defensive weapons.”324  Furthermore, as Edward Drea writes, “What set 
McNamara apart were not only a far-reaching agenda but the depth and 
breadth of his involvement in all Defense affairs.”325  He oversaw every 
feature of defense management, according to this portrayal, presenting an 
agenda that was novel and innovative and expanding it to every corner of his 
jurisdiction. By the relatively early date of,
January 1965 he stood near a peak of success and 
influence. In taking command of the largest 
department in the government, he had improved its 
military capabilities, firmly established civilian 
control over the military services, swept away many 
outmoded practices and organizations, and forced the 
services and bureaucracy to adapt to a new, more 
analytical approach to defense management.326
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Numerous voices have expanded this chorus. He brought his 
managerial expertise to the Department of Defense (DoD) and did not miss a 
beat. Borrowing methodologies developed by the Rand Corporation (a 
global policy think tank with close ties to the Air Force), McNamara’s 
Pentagon sought to subject an old object of study to exciting new techniques. 
As Arthur Schlesinger has described defense operations under McNamara, 
“The essence of their effort was the application of systematic quantitative 
analysis to strategic decisions.”327  He “entered on the scene,” as Halberstam 
put it, “an imaginative and able cog in an enormously successful machine:  
business methods applied to war.” And he brought with him a basic 
understanding of the affairs of men and how he would properly shape them. 
To him, “the mind was mathematical, analytical, bringing order and reason 
out of chaos. Always reason. And reason supported by facts, by statistics —
he could prove his rationality with facts….”328 That so many years later he 
still resolutely asserted, “things you can count, you ought to count,” has only 
seemed to confirm the legend — that McNamara subjected everything he 
possibly could to a relentlessly statistical analysis, delivering by this 
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sophisticated social-scientific method what was otherwise elusive: rational 
control in a fundamentally irrational world.329
It was a world that was quite removed from the automobile industry. 
There is, of course, an irrational aspect to selling cars, especially as 
automobile manufacturers resorted to techniques such as psychographics. 
The irrationality of salesmanship, however, could be channeled through test 
marketing, focus groups and other techniques to probe market reaction. 
None of this is available in war.
The Secretary whose reputation was built on counting, model-
building, and monolithic analysis — confirmed by critics and supporters 
alike — made Vietnam the “rational” war, or tried to anyway. The signature 
opportunity and challenge of his tenure offered him the greatest opportunity 
he had yet received. It afforded a chance to take the most complex, chaotic, 
and irrational of human endeavors and bring it under the kind of precise, 
empirical control that only PPBS and, even more so, systems analysis could 
provide. Thus, working under these assumptions, it comes as no surprise that 
Gregory Palmer has suggested as the basis for his study on McNamara and 
the management of the Vietnam War that “the Planning Programming 
Budgeting System…dominated American defense planning between 1960 
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and 1968 and played a large part in the escalation of the Vietnam War 
between 1965 and 1968.”330
This was the age of the “New Frontier,” after all, a time when 
vigorous, young public servants would sweep away the outdated, 
unnecessary practices of stodgy, close-minded generations.  It was a time 
when the novel and the logical would no longer be shackled by the 
conventional and the customary. The men whom President Kennedy 
appointed to the executive department were perpetually impatient. Neil 
Sheehan once wrote after a two-day visit to Saigon by McNamara “…high 
American officials of McNamara’s generation were always in a hurry, hurry 
to make decisions so they could hurry on to make more decisions.”331  It was 
a new age and they were here to usher in the rational modes of social and 
bureaucratic control that had been stifled for too long. It was a New Frontier 
and no individual more neatly fit the description of the “New Frontiersman” 
than Robert McNamara.332
The strength and appeal of this portrait, one which has been 
reproduced and strengthened with the passage of time, has firmly established 
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the terms of debate. It is obvious that McNamara managed the Vietnam War 
much as he managed everything else, with the same relentless procedures 
and the same tireless conviction that enabled him and his fellow “whiz kids” 
to revive the ailing Ford Motor Company and transform the Pentagon. If the 
American war effort proved a disaster (something that many, both the 
resolutely analytical and the nakedly political alike, have concluded), then it 
was certainly not because of under-management. If anything, it was over-
management by civilians, especially the Secretary of Defense, who would go 
as far as selecting bombing targets in managing the war. Halberstam first 
offered this kind of portrait, one that was not just highly critical of 
McNamara’s approach but one that, importantly, presumed that his error lay 
in over-management. To him, McNamara “knew nothing about Asia, about 
poverty, about people, about American domestic politics, but he knew a 
great deal about production technology and about exercising bureaucratic 
power. He was classically a corporate man; had it been a contest between the 
United States and Hanoi as to which side could produce the most goods for 
the peasants of South Vietnam, clearly we would have won. If it had just 
been a matter of getting the right goods to the right villages, we would have 
won; unfortunately, what we were selling was not what they were buying.” 
The military would “produce the raw data, and McNamara, who knew data, 
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would go over it carefully and extricate truth from the morass.” These 
conclusions would lead him to tell reporters, with great optimism, that all of 
the “indices were good.” But he “could not have been more wrong; he 
simply had all the wrong indices, looking for American production indices 
in an Asian political revolution.” He was unwilling to “adapt his own 
standards and criteria.” And all of this made him, “there is no kinder or 
gentler word for it, a fool.”333
What Halberstam first wrote has remained popular and, as 
demonstrated, has continued to shape our understanding of the Secretary and 
how he handled the Vietnam War. We glimpse a man managing the war to 
the fullest, managing it on precisely his own terms. He took the data and 
believed that he had extracted the clear picture that the details had otherwise 
obscured. The problem lay precisely here, that he allowed quantitative 
analysis to so fully shape his understanding of the conflict and the Asian 
society in which it took place, that he failed to understand who the 
Vietnamese really were or what they wanted. “Taking on a guerilla war was 
like buying a sick foreign company,” Halberstam mocked, “you brought 
your systems to it.”334  Many have disagreed with Halberstam’s biting 
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conclusions — either suggesting that McNamara’s techniques were more 
effective than he was willing to concede or that forces beyond the 
secretary’s control conspired against him — but few, if any, have disagreed 
with his basic premise:  that McNamara managed the war like he managed 
everything else.
The contention here is that this assumption needs to be rethought. 
Introduction to Vietnam and the First Major Decision
Let us start by looking at what McNamara actually did as the U.S. 
became entangled in the Vietnamese insurrection.335  Vietnam was not a 
high priority foreign policy issue in the early days of the Kennedy 
administration. Berlin, Cuba, relations with the Soviet Union and the Congo 
received greater attention. Even in Southeast Asia, Laos was the principal 
focus. When the president-elect and his top cabinet nominees, including 
McNamara, met with President Eisenhower the day before the Inauguration 
he told them that Laos was “the key to the whole area” and that if it fell “it 
would just be a matter of time until South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and 
Burma would collapse.” Kennedy would remark to W.W. Rostow, of the 
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National Security Council (NSC), a week after that meeting “This [Vietnam] 
is the worst we’ve got, isn’t it?  You know Eisenhower never mentioned it. 
He talked at length about Laos, but never uttered the word Vietnam.”336
Vietnam was also a low priority for McNamara for most of 1961. He 
requested a short 5-10 minute briefing at the end of January from Edward 
Lansdale, the celebrated Air Force officer and CIA operative, who helped 
Ramon Magsaysay defeat the communist Hukbalahap in the Philippines. 
Lansdale, who had spent considerable time in Vietnam in the period 1954-
1956 and was one of the few westerners whom South Vietnam President 
Diem trusted, had just returned from a visit to the country in mid-January. 
His memorandum on the current situation had reached the president and had 
created something of a stir. McNamara naturally wanted to be kept abreast, 
but the meeting did not go well. As Lansdale recounted several years later, 
when he entered McNamara’s office he dumped on his desk a stack of 
primitive guerilla weapons still caked with blood and mud. He was trying to 
impress him with the type of enemy the U.S. was facing and as he put it “the 
struggle goes far beyond the material things of life.” It was not the kind of 
briefing that McNamara appreciated. As he once told a White House aide 
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who was arguing against the war, “Where is your data?  Give me something 
I can put in the computer. Don’t give me your poetry.” 337  Lansdale had a 
good deal of poetry but little data. “Somehow I found him very hard to talk 
to,” he would say, “watching his face as I talked, I got the feeling that he 
didn’t understand me.”338
McNamara’s other contribution during the first few months was to 
persuade Kennedy to establish a Vietnam Task Force chaired by his deputy 
Roswell Gilpatric to review the administration’s policy and offer 
recommendations. He gave the committee only one week in which to 
accomplish its task. As we have already seen, short deadlines were typical of 
McNamara’s management style and frequently served a useful management 
goal of spurring actions. In the context of examining the highly complex 
military and political state of affairs in Vietnam, however, a short deadline 
made it likely that the final product would only be a rehash of prior 
initiatives and suggestions, especially because no one on the task force, save 
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Lansdale, had any experience in the subject. That is precisely what 
happened. As Gilpatric later reflected:
We took all of these masses of suggestions that 
came in from all of these people…who had been out 
there and we talked them over and threw them 
around at various sessions we had at State and 
Defense, and came up with this whole package of 
different measures. I think we bought that whole 
line and then put it forward as our own…I think we 
were kidding ourselves into thinking that we were 
making well-informed decisions.339
As the year progressed McNamara recognized that Vietnam would 
become a major area of attention. In August, he proposed to the Joint Chiefs 
that South Vietnam be “‘a laboratory for the development of organization 
and procedures for the conduct of sub-limited war’ run by an experimental 
command directly responsible to the Secretary’s office.”340  This was a 
perfectly normal corporate response. It is not unusual for a top manager to 
establish a small group outside the normal chain of command to develop a 
new product or service. Tom Watson had done the same sort of thing in 
developing the IBM 360. The military, however, has a different tradition and 
the Chiefs wanted no part of such a novel arrangement.
McNamara’s sustained engagement with Vietnam began in the late 
fall of 1961. The Viet Cong had enjoyed increasing success during the 
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summer, spurring President Diem to request a bilateral defense treaty with 
the U.S. and ask for the dispatch of combat troops. In response to the 
growing crisis, Kennedy sent Maxwell Taylor, his special military adviser, 
and W.W. Rostow of the NSC on a week-long fact finding mission to 
Saigon. Their report of November 3 drew a grim picture:  Viet Cong 
strength had almost doubled, and “the entire country was suffering from a 
collapse of national morale….” The report recommended a commitment of 
6-8,000 U.S. logistical and combat troops to work side-by-side with the 
Vietnamese and the encadrement of U.S. civilians into the Vietnamese 
bureaucracy to “show them how the job might be done.” Taylor 
characterized the new relationship as a “limited partnership” that required a 
shift in the military organization that was providing assistance to the 
Vietnamese military “from an advisory group to something near — but not 
quite — an operational headquarters in a theater of war.” 341
Initially, McNamara supported the Taylor-Rostow recommendations; 
indeed, the memorandum submitted by DoD on November 8, only five days 
after Taylor’s written report, signed by McNamara, Gilpatric, and the Joint 
Chiefs, suggested that those recommendations might be too timid to 
convince the North Vietnamese that the U.S. was fully committed to their 
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southern neighbor. The dispatch of combat troops, they argued, should be 
accompanied by a warning “that continued support of the Viet Cong will 
lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam.”342  As McNamara 
remembered it in his memoir, he immediately had second thoughts about his 
advice and three days later sent a revised joint State-DoD memorandum 
recommending against sending combat troops. 343
What had prompted this quick change of mind?  After all, sending 
combat troops into a foreign country is a momentous decision. How could 
McNamara have changed his mind so quickly on so important an issue?  
Was it self-generated, as he maintained, or had he realized that his initial 
advice was contrary to the wishes of the president?  As we saw when he was 
working at Ford, McNamara’s bureaucratic antennae were particularly 
sensitive to the wishes of his superiors. It turns out that President Kennedy 
did not want any public discussion of the possibility of sending U.S. combat 
troops to South Vietnam. In an unusual step either he, or someone close to 
him, had planted a story in the New York Times that Taylor’s proposed trip 
to Saigon was to consider many options and that the possible dispatch of 
U.S. combat troops was at “the bottom of the list.” Citing authoritative 
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sources, the Times reported, “Military leaders at the Pentagon, no less than 
General Taylor himself, are understood to be reluctant to send organized 
U.S. combat units into Southeast Asia.” As the Pentagon Papers 
characterized the Times report, “this was simply untrue.” 344  To keep 
Taylor’s recommendation of combat troops secret, Kennedy went so far as 
to recall copies of the report from all recipients other than his top advisers. 
The Taylor-Rostow report was debated extensively over a two-week 
period. Kennedy decided not to send combat troops, but approved aid to 
increase South Vietnam military forces and a substantial increase in the 
number of U.S. advisers to the South Vietnam military down to battalion 
level as well as in each provincial capital. It was the first significant step 
toward the Americanization of the war.345
The President’s decision, embodied in National Security Action 
Memorandum (NSAM) 111, neglected to state clearly the objective of 
America’s involvement in the South Vietnamese struggle. The military, and 
McNamara, had requested a clear-cut statement of a commitment to an 
objective like “…preventing the fall of south Vietnam to Communism.” That 
was not forthcoming. Instead NSAM 111 stated, “The United States 
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Government would join forces with the South Vietnamese Government in a 
sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation 
in South Vietnam” followed by a list of 10 initiatives.346 It was not an 
objective that the military, or indeed any manager, would feel comfortable 
with, and it would characterize the entire war effort.
McNamara’s Travels:  The Illusion of Management
JFK’s decision marked the beginning of McNamara’s “personal 
responsibility” for the conflict. When President Kennedy asked for a cabinet 
officer “to be responsible for monitoring progress” in Vietnam, McNamara 
volunteered.347  After the issuance of NSAM 111, which spelled out the 
details of the president’s decision, McNamara took over. He may have been 
charged with “monitoring progress”, but to the world he seemed to take 
charge. 
He made his first trip to Hawaii to begin the process of establishing 
procedures to implement the president’s decision in the middle of December. 
That meeting would be followed in the next nine months by five more trips 
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to Hawaii and one trip to Vietnam. On January 12, 1962, the NYT reported 
that McNamara, “who rarely leaves Washington even on business trips…had 
committed himself to similar trips every thirty days over the next few 
months.”348  From this first trip in December, 1961 until his resignation in 
November, 1967, he would make 11 trips to Hawaii for conferences on the 
war and nine trips to Vietnam for the same purpose.349  These trips did much 
to create the image of a manager in charge, especially because they were so 
out of character. As the Times had reported in January, 1961 McNamara 
seldom left his Pentagon office. During his tenure as Secretary, McNamara 
did not address any of the military academies and almost never visited any 
troops outside Vietnam. Thus, his regular trips to Hawaii and Saigon 
acquired special significance. They were also an integral part of his 
management philosophy — project leadership through activism:
The role of a public manager [he would say] is very 
similar to the role of a private manager; in each case 
he has the option of following one of two major 
alternative courses of action. He can either act as a 
judge or leader…I have always believed in and 
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endeavored to follow the active leadership role as 
opposed to the passive judicial role.350
But what did all this activity accomplish?
McNamara was clearly sensitive about his trips to Honolulu and 
Vietnam; he justified the meetings on the ground that it was the best way to 
obtain accurate information: 
…Were our views of the problems we faced 
realistic?  Would our plans to deal with them
succeed?  How were we to know when we were 
moving in an alien environment alongside a people 
whose language and culture we did not understand 
and whose history, values, and political traditions 
differed profoundly from our own…
None of us…was ever satisfied with the information 
we received from Vietnam. Of course, we asked for 
and got factual reports on military operations. And 
we avidly read the flood of narrative analyses from 
our embassy in Saigon. But very early we decided 
there was a need for regular meetings among the 
senior U.S. officials in Saigon and Washington 
dealing with these issues.
His answer was personal briefings:
Critics have subsequently faulted us for holding 
such meetings…While they were far from perfect, 
the meetings in Hawaii and Vietnam permitted 
those of us from Washington to convey the 
president’s thinking and objectives to our 
colleagues in Vietnam and gave them the 
opportunity to offer reports and make 
recommendations for further action. I believe we 
would have been far worse off if the meetings had 
not been held.351
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No one seriously argues that no meetings should have been held, but 
there are genuine questions:  was a two-day briefing of the Secretary of 
Defense the best way to determine whether Washington’s view of the 
problems faced by the U.S. was “realistic”?  Would fewer, but longer and 
more probing discussions, especially with more junior military personnel, 
have been more productive?  Would it have been more revelatory to send 
junior staff members to explore the issues since they were not subject to the 
protocols inherent in the visit of a senior administration official like 
McNamara?  What were the negative consequences stemming from how 
briefings were conducted?352
First, the trips were exhausting. If they were to Hawaii, the aircraft, a 
converted windowless KC-135 without soundproofing and initially without 
bunks, would leave on a Sunday afternoon and arrive before midnight in 
Honolulu. Monday would be filled with all-day briefings with an evening 
departure for Washington so that McNamara could brief the president on 
Tuesday morning. A Saigon trip, which took over 20 hours, was even worse. 
As William Colby, a future Director of the CIA, described it: 
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[We] were bundled into the windowless KC-135 jet 
for the familiar leap from Andrews Air Force base 
outside Washington to Anchorage, Alaska, to Tan 
Sun Nhut airport in Saigon. The procedure was 
always the same:  diving upon arrival into a series 
of briefings in hot, stuffy rooms and a succession of 
conferences with American and Vietnamese 
officials (in that order) to try to determine what was 
happening “on the ground.”353
Chester Cooper of the NSC described one of his visits as follows:
His typical trip involved leaving Washington in the 
evening and, after a twenty-four hour journey and a 
thirteen hour time change, arriving in Saigon at 
eight in the morning. The Secretary would emerge 
from the plane and suggest graciously that his 
fellow-travelers take a half-hour or so to wash up 
and then join him at a 9 o’clock briefing at MACV 
Headquarters. There, for the next three hours, they 
were expected not only to add up figures but to 
absorb the rapid-fire series of complicated military 
briefings liberally seasoned with charts, graphs, 
maps, and the inevitable sequence of slides.354
What were the briefings and conferences like? In Hawaii they were 
conducted in a large conference room before 50 or 60 persons so that even 
McNamara had to admit, “the crowded atmosphere and agenda often made it 
hard to focus on the issues at hand and ensure we were receiving candid 
reports and thoughtful recommendations.”355  Mac Bundy, the National 
Security Adviser, accompanied McNamara on his November, 1963 trip to 
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Honolulu and before the trip asked his colleague, Mike Forrestal, what the 
conferences were like. Forrestal reported:
…that past meetings had consisted of 100 observers 
in the commander’s conference room watching the 
military briefers unveil “a dazzling display of maps 
and charts, punctuated with some impressive 
intellectual fireworks from Bob McNamara.”
Bundy remarked that “the agenda seemed to be full of briefings and 
[I] asked Forrestal if something could be done about that or whether they 
would have to have some dinners on the side to do some real talking.” 
Apparently it was difficult to change the format; the large circus-like 
briefings continued, and there were few occasions for candid talk. Later, 
when he was looking for a pithy way to summarize this trip for his staff, 
Bundy concluded that the best way to describe the briefings was “people 
tried to fool him [McNamara], and he tries to convince them they cannot.”356
The inadequacy of quick fact-finding visits was dramatically 
demonstrated by the oft-repeated description of a weekend trip by two 
officials to determine whether the U.S. should support a coup against 
President Diem in the fall of 1963. The administration was divided. The 
group supporting a coup despaired of ever winning the war unless Diem 
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dismissed his brother, Nhu, as an adviser which the South Vietnamese 
president refused to do. The opposing group admitted that Nhu was a malign 
influence but argued that Diem was the best available leader for the country, 
that a coup invited chaos, and that the U.S. should stick with him but 
continue to bring pressure to remove Nhu. As happens so often when faced 
with a difficult decision, each side hoped that more “on the ground” 
information would resolve the problem. Accordingly, Kennedy sent Maj. 
General Victor Krulak from Defense and Joseph Mendenhall from State on a 
four-day round-trip to Vietnam to report on the situation. Upon their return, 
Krulak gave an optimistic view of the military situation. He assured the 
group that the war was being won and that abandoning Diem would 
undermine a successful strategy. Mendenhall on the other hand reported that 
the war was being lost and that Diem had forfeited the trust of the country, 
especially in Saigon, Danang, and Hue. When they had finished, Kennedy 
wryly asked, “The two of you did visit the same country, didn’t you?” 357
One consequence of having a senior official like the Secretary of 
Defense participate in high-level conferences was that it attracted heightened 
press attention. Inevitably, both when McNamara departed Vietnam and 
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later when he arrived in Washington, he would be asked about the war’s 
progress. During the first two years the response was that it was going well. 
McNamara admitted that his optimism may have been a bit overstated but 
later blamed it on the positive reports that he received from the U.S. military 
which relied on “very inaccurate information from the South Vietnamese, 
who tended to report what they believed Americans wanted to hear.”358  The 
explanation is too glib. Americans stationed in Vietnam also reported 
information that they thought higher authority wanted to hear.
Take, for example, the briefing McNamara received on his first trip to 
Saigon in May, 1962. One question on the top of the agenda was the strength 
of the Viet Cong. The head of  Military Assistance Command Vietnam’s 
(MACV) intelligence was Col. James Winterbottom an Air Force officer 
whose specialty had been selecting sites for nuclear targeting. He had 
previously briefed McNamara in February in Honolulu in what has been 
described as a “confusing presentation of charts and figures…”359  Before 
his visit McNamara had cabled ahead requesting a province-by-province 
analysis of Viet Cong strength. Winterbottom knew he was on the spot. 
Initially, his team came up with a total figure of 40,000 Viet Cong which 
                                                          
358 McNamara, op. cit., p. 47.
359  Langguth, op. cit., 173-74.
255
was about double that of any previously reported figure. The number was 
unacceptable, so he tightened the criteria and reduced the figure to 25,000. 
General Harkins, the MACV commander, would not accept this number 
either. Accordingly, the colonel relieved the team he had been working with, 
and assembled a new group of junior officers whom he hoped would be 
more pliable; they cut back the figure to 17,500. “By the time McNamara 
got to Saigon, it was the more authoritative-sounding 16,305.”360  One can 
sympathize with the colonel. During virtually the whole war, U.S. 
intelligence was inaccurate and misleading. A study conducted by the 
JASON division of the Institute for Defense Analysis in the summer of 1966 
concluded:
…with very few exceptions our information on 
communist logistics and manpower was so inexact 
that it was difficult to come to any conclusions as to 
the effectiveness of our military policy. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the data is so soft that we 
cannot state with confidence whether we have been 
doing better or worse militarily over the past 
year.361
The colonel was undoubtedly aware of the truism:  “To adopt a 
negative attitude was defeatism, and there were no promotions for 
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defeatists…positive reports were rewarded, even if they bore little 
resemblance to the truth.”362
It is difficult to accept that McNamara had unbounded confidence in 
the figures that the military were reporting. He acknowledged in his memoir 
that he received information from other sources like the CIA and the State 
Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research, and the reports of the 
much-criticized American journalists were available if he chose to read 
them. Generally, these sources were less optimistic and more accurate.363  
Yet, there is no evidence that McNamara, the data-driven manager, sought 
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intelligence independent of the military until 1967 when he asked the CIA to 
analyze the effectiveness of air operations over North Vietnam.364
McNamara’s optimistic public reports on the progress of the war were 
not exclusively the product of faulty intelligence. A number of historians of 
the war, most notably Stanley Karnow, have charged him with consistently 
dissembling. More specifically, Karnow charges that McNamara misled the 
public on at least four separate occasions.365  The record largely bears out 
this assessment. For example, when describing his trip to Saigon in 
December of 1963, Karnow writes, “But, as usual [McNamara’s] public 
utterances bore no relation to his real estimate.”366  McNamara admitted that 
when he reported on his December, 1963 trip:  “We reviewed the plans of 
the South Vietnamese and we have every reason to believe they will be 
successful…[was] an overstatement at best.”367  In his defense, however, 
readers of the New York Times were not misled about the then current 
situation. Max Frankel’s lead story on page one describes McNamara’s 
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report to the president as “sober”; he reported that McNamara told “…the 
president and other high officials about recent successes of the Communist 
guerillas…the Administration acknowledged with silence that it had 
abandoned the 1965 deadline for the removal of most United States troops 
from Vietnam.” 368 There was little doubt that the situation in Vietnam had 
seriously deteriorated whatever McNamara might have stated about future 
plans.
Karnow’s charge has greater merit when it comes to the March, 1964 
trip. McNamara’s official report, captured in a March 16, 1964 
memorandum for the president is extremely gloomy. “The situation has 
unquestionably been growing worse…” McNamara wrote. He went on to 
catalog how the Viet Cong controlled greater portions of the countryside; 
ARVN desertion rates had been increasing in the last 90 days, and “the 
weakening of the government’s position has been particularly noticeable.”369  
Yet the March 15 edition of the New York Times’ lead column read: 
M’NAMARA TELLS JOHNSON OF GAIN IN VIETNAM WAR.370 He is 
not quoted in the article, however, only “authoritative sources.” It may have 
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been White House spin; to what extent McNamara was compliant we cannot 
know, but he did not contest the article, or the impression it created.
The most egregious example of McNamara’s “public/private” reports 
was after his October, 1966 visit to Vietnam. The New York Times reported:
Mr. McNamara made a generally optimistic 
appraisal of the situation in South Vietnam during a 
brief news conference before his departure. He said 
that military operations had “progressed very 
satisfactorily” in the last year and that “the rate of 
progress exceeded our expectation.” 
371
In his top secret report to the president on October 14, 1966 he took a 
distinctly more pessimistic tone. He would write:
In essence, we find ourselves — from the point of 
view of the important war (for the complicity of the 
people) — no better, and if anything worse 
off…But the discouraging truth is that…we have 
not found the formula, the catalyst for training and 
inspiring them into effective action.
As for military operations:
I see no reasonable way to bring the war to an end 
soon. Enemy morale has not broken…He knows 
that we have not been, and believes we will not 
probably be, able to translate our military successes 
into the “end products” — broken enemy morale 
and political achievements by the Government of 
Vietnam…372
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Were these trips really a way to acquire on-the-spot information?  Not 
if his associate and admirer, Adam Yarmolinsky, is to be believed. In a 1978 
interview he offered a different take:
[McNamara] regarded his trips as theater, and, in 
fact, the report was usually drafted before he left 
and then revised in the light of what assessments 
they made of what people told them…I don’t think, 
and he may contradict me, that he would say that 
those 24, 48, and 72 hour trips were in any sense 
fact-finding.373
As the war ground on McNamara appeared increasingly to recognize 
that his visits were an occasion for theater. Whereas in the early years, he 
would be closeted with generals, 
ambassadors, and other high-ranking 
officials, toward the end of his service he would use his trips to visit troops, 
watch launches from aircraft carriers and participate in similar ceremonial 
functions.
                                                          
373 Congressional Research Service Interview with Adam Yarmolinsky, Oct. 27, 1978 as 
quoted in Gibbons III, p.369; it was common for McNamara to order a draft of his report 
before he left on his trips. For example, before his March, 1964 trip to Saigon he 
instructed John McNaughton, the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs to 
draft a memorandum to “serve as an overall vehicle for thought…and a framework for his 
report on his return.” H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert 
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, (NY: Harper 
Collins, 1997), p. 71.  He did the same thing before his July 14, 1965 trip to Vietnam 
when Yarmolinsky was the drafting officer. Gibbons, III p. 369. Similarly, Krulak drafted 
the military portion of the McNamara-Taylor Saigon trip in September, 1963, Kaiser, op. 
cit., p. 258.
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This theater exacted a price, however. Since McNamara’s public 
reports of his visits frequently contrasted with his private messages to the 
President, the discrepancy undermined public and congressional trust.374  
Any manager knows that it is important to retain the trust of all stake holders 
of the organization. This means in the case of a public institution the trust 
not only of his colleagues in the department but of Congress, which funds 
the organization, and the general public as well. Actually, McNamara was 
aware how important public support for the war could be. At the Honolulu 
conference, June, 1-3, 1964, when the expansion of the war and increased 
U.S. involvement were the main topics of discussion, he argued that it would 
take “at least 30 days to prepare the public” for the expanded effort.375
Neither the administration nor McNamara made such an effort; indeed, they 
did all that they could to disguise the new policy. 
                                                          
374 McNamara statements to the press about the state of the war were at times misleading 
but were not his most egregious efforts to spin the information. That honor goes to his 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in favor 
of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 6, 1964. In that testimony he flatly stated that 
the Navy had no knowledge of South Vietnamese operations against North Vietnamese 
coastal installations (so-called 34-Alpha operations): “…our Navy …was not associated 
with, was not aware of any South Vietnamese actions, if there were any. I want to make 
that clear.” Three and one-half years later appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, when the committee had ample evidence that this statement was flatly wrong 
he persisted arguing that he had testified that the Navy “was not aware of the details [of 
the operations]” which was not at all what he had said. See: Joseph C. Goulden, Truth is 
the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair—Illusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand 
McNally & Company, 1969) pp. 59, 218 (emphasis supplied). McNamara finally 
admitted his initial statement was wrong in his memoir, McNamara, op. cit., p. 137.
375 Gibbons II,  p. 261.
262
McNamara also recognized the constraints which prevented him from 
disclosing his true beliefs about the war. “It is a profound, enduring and 
universal ethical and moral dilemma: how, in times of war and crisis, can 
senior government officials be completely frank to their own people without 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy?” he would write.376  The dilemma is 
incontestable; McNamara did little to resolve it.
Logistics
McNamara may have created the illusion of management with his 
frequent visits to Hawaii and Vietnam, but such was not the case with his 
handling of the logistical demands of the war. He was very much involved in 
managing the logistical aspects of the conflict. There are two basic aspects 
of logistics during combat operations: distribution and production. 
McNamara took a direct, sustained personal interest in each of them after the 
U.S. began combat operations in 1965. His interest is hardly surprising for 
during his fourteen years at Ford he had devoted substantial time to 
managing the flow of widely dispersed parts and assemblies that needed to 
come together to produce an automobile. He was no stranger to logistics. 
                                                          
376 McNamara, op. cit., p. 105.
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Distribution
Distribution of logistical support presented a number of daunting 
obstacles during the Vietnam War. First, there was the length of the supply 
line — 9,000 to 11,000 miles from the home base to the theater of combat, 
the longest in U.S. military history up to that time. Second, the country was 
overwhelmingly agricultural and lacked the infrastructure of a modern 
industrial state:  deep-water ports, terminals, airfields, railroads, paved roads 
and all of the communication, transportation, maintenance, and storage 
facilities that are required to establish a logistical base for a highly 
mechanized modern military machine. Third, the country’s geography and 
climate presented formidable challenges. In a small area, roughly the size of 
the state of Missouri, there were jungles, tropical forests, mountains, deltas, 
and swamps. The weather could be atrocious. It is said there are two weather 
systems in Vietnam: hot and wet (May-September) and hot and dry 
(October-March). The wet season makes unpaved roads impassable and 
severely limits air mobility. The dry season produces a fine corrosive laterite 
dust that penetrates everything, wearing out engines, clogging fuel, and 
lubrication lines, and even infiltrating food and open wounds. Finally, as 
Joseph Heiser notes, “For the first time in modern history the U.S. Army 
was required to establish a major logistical base in a country where all areas 
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were subject to continuous enemy observation and hostile fire with no 
terrain under total friendly control.”377
These were formidable obstacles but even more significant was the 
rapidity of the military buildup and Westmoreland’s decision to accept 
combat troops and their supporting units at the same time rather than bring 
in the supporting units first to establish a logistical base. The growth of the 
U. S.’s military presence was dramatic.   At the end of June, 1965, just 
before President Johnson made his announcement to grant Westmoreland’s 
request for additional troops, there were 27,300 army and 59,900 total U.S. 
military personnel in South Vietnam. Eighteen months later there were 
239,400 army and 485,300 total military personnel in the country and all 
were fulfilling their missions without significant logistical interruptions.378  
One needs also to bear in mind that the U.S. military did not travel light. The 
1st Logistical Command, for example, calculated that on average it took one 
ton of supplies to support one soldier in Vietnam for one month which 
would mean that at the end of 1966 approximately 485,000 tons of supplies 
were being shipped to Vietnam monthly. By contrast, McNamara estimated 
                                                          
377Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Heiser, Logistic Support (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 1974), p. 37. Heiser was the commander of  1st Logistical Command in Vietnam.
378 Ibid. p. 14.
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it took from 1200 to 4200 tons of supply per month to support the combined 
VC/NVA operations.379
To supervise the logistical buildup McNamara chose Paul R. Ignatius. 
Ignatius had entered the Kennedy Administration as Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for procurement, supply, and base structure in May, 1961. After 
three and one-half years on the job, he was promoted to Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Installations and Logistics just prior to the escalation of the 
war. A graduate of the Harvard Business School, Ignatius had been an 
instructor at the school and then left to found a firm which offered executive 
training programs to business and government organizations. Intellectually 
comfortable in the fast-paced hierarchy of the Defense Department, he was 
less wedded to statistical analysis than his boss. He also had a less 
aggressive personality and relied more on persuasion and teamwork to 
accomplish his tasks. He supervised a staff of technical experts who 
                                                          
379 Ordnance was, of course a large part of the total supplies. U.S. figures come from First 
Logistical Command Fact Book 1968, Center of Military History, p. c-2; McNamara’s 
estimate from PP, Gravel ed. IV p.625. McNamara’s figures are substantially at odds 
with the figures he used before the Senate Preparedness Committee in August, 1967. 
There he testified”…intelligence estimates suggest that the quantity of externally 
supplied material, other than food, required to support the VC/NVA forces in South 
Vietnam at about their level of combat activity is 15 tons per day.” This was a 
ridiculously low figure equivalent to 450 tons per month or from 1.6 to 2.0 ounces per 
combatant then reported to be in country. Senator Jackson, and the Committee’s Counsel, 
James Kendall pointed out the improbability of the figures. It was a clear indication that 
by August, 1967 McNamara was no longer at the top of his game. Hearings before the 
Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4, August 25, 1967, pp. 277, 298, 368.
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“weren’t flashy or shining intellects like most of Enthoven’s whiz 
kids…they weren’t kids and you couldn’t find a whiz among them, but they 
knew how to get things done.”380
The initial tasks were to build the infrastructure necessary to receive, 
store, and distribute the material required to support military operations and 
begin the logistical buildup. The military construction program was 
entrusted to four giant private international engineering and construction 
firms because Johnson would not call up the Reserves and National Guard 
that contained most of the military construction units. At the peak of the 
effort in mid-1966, there were 51,044 civilian personnel working on 
construction projects and only 10% of them were Americans. The results 
were impressive; the U.S. would eventually build:
8 jet fighter bases with 10,000ft. runways
6 new deep-water ports with 28 deep-draft berths
26 hospitals with 8,280 beds
280,000 KW of electrical power
10.4 million sq. ft. of warehousing
3.1 million barrels of POL storage 
4,100 kilometers of highway
Plus; ammunition storage, communication, and sanitation 
facilities381
                                                          
380 Paul R. Ignatius, On Board: My Life in the Navy, Government and Business 
(Annapolis, MD., Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 115.
381 Carroll H. Dunn, Base Development in South Vietnam 1965-1970 (Washington, DC, 
Department of the Army, 1972), p. 42.
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Massive as it was, the construction program did not require high-level 
intervention except to establish a command structure capable of assigning 
priorities to specific projects.  
Such was not the case when supplies began arriving in large quantities 
in the fall of 1965. In the absence of a timed-phased buildup of logistical 
support or any meaningful consumption or other experience data, the 
military made estimates of needed supplies and “pushed” them into the 
theater (so-called “Push Packages”) until such time as normal requisitioning 
procedures could be established (i.e., a “pull” system). The result was 
dozens, indeed at times over a hundred, ships waiting to be unloaded and 
tons of supplies piling up in port areas much of it improperly marked and 
sorted and frequently hundreds of miles from its intended recipient.
The push system created two significant problems. First, the estimates 
might not take into account the particular requirements for Vietnam. The 
department needed an advance warning system for items considered 
essential for the army buildup by field commanders. Essential items could be 
as commonplace as tropical uniforms and boots, as vital as 40-mm gun 
ammunition, or as uncommon as collapsible petroleum storage tanks. Such 
items were listed on so-called Flagpole Reports and would be reviewed by 
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Ignatius and his staff on a weekly basis and discussed with McNamara in his 
weekly conferences with Ignatius.
Once potential shortages had been identified, a system needed to be 
established to make sure the items got to the field quickly, bypassing the 
normal delivery process. Such a system was especially important in the case 
of spare parts. The corrosive laterite soil and dust, previously mentioned, 
wreaked havoc with vehicles and helicopters which were essential 
components of Westmoreland’s ground strategy.  This caused a large 
number to be “deadlined” (i.e., unavailable for use). The Red Ball Express, 
named after the famous truck convoy system that operated in France during 
World War II, was designed to allow Westmoreland to request repair parts 
especially for deadlined equipment. Red Ball Express requisitions received 
special attention within the theater, and if they could not be satisfied, they 
were sent back to the States where they would be filled on a priority basis 
and then segregated and shipped on dedicated aircraft to Vietnam. The 
control office in Vietnam had the tail number of the aircraft, which was also 
marked with a large red ball, along with the cargo manifest so that particular 
items could be identified. We have become so used to delivery of 
individually identifiable packages by Federal Express, UPS, and the Post 
Office that the Red Ball Express seems quite ordinary. At the time it was 
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highly innovative and Ignatius gives McNamara credit for conceiving it and 
monitoring the system at their weekly briefings. He credits McNamara’s 
curiosity and willingness to immerse himself in the details of programs to 
his desire to “find out how the system was functioning. Then he could hold 
people’s feet to the fire until the progress he sought was attained.”382
McNamara’s military aide, Robert Pursely, gives another example of 
his preternatural willingness—or rather his compulsion—to immerse himself 
in details. The problem was ordnance. Pursley reported that it was obvious  
there was enough ordnance in Vietnam, but “…people just weren’t keeping 
track of where casings and fuses and other things were.” As a consequence, 
some units lacked the ordnance they needed; for them there was a shortage. 
As Pursley described his boss’s actions:
Bob McNamara and I worked together on a large 
“horse blanket” that had all the kinds of ordnance 
arrayed in one way, and where they might possibly 
be laid the other way. It was an array about as big as 
this table…We worked one whole Friday night and 
Saturday on that …That was instructive in a lot of 
ways. One, the dedication in McNamara’s 
insistence that we get right into the middle of a 
problem to try to understand it well, and not just 
wait for the system to percolate back up; two, the 
endless hours, the ability to work intensely over 
such a long period of time.383
                                                          
382 Ignatius, op. cit., p.136.
383 Pursley, OSD Interview, Sept. 6, 1995, pp. 7-8.
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Flagpole and Red Ball Express were considered extraordinary 
measures. They did not solve the major problem of tons of supplies piling up 
at port locations. Something had to be done to clear up this huge backlog and 
develop a system where items shipped from the States could be identified, 
stored, and shipped to their intended recipient. Ignatius believed that the best 
way to approach the problem was to make the army part of the solution. The 
army should be directed to assemble a team of knowledgeable military and 
civilian personnel and send them to Vietnam “for as long as it took to 
identify the supplies and bring them under control.” He would leave the 
composition and size of the group to the army. McNamara had other ideas. 
He thought the team should be no larger than fifteen and “if the army can’t 
do the job, we should send management experts out there.” Ignatius pointed 
out in his memoir that when McNamara “would bear down too hard on a 
point that was more complex than he seemed to realize…it was 
important…not to be overwhelmed by the vigor of his argument. With one 
so dominant and quick to make decisions, a subordinate should stand his 
ground if he thinks it will help to keep his boss out of trouble.” Ignatius 
stood his ground in this case and prevailed. The army seized the opportunity, 
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containerized supplies with proper manifests, restored more normal 
requisitioning procedures, and the stockpile shrank to normal.384
Production
In many ways the production side of logistics was more difficult to 
manage than the distribution. Distribution was almost entirely in the hands 
of the military while production depended almost entirely on outside 
contractors. Production was also influenced by large exogenous forces like 
the economy. For example, when President Johnson approved the first large-
scale increase in combat forces in July 1965, the economy had enjoyed 56 
months of continuous growth and there was pressure on prices as evidenced 
by the attempt to raise aluminum prices in the late fall of the year. Under the 
circumstances it would not be easy to fight an economical war, but 
McNamara was determined to do so. He resolved not to repeat the Korean 
                                                          
384 Ignatius, op. cit., pp. 117, 136-7; Shapley tells a similar tale. McNamara was 
frustrated by the army’s inability “to give him a complete set of tables showing all 
the…job specialties needed by each division…[including] the amount and kinds of 
equipment required by each group.” He wanted to hire additional system analysts to do 
the job, but the head of the section, William Brehm worried about the effect of a group of 
civilians telling the army what its requirements were “right down to two-men well-
digging detachments.” He was able to persuade more senior officials to persuade 
McNamara to “let the Army figure its requirements itself and it did the job well.” 
Shapley, op. cit., p. 237.
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experience when the war was overfunded by at least $30 billion and had 
“…left a huge residue of excess stockpiles.”385
Reports of shortages began to appear as early as July 1965 when the 
New York Times reported a shortage of jungle uniforms, shoes, tents and 
refrigerators for food supplies in Vietnam.386  It was too early to tell, 
however, whether this was a distribution or production problem.   A month 
later the Times reported that McNamara would be called before a special 
Senate hearing “to answer a charge that the Army is in danger of serious 
equipment shortages.”387   Again, in September the Times reported that there 
were deficiencies in the supply and maintenance of equipment in Europe 
most likely because of the funneling of equipment to Vietnam.388   In a more 
comprehensive article in October, Hanson Baldwin, the military-affairs 
editor of the Times and a dogged critic of McNamara who excoriated his 
“buy only what we need” philosophy, reported that “personnel and 
equipment problems of increasing severity are facing the armed services as 
the United States military commitment in Vietnam becomes larger.” 
Baldwin specifically mentioned trained personnel, ammunition and spare 
                                                          
385 Drea, op. cit., p. 510.
386 NYT, July 25, 1965, p .2.
387 NYT, Aug. 6, 1965, p. 2.
388 NYT, Sep. 6, 1965, p. 4.
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parts as items in actual or potential short supply.389  The first clear indication 
that there would be production problems was reported in December when 
the Times disclosed the reluctance of clothing manufacturers to bid on 
contracts for military uniforms because “…the nation’s men’s clothing 
manufacturers are enjoying good civilian business…” 390
The most trenchant criticism of McNamara’s management came on 
February 21 in another article by Hanson Baldwin that amounted to what 
Edward Drea calls a “…scathing indictment of the Johnson administration’s 
mismanagement of the armed services.” Baldwin asserted that “the nation’s 
armed services have almost exhausted their trained and ready military units 
with all available forces spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and 
elsewhere…[and] there are major existing shortages in uniforms and 
clothing, and actual or potential shortages of various types of ammunition 
and equipment…” 391  Reports of shortages would continue through 1966 
and even into 1967 and would rouse Congress to look into the situation. 
McNamara’s most persistent critics were Rep. Gerald Ford, the House 
minority leader, and Senator John Stennis of the Senate Preparedness 
                                                          
389 NYT, Oct. 14, 1965, p. 24.
390 NYT, Dec. 21, 1965, p.59.
391 Drea, op. cit., p. 511; NYT Feb. 21, 1966,  p. 1.
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Committee. Baldwin was also roaming the corridors of the Pentagon ready 
to pounce at any time. 
How did McNamara handle the criticism?  Basically, in two ways by 
explanation or bluster. By way of explanation, McNamara would tell 
congressional committees that any shortages were only temporary and that a
“hot line” system he had initiated would put things aright in short order. He 
testified he wanted to avoid the rapid build-up of a production line for an 
item, a bomb, for example, that would have to be shut down when 
production surpassed consumption. Such a start-stop system, he argued, was 
both inefficient and expensive. His solution was to try and smooth out 
production with a “hot line.” Battlefield commanders would be asked for 
their estimates for ammunition for a specified period. McNamara’s office 
would take their figures and compare them with past consumption and make 
its own estimate of a base line production schedule. If demand was higher, 
production could be increased within 90 days under the flexible “hot line” 
system. To cover any deficiency, short falls could be drawn from world-
wide stocks.  
It was the kind of system one might expect from an automobile 
executive — keep the production line moving smoothly on a long-term 
basis, adjusting for periodic increases or decreases. The difficulty was that 
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the Vietnam War involved constant escalations, both in military personnel 
and operations. Thus, there was no smoothing out of supply and demand, 
only constant increases. For example, in April 1966, the production level of 
250 lbs. and 500 lbs . bombs had been set at 65,000 tons per month. The 
figure was revised to 80,000 tons per month in March 1967 and again in 
May to 92,000 tons based on a projected 800 B-52 and 30,000 tactical 
sorties per month. The military wanted even more. According to Ignatius, 
CINCPAC, which was in charge of the air war, wanted to increase the 
number of B-52 sorties from 800 per month to 1200 and The Joint Chiefs 
contemplated requesting an amount as high as 2000 sorties per month. 
Ignatius wryly notes that together with ground munitions, there was a 
possibility that “we would likely exceed the nation’s entire capacity for 
making explosives.”  Whatever the theoretical merits of McNamara’s “hot 
line”, it did not work in Vietnam. The Joint Logistics Review Board 
concluded that production of air munitions, especially the effective 750 lbs. 
bomb, did not catch up with consumption until 1967, 19 months  after 
initiation of the contract. 392
McNamara’s other response to allegations of shortages was bluster. 
He went ballistic after reading Baldwin’s allegations of actual and potential 
                                                          
392 Ignatius, op. cit., p. 133.
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shortages, complaining that “disunity was the ‘biggest danger facing the 
country’ .…”393 He assembled a press conference during which, according to 
the Chicago Tribune, a “bristling indignant”, “desk-thumping” McNamara 
“…insisted that the military had not become ‘overextended’ in meeting the 
manpower and equipment demands of the war in southeast Asia.” In the 
same articles the Tribune facetiously noted that the Chief of Staff of the 
Army “came within an adverb of challenging the veracity of the Secretary of 
Defense” when he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
that “…the Vietnam War had indeed ‘extended’ the army’s capabilities.”394
Another example occurred the following month when McNamara 
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He was asked 
about an article that appeared in the Times that day to the effect that the Air 
Force had “…drastically reduced the number and intensity of its bombing 
raids…because of a shortage of parts for bombs.” McNamara denied the 
report, and threw out a raft of statistics about bombing in World War II and 
the Korean war. He complained that “…we [presumably the media] try to 
                                                          
393 Drea, op. cit., pp. 511-512.
394 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 14, 1966, p. 16.
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seek out and exaggerate imaginary weaknesses and that was what the article 
did.” He characterized the news story as “baloney”. 395
Three days later in an editorial the New York Times asked if there 
were no shortages why was the U.S. repurchasing 750 lbs. bombs it had sold 
for $1.70 to a German dealer for $21.00 each. It went on to catalog a number 
of other “undeniable scarcities” and concluded “…Mr. McNamara does 
himself no credit by trying to deny the obvious.” 396
In his handling of the alleged logistical shortages, McNamara 
frequently displayed what Peter Drucker described as his greatest weakness 
as a leader — he confused leadership with morality. “Anyone who did not 
agree was an ‘enemy,’ and clearly had to be damaged, destroyed or at least 
humiliated,” he would write to Tom Morris who was preparing a paper on 
McNamara’s management. 397
Although there were shortages, overall they did not seriously impede 
combat operations. General Westmoreland paid appropriate tribute to the 
logistical effort telling U.S. News and World Report:
Never before in the history of warfare have men 
created such a responsive logistical system — one 
that is capable of supporting a flexible strategy that 
                                                          
395 Hearings on S. 2859, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 89th Cong., 2nd
Sess., April 20, 1966, pp. 200-203.
396 NYT, Apr. 23, 1966, p. 40.
397 Letter Drucker to Morris, February 6, 1978, Morris Project,  p. 3.
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created sudden requirements from widely scattered 
points. Never has there been such zealous 
participation by logistical troops who believe in the 
importance of full and fast support for the combat
elements. Not once have the fighting troops been 
restricted in their operations against the enemy for 
want of essential supplies. 398
                                                          
398 As quoted in Einthoven & Smith, op. cit., p. 278. Westmoreland repeated this 
assessment in his appearance before a Joint Session of Congress on April 28, 1967. Con. 
Rec., 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 113, pt. 9: 11153-55.
Probably the biggest logistical controversy during the war was over the new M-16 rifle 
that frequently jammed. The controversy as to whom or what organization was 
responsible still rages, but a fair reading of the record absolves McNamara and 
Installations and Logistics from major responsibility. See: James Fallows,  National 
Defense (NY: Random House, 1981); Thomas L. McNaughter, The M-16 Controversies: 
Military Organization and Weapon Acquisition (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1984); William 
H. Hallahan, Misfire: The History of How America’s Small Arms Have Failed Our 
Military (NY: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1994); C.J. Chivers, The Gun (NY: Simon & 
Schuster, 2010).
Things have apparently not changed much. Secretary Gates in his recent memoir writes, 
“The Department of Defense is structured to plan and prepare for war but not to fight 
one.” He goes on to describe the difficulty of getting “…commanders and troops in the 
field…what they needed” and concluded that he, like McNamara “…had to be the 
principal advocate in Defense for the commanders and the troops….” Gates, op. cit., pp. 
116-118.
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McNamara and The Military:  Strategy and Personnel
After JFK made his decision on November 15, 1961 to increase aid to 
South Vietnam there was a burst of enthusiasm and activity. As we have 
described, McNamara began his almost monthly trips to Hawaii or Saigon 
and took control of the military aspects of the struggle. In a remarkably short 
period the U.S. seemed to have turned the situation around. When 
McNamara visited Saigon in May 1962 only six months after the new policy 
had been in effect, he told Neil Sheehan, a young UPI reporter, “Every 
quantitative measurement we have shows we’re winning this war.”399 Two 
months later, General Paul Harkins, the head of the Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV), told McNamara at one of the Hawaii 
conferences on July 23, 1962 that the Viet Cong (VC) would be eliminated 
as a significant force about a year after the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) 
became fully operational. Reports from the field were equally encouraging 
— indeed so encouraging that McNamara ordered planning to begin for a 
phased withdrawal of U.S. military personnel beginning in 1963, to be 
completed by the end of 1965. 
It was an order that is difficult to understand. Its premise was that the 
South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) was performing well enough that it would 
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not need U.S. advisory or support personnel after 1965, and indeed could 
start reducing assistance as early as 1964. It was difficult to believe that an 
insurrection which had been in progress for more than three years could be 
turned around in seven months when similar insurrections in Malaya and the 
Philippines had taken up to a dozen years, and both of them had been 
conducted under more favorable circumstances. Robert Dallek characterized 
the decision as one “…based on guesswork resting more on hope than 
anything concrete — an astounding bit of flimflam from someone who 
prided himself on statistical analysis.”400  McNamara consistently 
maintained that his decision was based on the best intelligence available at 
the time. Although he admitted that the intelligence turned out to have been 
overly optimistic, he blamed that problem on the South Vietnamese. 
There was, however, plenty of intelligence at the time that already 
indicated the ARVN was not performing well. Brigadier General E.K. 
Egleston, Acting Chief of the Military Assistance Group, prepared a series 
of studies based on the performance of ARVN units during the first half of 
1962. Of thirteen ARVN operations he studied, two were partially successful 
and eleven were failures.401 Later, the battle of Ap Bac in January, 1963 
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demonstrated serious deficiencies in the ARVN, especially its unwillingness 
to press the attack against the enemy. Although characterized as a “success” 
by MACV, the operation was recognized by U.S. journalists as a defeat. The 
battle prompted Arthur Krock, a respected middle-of-the-road columnist of 
the New York Times, to suggest that there should be a “fundamental review” 
of the administration’s Vietnam policy. In addition, there were numerous 
discouraging reports about the Strategic Hamlet program not meeting its 
goals, and the political unrest in the Buddhist community was also widely 
reported. Yet the generally upbeat assessments continued through most of 
1963. McNamara’s spokesman, Arthur Sylvester, who accompanied him on 
a ten-day trip to Vietnam in September, 1963, for example, remained 
relentlessly optimistic just two months before the coup that deposed 
President Diem. He stated that the “military events in Vietnam were ‘getting 
better and better rather than worse and worse’…[and] that reports today 
showed that the Government was ‘rapidly approaching’ militarily the point 
where the goals set will be reached relatively shortly.’”402  Public statements 
made by McNamara and Taylor after the trip reaffirmed the 1965 
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withdrawal date.403  Even the coup that deposed President Diem in 
November of that year did not alter the reports that were sent to Washington. 
It is difficult to believe that McNamara’s decision to begin 
withdrawing troops in 1963 was the result of his assessment of the military 
situation on the ground in 1962. It seems much more probable that his 
decision was based on the imperatives of Washington rather than, those of 
Saigon, and that he was acting under the directions of The White House.
As we have seen, Cuba and Berlin were the principal geopolitical 
hotspots in 1962. President Kennedy had consistently sought to downplay 
the role of U.S. advisers in Vietnam and the White House uniformly denied 
the numerous reports in the media that those advisers were more heavily 
involved in combat than the administration would admit. McNamara came 
close to admitting in his memoir that his order to begin planning for a 
phased withdrawal was in response to White House direction. He justified 
the directive on the ground that the goal of the U.S. was “to train the South 
Vietnamese to defend themselves.” Accordingly, he reasoned “if the training 
would prove successful…we would be able to withdraw — or enough time 
would elapse to indicate it would fail — in which case our withdrawal would 
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also be justified.”404 But McNamara certainly did not have the authority to 
order a withdrawal of U.S. troops if the South Vietnamese failed in their 
effort to defend themselves. Only the president could make such a decision. 
If McNamara’s reasoning is correct, only the White House could have made 
such a decision, and it is most likely that it was the source of the directive.405  
It is possible that the new policy may have also been designed to 
convey a message:  (1) to Diem that he could not rely indefinitely on U.S. 
assistance, and that the South Vietnamese had to take steps to put their house 
in order and (2) to the U.S. military and other supporters of a more robust 
military effort “…to put the lid on the inevitable bureaucratic and political 
pressures for increased U.S. inputs into Vietnam.”406
Whatever the reasons, the optimistic reports that established the 
foundation for the phased withdrawal policy would lead directly to the loss 
of credibility when it became apparent that there was no progress in 
Vietnam, and that the country could not survive as an independent nation 
without increased American support. That realization came at the beginning 
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of 1964 when the euphoria that had prevailed through 1962 and much of 
1963 had dissipated. By the March, 1964 Hawaii Conference it was clear 
that the military situation was deteriorating and additional U.S. help would 
be required. The president, now Lyndon Johnson, was reluctant to take any 
drastic steps to alter existing practices because of the forthcoming election 
and the potential danger to his Great Society programs. Much of the year —
especially during the period immediately after the election — was spent 
planning the U.S.’s entry into the war as a combatant.407
Those plans came to fruition early in 1965. The Administration 
initiated what would turn out to be a three-year sustained aerial 
bombardment of North Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder, on March 2. 
Six days later, two Marine battalions landed at Da Nang. They were under 
strict orders “not to engage in day to day operations against the Viet Cong” 
but to assume defensive positions and protect the base from attacks.408  Less 
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than a month later those instructions were secretly superseded when two 
additional Marine battalions were dispatched to Vietnam. In NSAM 328:
The president approved a change of mission for all 
Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit 
their more active use under conditions to be 
established and approved by the Secretary of 
Defense in consultation with the Secretary of 
State.409
As the authors of the Pentagon Papers make clear this was a pivotal 
document. “It mark[ed] the acceptance of the President of the United States 
of the concept that U.S. troops would engage in offensive ground operations 
against Asian insurgents.” The memorandum was still tentative, however, 
and Ambassador Taylor, who had been in Washington for consultations, 
cabled on his way back to Saigon, “In Washington discussions…it was my 
understanding the SecDef would provide text of revised mission.”410  This 
was the perfect opportunity for McNamara to seize the initiative and set 
policy for the conduct of the ground war, subject, of course, to approval by 
the president. He did not.
There were two basic strategies for proceeding with the ground war 
after the president had authorized combat operations for U.S. military 
personnel. Ambassador Taylor joined by William Bundy, Assistant 
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Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, favored, at least initially, a so-
called enclave strategy that would send troops to secure bases like Ton Son 
Nhut (near Saigon) and coastal cities like Qui Nhon and Nha Trang. Those 
troops would secure the base and then engage in a mobile counterinsurgency 
role in the vicinity for improved protection of the base and, following the 
acquisition of experience in such missions, would be available as a reserve 
force in support of ARVN operations within 50 miles of the base. Enclave 
was a cautious policy. It did not require as many troops as the competing 
strategy; it allowed U.S. troops to gain experience in counterinsurgency 
operations; it placed the ARVN in the lead; and it permitted the president to 
withdraw U.S. forces if the situation so dictated. 
For a variety of reasons, the most notable being the difficulty of 
working out command relationships between U.S. and ARVN commanders 
in joint operations, the first test of the enclave model did not occur until 
August 18, 1965 with Operation STARLIGHT. The authors of the Pentagon 
Papers write,
…[it] was conducted with dramatic success 15 
miles south of the Chu Lai enclave. It established 
the viability of enclave operations limited to the 
northern coast of South Vietnam, a fact that no one
disputed, but such operations were by that time only 
one facet of a much more ambitious strategy 
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sanctioned by the president and in the process of 
being implemented by Westmoreland.411
The competing strategy, strongly urged by Westmoreland and 
supported by the Joint Chiefs, envisaged a three-stage war plan:
Stage I: Secure base areas with a Tactical Area of 
Responsibility (TAOR) out to the range of light 
artillery. [the stage the marines who had already 
landed were involved in.]
Stage II: Deep patrolling and offensive operations 
outside the TAOR with ARVN forces.
Stage III: Long-range search and destroy operations.412
Westmoreland’s plan was considerably more ambitious than Taylor’s. 
It called for a significantly larger commitment of U.S. personnel and, since it 
would have been difficult to extract U.S. forces, was implicitly a 
commitment by the United States to see the war through to the finish.
Delay favored Westmoreland. During the summer the Viet Cong had 
successfully overrun a number of important South Vietnam towns like Song 
Be, the capital of Phuoc Long province and completely decimated two 
battalions of ARVN in the battle of Ba Gia. “By mid-June, the Viet Cong 
offensive was in full swing” the CIA would report at the end of the week of 
June 14: “the initiative and momentum of military operations continue in 
favor of the Viet Cong. The impact of Viet Cong operations is being felt not 
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only by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) but by the 
nation’s internal economy, as well. Nothing this week points to the Republic 
of Vietnam (RVN) wresting the initiative from the Viet Cong (VC).”413
One week earlier on June 7, Westmoreland had sent an urgent request 
for additional troops, the so-called “44 battalion” request. He pointed out the 
seriousness of the situation and asked for an immediate increase of 41,000 
troops bringing the total of U. S. personnel to 123,000. He also suggested 
that in all likelihood he would need an additional 51,000, bringing the total 
to close to 175,000 troops. After an extended discussion, the president 
approved Westmoreland’s request.414  Westmoreland had previously 
received authority on June 26 to commit U.S. forces in offensive combat 
operations in support of ARVN “in any situation…when, in Commander, 
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam’s (COMUSMACV’s) 
judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN 
forces.” As the Pentagon Papers note, “this was about as close to a free hand 
in managing the forces as General Westmoreland was likely to get.” He used 
it the next day to initiate a search and destroy operation in which U.S. and 
ARVN forces invaded Viet Cong base areas to destroy existing stores of 
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supplies and munitions. “The enclave strategy was finished,” although a 
modified version would reappear.”415
What was McNamara’s position on the two strategies?  The Pentagon 
Papers conclude that “It is difficult to be precise about the position of the 
Secretary of Defense during the build-up debate because there is so little of 
him in the files.” The Papers go on to quote a number of excerpts from 
memoranda McNamara had prepared but they are at best equivocal. In the 
end, the Papers conclude that “From the records, the Secretary comes out 
much more clearly for good management than for any particular strategy.”416
Although McNamara did not disclose his opinions on battlefield 
strategy there was no doubt about his position on Westmoreland’s request. 
He supported the troop increase in a memorandum that also argued for an 
increase in the air war and a naval quarantine. His position was set forth in a 
June 26 memorandum which has been lost. We know the substance of the 
memorandum, however, because on June 30, McGeorge Bundy wrote a 
cogent and prescient comment on McNamara’s draft which defined the 
issues:
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The draft proposal to the president seems to me to 
have grave limitations.
1. It proposes a doubling of our presently planned 
strength in South Vietnam, a tripling of our air 
effort in the north and a new and very important 
program of naval quarantine. It proposes this new 
land commitment at a time when our troops are 
entirely untested in the kind of warfare projected. It 
proposes greatly extended air action when the value 
of the air action we have taken is sharply disputed. 
It proposes naval quarantine by mining at a time 
when nearly everyone agrees the real question in 
not in Hanoi but in South Vietnam. My first 
reaction is that this program is rash to the point of 
folly.
2. I see no reason to suppose that the Viet Cong will 
accommodate us by fighting the kind of war we 
desire…I think the odds are that if we put in 40-50 
battalions with the missions here proposed, we shall 
find them only lightly engaged and ineffective in 
hot pursuit. 
3. The paper does not discuss the question of 
agreements with the Vietnamese Government…The 
apparent basis for doing this is simply the 
increasing weakness of the Vietnamese forces. But 
this is a slippery slope toward total US 
responsibility and corresponding fecklessness on 
the Vietnamese side.
4. The paper also omits examination of the upper 
limit of US liability. If we need 200 thousand men 
now for these quite limited missions, may we not 
need 400 thousand later? Is this a rational course of 
action?
* * * * *
8. If casualties go up sharply, what further actions 
do we propose to take, or not to take? More broadly 
still, what is the real object of the exercise? If it is to 
get to the conference table, what results do we seek 
there? Still more brutally, do we want to invest 200 
thousand men to cover the eventual retreat? Can we 
not do that just as well where we are now?
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The author has found no single expression of the flaws in the 
administration’s proposed policy as cogent as Bundy’s memorandum. One 
would think that it would have given McNamara occasion to pause and 
attempt to craft some answers, but it did not slow him up for an instant. He 
submitted a revised memorandum a day later “with only minor changes from 
his earlier draft [and] …ignored almost all of Bundy’s questions.”417  In his 
memoir McNamara states that “I shared all his [Bundy’s] views and 
concerns. But the challenge was to lay out the answers—not just the 
questions.”418
McNamara’s reaction to the Bundy critique in his memoir is 
reminiscent of his attitude towards George Ball’s memoranda critical of the 
administration’s Vietnam policy. Beginning in October, 1964, Ball would 
write eighteen memoranda and talking papers against the war. On several 
occasions he would receive a call from McNamara asking to come and speak 
to him. Although protocol dictated that Ball should travel to the Pentagon, 
McNamara insisted that he come to State. There, frequently accompanied by 
John McNaughton his Assistant for International Security, he would say 
words to the effect:
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‘Gee, George, you’re right, everything you say here 
[i.e., Ball’s memorandum] is exactly the case. The 
war is going no place but down a rat hole, we’ve got 
to find a way to get out.’ And do you know what? 
The next day, in a meeting with the president at the 
White House, there’d be not a trace of what had 
gone on the day before.419
The reluctance of McNamara to become engaged in the details of 
military tactics characterized his entire attitude toward the intricacies of 
military operations. As Robert Komer pointed out in his study for the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
The President and the Secretary of Defense made 
final decisions on overall personnel ceilings and on 
political constraints within which the military 
should operate outside Vietnam…[but] they never 
infringed on the traditional military control over the 
conduct of the war inside South Vietnam…The 
author at least cannot recall any major instances in 
which senior civilian officials…([including] the 
civilian leadership in DoD) directly intervened in 
the way the U.S. military ran its in-country war 
after 1965….420
In addition, readers may recall that when McNamara was at Ford he 
insisted that any major recommendation that came to him have at least two 
alternatives and if it was a really significant issue three choices. There were 
alternatives to search and destroy but there is no evidence that McNamara 
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ever insisted that requests from the military contain alternatives. It wasn’t 
the way the military did things at the time and he acquiesced.421 Actually 
McNamara’s hands-off attitude towards the military aspects of the war had 
begun well before 1965. It is an elementary principle of management that 
one of the most important tools in the manager’s kit is the ability to select 
key personnel. As we have seen, Alfred P. Sloan would subject the 
appointment of even a subordinate position like master mechanic in one of 
GM’s subsidiaries to a searching inquiry.422  McNamara had also 
demonstrated his awareness of the importance of choosing top personnel 
with whom he could work by the diligence and energy he exhibited in 
choosing his own key staff. He had even gone so far as to turn down two 
requests by the president to appoint individuals who had materially helped 
him win the election. Yet when it came to Vietnam, there is virtually no 
evidence that either he or the President devoted much time and thought to 
the selection of the first two military commanders who would lead 
Americans in Vietnam.
General Harkins and Westmoreland were soldiers from an old mold, 
and both were protégées of Maxwell Taylor. Harkins had been on General
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George Patton’s staff during WWII and embodied the can do spirit of that 
famous general. Westmoreland, a former Superintendent of the Military 
Academy, was described as “all spit and polish, two steps up and one back.” 
He was, however, about to be involved in a counterinsurgency war, and 
according to one of his former colleagues from West Point “…he would 
have no idea how to deal with it.”423
Harkins, 57 at the time of his appointment, was, according to 
Ambassador Lodge with whom he was constantly quarrelling, “totally 
insensitive to all political considerations and simply gave his blind loyalty to 
whomever was running things in the government of Vietnam.” Mac Bundy 
reported that he “has been unimpressive in his reporting and analyzing and 
has shown a lack of understanding of the realities of the situation.” 
McNamara was most dismissive, “he wasn’t worth a damn so he was 
removed…you need intelligent people.”424  How had an officer so deficient 
in the performance of his duties been appointed?  It appears as if McNamara 
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merely accepted the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs and did not even 
bother to interview him. In his December 21, 1961 memorandum to the 
President, McNamara first recommended that the senior U.S. Commander in 
Vietnam be a four-star general and then wrote: 
I further recommend the assignment of Lt. General 
Harkins to this position.…The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
consider him an imaginative officer, fully qualified 
to fill what I consider to be the most difficult job in 
the U.S. Army.
Six days later Mac Bundy would write the President:
I notice with some alarm that Secretary McNamara 
does not seem to have a personal judgment of 
General Harkins…I wonder if it would not be wise 
for you or Secretary McNamara, or perhaps both to 
have a careful talk with Harkins, before this 
appointment is made.425
Hawkins apparently met Kennedy in Palm Beach early in January, 
1962, but it was a ceremonial meeting not a job interview. The decision had 
been made.426
We can be certain that neither McNamara nor the President 
interviewed Westmoreland before he was sent to Vietnam as Harkins’ 
deputy. He had been commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps headquartered 
at Ft. Bragg, NC for only six months when he received a call from General 
Earle Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, informing him that he was to be 
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Harkins’ deputy. Wheeler made it “quite clear” that he was being sent 
eventually to take over command. Before he left on his new assignment, 
Major General William Yarborough, Commanding General of the U.S. 
Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg which was conducting “a serious and 
systematic study of guerilla warfare” had written him a long letter passing 
along his thoughts on the conflict in Vietnam. “I cannot emphasize too 
greatly that the entire conflict in Southeast Asia is 80 percent in the realm of 
ideas and only 20 percent in the field of physical contact,” he wrote, “Under 
no circumstances that I can foresee should US strategy ever be twisted into a 
‘requirement’ for placing US combat divisions into the Vietnamese conflict 
as long as it retains its present format.”427  Yarborough’s advice was much 
closer to McNamara’s professed attitude toward the war, but Westmoreland 
was of the “old school”; he had other ideas.
Westmoreland arrived in Vietnam on January 26, 1964 and would 
have met McNamara on the latter’s visit two months later, but they did not 
have a “private talk” until McNamara returned to Vietnam May 12-13 after 
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the announcement of his appointment as commander of MACV on April 25, 
effective June 20.428
In the case of the two battle commanders, McNamara would not have 
known their personal attitudes toward the war, but in the case of Earle 
Wheeler, with whom he had worked since the latter became Army Chief of 
Staff on August 9, 1962, he would have had no doubt on where he stood. In 
a speech at Fordham a few months after becoming Chief of Staff Wheeler 
would say:
It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in 
Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic, rather than 
military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam 
is military.…The struggle in Southeast Asia, then, is a military 
struggle in a military context, with political and economic factors 
significant but not as significant at this moment, I think, as are 
the military factors.429
Wheeler maintained this position throughout his eight years as a 
member of the Joint Chiefs, including six years as chairman, the longest 
tenure on record up to the present day. He never appreciated that the country 
was fighting what McNamara in a memorandum to the President described 
as two wars — “the ‘regular’ war against the main force Viet 
Cong/NVA…and the ‘Pacification’ or revolutionary development war to 
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neutralize the local Viet Cong and gain the permanent support of the South 
Vietnamese population.”430
Thomas Ricks in his study of American military command from 
WWII to the present has argued that one of the problems with the conduct of 
the Vietnam War was that:
…the senior military leaders participated too little 
[in policy formation]. President Johnson, Maxwell 
Taylor, and McNamara treated the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff not as military advisers but as a political 
impediment, a hurdle to be overcome, through 
deception if necessary. They wanted to keep the 
Chiefs on board with policy without keeping them 
involved in making it or even necessarily informed 
about it.431
Certainly part of the reason military leaders were not invited to 
participate in major policy discussions — remember, Wheeler was not 
invited to the famous Tuesday luncheon until 1967 — was that their views 
on the nature of the war were so divergent from most of the top of the 
civilian leadership. Some of this could be expected as a result of the 
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military’s training and the nature of their professional experience. But the 
gulf was so wide that it does provide a complete explanation. By October 1, 
1962, the Administration had appointed three of the five members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and by January 31, 1965, as combat operations began, 
all of its members. It is difficult to explain why the civilian and military 
remained so far apart on how the war should be prosecuted since all the 
Chiefs had been chosen by the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. Suspicion 
falls on McNamara’s disinterest in military personnel matters and his 
reluctance to vet thoroughly the top military leadership to make sure that 
there was a common general understanding of the nature of the Vietnam 
conflict and how to fight an insurrection. It was, at least in part, a failure of 
management.
Attrition Strategy
McNamara’s reluctance to interfere with the military operations 
extended to policies that he knew were not working. Westmoreland’s 
attrition strategy is one example. The policy was based on a simple 
proposition. If the allies432 could kill more of the enemy than they could 
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replace, eventually they would reach a crossover point. When that point was 
reached the enemy should be willing to negotiate some sort of settlement. 
How long such a process would take and indeed, to what extent North 
Vietnam was willing under any circumstances to negotiate was left up in the 
air. To reach the crossover point the allies needed to reduce the number of 
troops and the supplies entering South Vietnam from the North and increase 
the number of VC/NVN troops killed in the South.
Reducing infiltration from the North had proved difficult because 
short of invading Laos, Cambodia and possibly North Vietnam — operations 
that were clearly off the table — the only method available was bombing —
the results of which were disappointing. In 1966 McNamara began pushing 
Westmoreland to construct an anti-infiltration barrier consisting of an 
electronic fence supplemented by mines and air and ground surveillance. It 
was a project Westmoreland stoutly resisted and nothing came of it.433  
Subsequently, the flow of men and material from the North was only 
modestly reduced.
The other part of the equation was not much more encouraging. To 
kill more of the enemy Westmoreland ordered a series of search and destroy 
missions against VC/NVN sanctuaries. One of the larger examples of such 
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an operation was JUNCTION CITY. Between February 22 and April 15, 
1967, 25,000 U.S. and ARVN forces engaged the 9th Viet Cong Division in a 
major search and destroy operation. During the 72 days they were engaged, 
allied forces killed 1,776 Viet Cong and destroyed large amounts of 
ammunition, medical supplies, and the main food staple, rice. The operation 
was deemed a success, and the after action report claimed that it 
“confirmed…that such multi-division operations have a place in modern 
counterinsurgency warfare.” Andrew Krepinevich does not agree. He points 
out that the enemy division “was not rendered ineffective, and with one 
exception, the only significant engagements were those initiated by the Viet 
Cong.” The enemy was able to slip away whenever he wished. Furthermore, 
the operation required an immense amount of firepower — 3,235 tons of 
bombs and over 366,000 rounds of artillery. “Thus,” he notes, “several tons 
of ordinance were required to kill one Viet Cong.”434
The collateral damage was also extensive. There are no figures for the 
number of refugees created by each search and destroy operation but certain 
cumulative figures are. Krepinevich reports that between 1964 and 1969 
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over three million Vietnamese (or 20% of the population) became refugees 
as a result of the attrition strategy and the policy of population relocation. 
Those policies resulted in a loss of economic potential, cost the government 
and the U.S. the loss of goodwill and large sums, encouraged corruption and 
receptivity toward the VC, and finally resulted in the loss of intelligence in 
the areas that had been abandoned.435  Search and destroy ran counter to all 
of the policies that the Pacification program was attempting to encourage.
Doubts about the strategy first came to McNamara’s attention from 
Marine Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak in mid-January, 1966. The two men had 
worked together since 1961 when Krulak was Special Assistant for Counter 
Insurgency to the Joint Chiefs. He was a participant in the 1963 trip to 
Vietnam with Joseph Mendenhall at the behest of President Kennedy — a 
trip that produced diametrically opposing assessments of the situation. 
Krulak had been disturbed by what he observed during two firefights 
involving marines late in 1965. It spurred him to write a 17-page 
memorandum in which he argued “attrition would fail…because attrition 
was the enemy’s game… [the enemy was] ‘seeking to attrite U.S. forces 
through the process of violent close-quarters combat which tends to diminish 
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the effectiveness of our own supporting arms, i.e., artillery and air power”436
Krulak fortified his basic argument with numbers. The Communists had at 
their disposal a military manpower pool of approximately 2.5 million men. 
Using the current official kill ratio of 1 American or South Vietnamese 
soldier killed for 2.6 Viet Cong or North Vietnamese (which was probably 
optimistic) and the proportional share of dying between Americans and 
Vietnamese troops (a figure that was likely to change to the disadvantage of 
the Americans), he calculated that it would take 10,000 Americans and 
165,000 South Vietnamese killed “to reduce the enemy [manpower] pool by 
a modest 20 percent.”437  Krulak presented his memorandum personally to 
McNamara who saw the figures and was impressed, but there was no follow-
up.
A few months later an Army Staff report appeared entitled “A 
Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South 
Vietnam” or PROVN for short. The report criticized the lack of “a unified 
and well-coordinated program for eliminating the insurgency in South 
Vietnam” and argued that U.S. policy should primarily focus on pacification. 
A number of critics of U.S. Vietnam policy, notably Lewis Sorley, have 
                                                          
436 Sheehan, op. cit., p. 630.
437 Ibid, see also Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine 
Corps, (Annapolis, Md., Naval Institute Press, 1984).
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characterized the study as “thoroughly repudiat[ing] Westmoreland’s 
concept, strategy, and tactics for conducting the war.”438  That may be 
somewhat of an overstatement as a recent article in the Journal of Military 
History points out, but there is no denying that the report’s emphasis on 
pacification cast substantial doubt that tactics like search and destroy were 
productive.439  McNamara was briefed on the report which he approved for 
limited distribution in September, 1966, but it did not have any impact as 
long as Westmoreland remained in command and large search and destroy 
operations continued.440
What did draw McNamara’s attention was a request for more troops. 
In June, 1966 Westmoreland requested additional personnel for the calendar 
year 1967 which would bring the total to 542,588. As the request was passed 
up the line through CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs, the figures changed 
somewhat, but Westmoreland’s figure is sufficient for our purposes. 
McNamara wanted to cap the total at 470,000 and that is the number he 
                                                          
438 Lewis Sorley, A Better War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1999), p. 6.
439 Andrew J. Birtle, “PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal”, 72 
Journal of Military History, (No. 4) October 2008 pp. 1213-1247.
440 A thorough debate on attrition strategy would have disclosed considerable 
dissatisfaction with the existing policy within Westmoreland’s command. In a 1974 study 
based on a sixty-item questionnaire mailed to 173 Army General Officers who held 
command positions in Vietnam 1965-1972, sixty-two percent of the respondents 
“show[ed] a noticeable lack of enthusiasm, to put it mildly, by Westmoreland’s generals 
for his tactics and by implication for his strategy in the war.” Douglas Kinnard, The War 
Managers, (Hanover NH, Univ. Press of New England, 1977), pp. 44-45.
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approved on November 11. In a Draft Presidential Memorandum dated 
November 17, 1966 he wrote an extensive memorandum to President 
Johnson justifying that figure. 
First, he argued:
…the data suggest that we have no prospects of 
attriting the enemy force at a rate equal to or greater 
than his capability to infiltrate and recruit, and this 
will be true at either the 470,000 U.S. personnel 
level or 570,000.
He went on to explain in greater detail:
…if it were assumed that new forces would produce 
enemy losses at a rate equal to the average of all 
forces deployed by the end of October, 1966 each 
deployment of 100,000 additional friendly troops 
would produce only 230 more total enemy losses 
per week compared to the 2915 current enemy input 
rate. A U.S. force of 470,000 would result in enemy 
losses of 2450 per week; an extra 100,000 U.S. 
personnel would increase average weekly enemy 
losses to about 2680, still less than the 3500 per 
week that the enemy is supposed to be able to 
infiltrate/recruit.441
McNamara’s analysis was a simple application of the law of 
diminishing returns. What is surprising is that he did not press the argument 
further. His analysis suggested that the U.S. would never be able to reach the 
crossover point.442  If that were true, did the large search and destroy 
                                                          
441 PP, Gravel ed. IV, op. cit., 370-371.
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Alain Enthoven added another argument against the attrition strategy in a memorandum to McNamara’s 
successor on March 8, 1968, “the enemy can control his casualty rate…by controlling the number, size and 
intensity of combat engagements…If he wants to suffer fewer casualties per month, he can fall back into 
the jungle and remote areas. If we go after him, we must accept combat on less favorable terms,” Enthoven 
& Smith , op. cit.,  p. 298.
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operations that Westmoreland initiated the following year in 1967 make 
sense?  Why didn’t he charge his Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis 
to analyze the issue?  It remains one of the major conundrums of 
McNamara’s management of the war.
According to Enthoven and Smith:
The Systems Analysis office did not have a 
prominent, much less a crucial, role in the Vietnam 
War. Prior to 1965, it had no role at all, and 
afterwards it was never closely involved with the 
strategy or operations. Such matters were largely 
outside its charter.
They argue that:
… systematic analysis and the application of 
program-budgeting concepts might have helped 
forestall the over-Americanization of the war, the 
pervasive optimism of official statements on the 
expenditure of billions of dollars on various war 
programs. Systematic analysis was a major missing 
element in understanding what the United States 
was doing in and to Vietnam. In Vietnam, no one 
insisted on systematic efforts to understand, 
analyze, or interpret the war. 443
Robert Pursley, who served as the military aide to McNamara and his 
two immediate successors, agreed. He told OSD historians that the only 
source “where there could have been an introduction of analytical thought as 
to what objectives we were really pursuing, what resources we had and how 
                                                          
443 Ibid., p. 270.
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that was going to be put together in some sort of strategic format” was 
Enthoven’s Systems Analysis section.444
Systems Analysis had a small role in the war beginning in 1965 when 
American combat troops were introduced into Vietnam. It was given 
responsibility for developing deployment tables for troops requested by 
Westmoreland. The following year its role was expanded to include 
responsibility for keeping deployment tables up to date ensuring that ceilings 
on total deployments were being observed and advising the secretary in 
selected cases with an independent analysis of force requirements. These 
were useful exercises, especially in holding down costs, but they were 
essentially a bookkeeping function. It expanded its role somewhat in 1966 
with studies on the effectiveness of mines and fire fights, a review of 
CINCPAC’s troop requests and Ambassador Lodge’s piaster budget in 
October of that year. The following year it prepared memoranda for 
McNamara before the Guam conference and in response to Westmoreland’s 
                                                          
444 Robert E. Pursely, OSD Interview, Sept. 6, 1995, p. 27.  There are others who served 
in the Secretary’s office who maintain that McNamara tried to use Systems Analysis but 
that the office struggled to “quantify the Vietnam War” and indeed, that “McNamara 
struggled with that problem all the way through [because] it just didn’t lend itself to that 
kind of quantification.”  Henry Glass OSD Interview, Nov. 4, 1987, William Kaufmann 
believed Systems Analysis was not able to make a greater contribution because its 
personnel “very quickly became micro-analysts. That’s where the operations research 
people feel most comfortable-footnote 102, cont. --defining problems pretty narrowly and 
fixing the constraints so they could make the problem manageable and make their tools 
work.” William Kaufmann OSD Interview, July 23. 1986, p. 16.
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request for additional troops.445 Thus, its role was larger than Enthoven & 
Smith suggest. Yet they are not wrong when they argue:
These examples should not be allowed to obscure 
the basic fact that there was no organized critical 
analysis of the strategy and operations of the 
Vietnam War---cost-effectiveness or otherwise. 
(emphasis in original) 
446
The mystery is why McNamara, the champion of PPBS and the 
advocate of systematic quantitative analysis to strategic decisions did not use 
Systems Analysis, the office he had created, to supply that function.
Apparently, it remained a mystery to McNamara himself as well. 
When he came to write his memoir around 1994 he described a study he had 
requested from the Joint Staff asking, “Can we win if we do everything we 
can?” Not unexpectedly the answer came back Yes, “within the bounds of 
reasonable assumptions…if such is our will.” But the report contained an 
important caveat. It cautioned that the assurance a U.S. victory “if we do 
‘everything we can’ must remain to a degree tentative for many reasons, 
including in particular the limited experience in South Vietnam to date with 
offensive operations approximating the kind envisaged herein.” As 
McNamara would write, “That was the key unknown.” The Joint Staff 
assumed the North Vietnamese would adopt large-unit operations which the 
                                                          
445 Enthoven and Smith, op. cit., pp. 296-297; Gibbons IV, pp. 345, 626-27.
446 Enthoven and Smith, op. cit., p. 306.
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U.S. could defeat by conventional military tactics like “search and destroy”. 
If they did not, U.S. and Vietnamese forces could wage effective anti-
guerilla operations. McNamara goes on to write:
I will never fully understand why I did not do so 
here. Although I questioned these fundamental 
assumptions during my meetings with Westy 
[Westmoreland] and his staff…I clearly erred by 
not forcing then or later either in Saigon or 
Washington---a knock-down, drag-out debate over 
the loose assumptions, unasked questions and thin 
analysis underlying our military strategy in 
Vietnam. I had spent twenty years as a manager 
identifying problems and forcing organizations—
often against their will—to think deeply and 
realistically about alternative courses of action and 
their consequences. I doubt I will fully understand 
why I did not do so here.447
Passing the question what mechanism McNamara had for “forcing…a 
knock-down, drag out debate” over strategy, he could have at the minimum 
turned the issue over to Systems Analysis to receive a preliminary 
analysis.448
The question remains why did McNamara not make greater use of his 
Systems Analysis office to analyze not only the question posed above but a 
number of others involving military tactics and strategy? Why did he move 
                                                          
447 McNamara, op. cit., p. 202-203.
448 Under a different president an exercise like “Project Solarium” that President 
Eisenhower used in 1953 to define U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union might have 
worked. It is doubtful that McNamara could have cajoled President Johnson into such a 
procedure because the manner in which Johnson arrived at major policy decisions was 
the antithesis of Eisenhower’s. see Evan Thomas, Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s 
Secret Battle to Save the World (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 2012) pp. 106-109.
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“…virtually alone in an area where he was least equipped to deal with the 
problems, where his training was all wrong, and the quantifier trying to 
quantify the unquantifiable?”449  He clearly felt uncomfortable dealing with 
issues of military doctrine. When asked by Henry Brandon, long-term 
Washington correspondent of the London Sunday Times “…why he did not 
tell his officers what to do and reminded him that Churchill had not hesitated 
to do so, he shot back that he was no Churchill and would not dabble in 
areas where he had no competence.”450  The comparison, of course, was 
absurd. Churchill was an elected leader with a popular mandate, not an 
appointed official. He was also known for making military strategic blunders
like Gallipoli in World War I. Finally, his Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Field Marshall Alan Brooke, spent considerable time dissuading him 
from some of his hair-brained schemes.
The episode, however, discloses a larger truth. McNamara was 
particularly uncomfortable with the irrationality of war. He could not 
conceive how a great industrial power with its overwhelming superiority in 
firepower, and mobility could be stalemated by a loosely-coordinated group 
                                                          
449 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 247. 
450 Herring, op. cit., p.38; accord: Henry Brandon, Autopsy of an Error: The Inside Story 
of the Asian War on the Potomac 1954-1969, (Boston: Gambit Press, 1969), p. 29.
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of peasant guerrillas. Try as he might to fit the contingencies of combat into 
a set of comprehensible parameters, they would not fit. 
There were at least three other factors inhibiting McNamara. First, he 
knew that Enthoven and many of his colleagues in Systems Analysis had 
created a great deal of resentment within the military as a result of their 
analysis of weapons procurement issues. He could accept the potential 
pushback from the Joint Chiefs, Congress and even the White House when 
the issues were cost and efficiency and he had control of the data as was the 
case with weapons acquisitions. With issues involving life and death and the 
contingencies inherent in combat so numerous, imposing a “civilian” 
solution on a resistant military was far more perilous for his leadership of the 
department and politically for the President. He could, however, have 
adopted a technique used by Secretary Laird who would have Systems 
Analysis prepare a paper but not quote or refer to it but use it for the insights 
it would give you on an issue but that was not McNamara’s way; it was too 
subtle.451
Second, overruling the strategy of a battlefield commander required a 
subtlety that was foreign to McNamara’s management style. If Systems 
Analysis had produced a study demonstrating the ineffectiveness of 
                                                          
451 Pursley OSD Interview, August 15, 1997, p. 39.
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Westmoreland’s attrition policy, he could not have just ordered 
Westmoreland to adopt a new strategy.452  He would have had to persuade 
military leaders like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Army Chief of 
Staff and the Marine Commandant that a change was necessary. It would 
best have been done informally, and it would have taken time. It would not 
have been a comfortable process for McNamara.
Third, McNamara could not have been sure of the backing of the 
President. Johnson called Westmoreland home in April, 1967 as part of his 
“charm offensive” to counter the growing anti-war sentiment in the country. 
The last thing he would have wanted was a squabble between his secretary 
of defense and his “whiz-kids” on one side and his military advisers and 
theater commander on the other. One should bear in mind that the entire 
Joint Chiefs seriously contemplated resigning en masse after McNamara’s 
testimony about the ineffectiveness of bombing before the Preparedness 
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in August, 1967.453  
A secretary of defense more politically astute and connected might have 
accomplished such a policy reversal, but it is unlikely that McNamara could 
have succeeded, and he probably knew it.
                                                          
452 Especially, because his position in the chain of command was for some in the military 
ambiguous, see footnote 323, supra.
453 Lewis Sorley, Honorable Warrior General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of 
Command, (Lawrence, KS, Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 283-285.
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What did McNamara have to say when he addressed the issue of 
attrition in his memoir?  First, he wrote, “With Washington’s tacit 
agreement, Westy fought a war of attrition, whose major objective was to 
locate and eliminate the Vietcong and North Vietnamese regular units.”454  
The statement is disingenuous. At the Honolulu conference held February 6-
9, 1966, Westmoreland received a written note setting forth six goals for the 
year. Number six stated:  “Attrit, by year’s end, VC/PAVN forces at a rate as 
high as their capability to put men into the field.”455 The authors of the 
Papers cannot positively identify the author of the note but state that it was 
“probably written by McNamara.”456  In any event, it certainly was not 
written by Westmoreland, and it certainly reflected the administration’s 
policy.
McNamara goes on to accept responsibility but in a curious way. He 
writes:
But the president, I, and others among his civilian 
advisers must share the burden of responsibility for 
consenting to fight a guerilla war with conventional 
military tactics against a foe willing to absorb 
enormous casualties in a country without the 
fundamental political stability necessary to conduct 
                                                          
454 McNamara, op. cit., p. 211.
455 PP, Gravel ed. IV, p. 625.
456 Ibid., p. 605.
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effective military and pacification operations 
(emphasis added).457
First, the President was the commander-in-chief and McNamara his 
principal deputy; he bore far greater responsibility than any other civilian 
adviser. And what does he mean by “consenting to fight?” He and the 
President were giving the orders. Perhaps he is suggesting that when it came 
to the war he was no longer playing the active leadership role he “always 
believed in and endeavored to follow” but the “passive judicial role” he 
disdained and that somehow he was less at fault because he was only 
“consenting” to what the military wanted to do. 
Nor did McNamara follow a managerial maxim he was fond of 
quoting:
…define a clear objective…develop a plan to 
achieve that objective, and systematically monitor 
progress against the plan…if progress [is] 
deficient…either adjust the plan or introduce 
corrective action to accelerate progress.458
Time and again in reports to the President he points out that the 
ground war was not making adequate progress, but there was no corrective 
action and no new plan.
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Conclusion
One of the enduring questions about the Vietnam War is McNamara’s 
role in the conflict. It has been the contention of this chapter that contrary to 
the prevailing view that he was actively managing the war, he was, with the 
exception of logistics, actually undermanaging it.
It was not for lack of attention. He devoted countless hours to the 
subject: regular grueling trips to Hawaii and Saigon to debrief generals, 
ambassadors, and Vietnamese political leaders, vigorous participation in all 
important policy meetings related to the war; regular attendance at the 
president’s famous Tuesday luncheons devoted to Vietnam when North 
Vietnam bombing targets were discussed and selected. He was active but 
that should not be confused with managing. What he and the president failed 
to do is what every top manager should do--provide strategic guidance.
Two caveats are in order up front. Firm strategic guidance would not 
necessarily have resulted in the U.S. reaching its goal of a South Vietnam 
free from Communism with the ability to defend itself. Good management 
cannot turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse. It can alter conduct, however, and 
in war that can mean savings both in terms of lives and money. 
Second, as McNamara recognized, one defect in the conduct of the 
war was the executive branch’s failure “to deal effectively with the 
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extraordinarily complex range of political-military issues…associated with 
the application of military force under substantial constraints over a long 
period of time.” He bemoaned the absence of a “full-time team at the highest 
level …focused on Vietnam and nothing else” consisting of the “deputies of 
the secretaries of state, defense, the national security adviser, the chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs and the CIA director.”459  A variant of such a structure 
might have been possible during the Eisenhower administration with its 
highly organized NSC, but the Kennedy administration dismantled that 
apparatus when it assumed office and given the close-to-the-vest manner in 
which President Johnson made decisions, it is highly unlikely he would ever 
have agreed to a system that could have restricted his discretion as such an 
administrative arrangement was likely to do. 
It was also not the way McNamara liked to operate. There is no little 
irony in reading the following in McNamara’s wartime memoir:
One of his [LBJ] closest advisers, in commenting
on an earlier draft of this text [In Retrospect], wrote 
that I had failed to emphasize properly the weakness 
of LBJ’s decision-making approach. “He did not 
like working toward a decision in company—he 
wanted to go one-on-one. He never let anyone see 
his hole card in any context.”460
                                                          
459 Ibid., pp. 321, 332.
460 Ibid., p. 294. 
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Although McNamara was not a poker player, his management 
approach was very similar to his boss’s.
McNamara’s greatest failure as a wartime manager was his 
unwillingness or inability to provide strategic guidance. There were periods 
when McNamara could have initiated comprehensive discussion of military 
strategy. First, when combat troops were initially sent to Vietnam, he was 
officially charged with determining the circumstances in which they were to 
engage the enemy. Later, there were several instances when the attrition 
policy came under criticism, although as an “activist” he should not have 
needed such stimulus to question Westmoreland’s strategy. He knew the 
VC/RVN had been able to match American increases in manpower step by 
step, and there was no reason to believe this would not continue in the 
future. He also knew that Johnson was not going to activate the reserves and 
that draft calls could not have been increased indefinitely. Accordingly, the 
strategy of attrition was unworkable. Yet he did not seize the reins as he did 
with virtually every other issue that came before him when he was in office.
McNamara advanced a number of reasons why he was not more 
forceful in establishing military strategy. One was that there was a host of 
other problems that required his attention and that “our failure was partially 
the result of having many more commitments than just Vietnam…we were 
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left harried, overburdened and holding a map with only one road on it. Eager 
to get moving, we never stopped to explore fully whether there were other 
routes to our destination.”461  In the early years of the administration (1961-
1963) there were a series of international crises that required top level 
civilian attention like Cuba, Berlin and Laos. By the middle of 1964, 
however, the world scene was considerably quieter. Yes, there was the 
invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Six-Day Arab-Israeli 
war in 1967, but these were relatively short-lived episodes that should not 
have distracted attention from the far more significant commitment of the 
United States in Vietnam. 
It is true that McNamara was a very busy man, but it was not the 
troubled international scene that consumed so much of his time but his over-
centralized management style. He was in the words of Pursley “…so 
involved in everything; it was hard to think of a principal issue in which he 
wasn’t involved” and as a consequence he was unable, or unwilling to 
“systemize” his responsibilities.462
He also suggested that it was difficult to establish policy because his 
office was dependent on data provided by the military and that such 
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intelligence was so unreliable as to preclude credible analysis, a complaint 
that is echoed by Enthoven.463  There were, however, other sources including 
the CIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR), foreign governments and the press. Furthermore, the military’s raw 
date was not that inaccurate. Thomas Hughes, the head of The State 
Department’s INR, relates a telling incident in his review of McNamara’s 
wartime memoir. INR had published a Research Memorandum on 
October 22, 1963 entitled, “Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam 
Show Unfavorable Trends” (RFE-90). Relying exclusively on the military’s 
own data, it drew a picture of a deteriorating military situation. Whereas the 
military had used annual figures of “VC incidents” to demonstrate a stable 
military situation, INR looked at the trend which showed a marked increase 
in recent incidents. It provoked a monumental outcry from McNamara who 
wanted Rusk to reprimand Hughes for “second guessing ‘military analysis’” 
and not incidentally, McNamara’s own analysis of the military situation in 
Vietnam contained in his October 2 memorandum to the president. Military 
intelligence required vetting, but it did not preclude credible analysis.464
Enthoven and Smith are much more on the mark when they write:
                                                          
463 Enthoven and Smith, op. cit., p. 292.
464 Thomas L. Hughes, “Experiencing McNamara” a review of McNamara’s In 
Retrospect, Foreign Policy No. 100 (Autumn 1995) pp. 160-163; see also Kaiser, op. cit., 
pp. 259-260; Gibbons II, p. 184.
320
It was generally recognized that an attempt to give 
the Systems Analysis office a charter to analyze 
Vietnam operations and strategy, one that really tied 
the office into decision making, would meet with 
such strong military resistance as to make it 
politically impossible.465
Systems analysis was for peacetime but wartime was for the generals. 
If we are to trust Enthoven, then McNamara undermanaged the war because 
he was unable to manage it in the manner that he wished. But this analysis 
leaves open another possibility. Perhaps McNamara undermanaged the war 
because he did not know how to apply the analytic techniques of which he 
was so fond. Henry Glass, who served six different secretaries of Defense, 
later said that McNamara’s team struggled to “quantify the Vietnam War,” 
and, indeed, that “McNamara struggled with that problem all the way 
through” because “it just didn’t lend itself to that kind of quantification.”466
McNamara had been a master at determining means once ends were 
established. But war was different; it required determining the ends as much 
as it did calculating the means. While a vigorous peace-time secretary, 
McNamara was an ambivalent war manager. It was not just that he could not 
subject the chaos of war to empirical control; it was that he implicitly 
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recognized the fact. He was tentative in his approach — in establishing 
concrete goals, in challenging the military’s assumptions, in demanding that 
Systems Analysis play a greater role in strategy, in encouraging pacification. 
But he was tentative because of the uncertainty of wartime analysis. The first 
step in business analysis was determining which ends were to be maximized. 
War provided no such luxury; it did not come fashioned with clear ends. 
Recognition of such facts in part inspired an era of limited warfare in which 
civilian oversight was expected to take a difference form.467  Furthermore, as 
Lawrence Kaplan observed, McNamara failed to understand a new kind of 
conflict.468  Military strategy was not his strong suit. Bureaucracy and cost 
efficiency were. McNamara was the ultimate peacetime Secretary of 
Defense. His main interest lay in restructuring the Pentagon. His energy and 
skills served him poorly when it came time to manage a war.
In an interview conducted with Maxwell Taylor, the former high-
ranking general asserted that secretaries of Defense wore “two hats,” a fact 
that was “seldom recognized.” Taylor deemed this a significant problem 
since it meant that the secretary was both “the head of a great Department” 
but also that he “has another role, which is rarely mentioned or defined, in 
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the chain of military command.”469  This second hat was altogether different 
than the first, and lacked the formal definition and clear accompanying 
expectations of the first. It should come as no surprise that McNamara was 
uncomfortable wearing it.
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION
We have followed McNamara through a number of management 
milestones during his seven-plus years as Secretary of Defense. Some of his 
initiatives like the PPBS and its complementary system analysis 
methodology have been generally recognized as major contributions to 
improving the management of the Defense Department. Other initiatives like 
the TFX development project have been recognized as failures. Still other 
managerial tests like the Vietnam War furnish ambivalent or mixed verdicts. 
Logistically, the war was not handled badly. On the other hand, 
McNamara’s reluctance to become involved in how the ground war was 
fought and his inability to provide firm strategic guidance to the military 
were managerial failures.
The end of this study is an appropriate time to look more broadly at 
McNamara’s management style and his operational methods. An expedient 
way to proceed would be to consider Tom Morris’s effort to assess 
McNamara’s record as a manager in a talk he prepared for presentation to 
The Academy for Management in August, 1978 (referred to previously in 
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Chapter 3).470 Morris knew McNamara well. He spent all but one year 
between 1961 and 1968 working for him as Assistant Secretary for 
Installations and Logistics (I&L) and Assistant Secretary for Manpower. He 
was clearly an admirer of his management style. As he told Defense 
Department historians in explaining why he returned to DoD after a one-year 
absence, “once you have lived under such a dynamic leader, you never 
forget it, and you miss it quickly.”471
Morris divided his analysis into five separate categories:  
organization, planning, communication, decision-making and 
implementation.  Unsurprisingly, he came to the conclusion that McNamara 
“…was a managerial giant in the Pentagon… [and a] genius as a practitioner 
in management.”   How did he reach those conclusions?
Organizer
Morris gave McNamara high marks for his organizational ability in 
consolidating a number of service-wide functions as exemplified by the 
Defense Supply Agency, which buys, stores and issues common items used 
by all the services. Under McNamara there were a number of similar 
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consolidations involving joint activities like intelligence, in the form of The 
Defense Intelligence Agency, transportation, contract administration and 
contract auditing. All in all, Morris claims that McNamara consolidated 
some ten support agencies. In addition, he brought a new analytical approach 
to the entire military procurement effort by supporting the establishment of 
The Logistics Management Institute, a non-profit research organization that 
focused its attention on defense procurement issues and developed a number 
of important studies on the subject. These were laudatory steps in making 
the Defense Department more cost-conscious, and they required a good deal 
of McNamara’s personal attention since they were resisted both from within 
the department and Congress. That praise should be somewhat tempered, 
however, since the need for consolidation was generally recognized, and a 
great deal of what was done in the early Kennedy-McNamara period “was 
already pre-figured in what had been going on before under their 
predecessors.”472
McNamara’s organizational abilities should not be judged, however, 
solely on the basis of the actions that he took; to get a complete picture one 
must also consider actions that he did not take. For example, how did he 
organize the war effort in Vietnam? Did he organize it in the most effective 
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way? In his memoir McNamara laments the absence of an interagency 
subcabinet committee that devoted its attention exclusively to Vietnam to 
advise the President. He blames its absence for the Administration’s failure 
to confront the most fundamental issues involved in the conflict in Southeast 
Asia.473
In the absence of an interdepartmental group, the question arises why 
McNamara did not at least establish a group within DoD devoted exclusively 
to developing on a long-term basis the objectives the United States ought to 
be pursuing, what resources were available, and how to fashion a set of 
coherent objectives. Such a group could have included representatives from 
                                                          
473 Actually, from time to time the president would establish informal groups of 
subcabinet officials to discuss the war. The most notable example was the regular 
gathering of some ten subcabinet officials who would, beginning early in 1967, meet 
every Thursday at 5:00 pm in the office of Nicholas Katzenbach, the Under Secretary of 
State. McNamara would occasionally attend. Known as the “Non-Group,” its atmosphere 
was according to William Gibbons “…congenial—drinks were served—and informal. 
Although subjects for discussion were frequently known in advance, there was no formal 
agenda and no notes were kept.” It was, Gibbon notes, in many respects like the Tuesday 
luncheon group of Cabinet-level officials that met in the White House to discuss the war. 
This was hardly the kind of arrangement McNamara had in mind and was certainly not 
the kind of structure the situation demanded. Admittedly, only the president could 
instigate such a system, and any independent group with any sort of authority would have 
been at odds with President Johnson’s decision making process which involved “…tight 
personal control and loosely structured organization.” On the other hand, McNamara
never seems to have raised the issue with the President. Given his high standing with 
Johnson, and his centrality in discussions about Vietnam he would have been the most 
appropriate individual to broach this issue. See: Gibbons, IV pp. 479-472; Chester 
Cooper, op. cit., p. 413; George Herring argues that no such group was established 
because the administration was following a “limited war theory” which posited that war 
should be fought under peacetime arrangements and a gradualist approach. Herring, op. 
cit., p. 22.
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Systems Analysis, the Joint Staff, International Security Affairs and 
appropriate intelligence sources. If properly managed, it might have helped 
avert the situation which Bruce Palmer and Lewis Sorley have identified as a 
major deficiency in the prosecution of the war, “…our military leaders failed 
to get across the message that the U.S. strategy was not working and over 
time would probably fail to achieve stated U.S. objectives.”474
It was not that the absence of such a device went unnoticed. 
McNamara’s Air Force aide, Robert Pursley, found it was “…odd that the 
Secretary of Defense did not have an explicit vehicle for attaching himself to 
the rest of the department to influence the way it worked on Southeast Asian
issues.” As Pursley describes the management of the war, McNamara
“would give assignments to the chairman [of the JCS], and allow him to do 
things operationally, give certain assignments to Alain Enthoven; but it was 
all part of ongoing business. That was mixed in with nuclear management 
and everything else…in the absence of having a dedicated institutionalized 
kind of structure it sort of implies that it is business as usual, not a lot 
                                                          
474 Bruce Palmer, The 25-year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam, (Lexington, 
KY: The Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 201.
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different from any of the other great array of issues that are handled during 
the course of the day.” 475
When Pursley mentioned the issue to Melvin Laird, who succeeded 
McNamara, one of his first acts was to set up a Vietnam Task Group that 
met daily.
One cannot know, of course, how effective such a special purpose 
group would have been, but it is puzzling that McNamara appears never to 
have considered such an arrangement since he had proposed that the war be 
“a laboratory for the development of organization and procedures for the 
conduct of sub-limited war” 476 Given McNamara’s analytical bent and 
insistence that decision-making be based on the best in available 
intelligence, one might have expected some institutional structure to study 
the war. Whatever McNamara’s reasoning, the absence of a focused single 
group devoted to studying the war tempers one’s acceptance of Morris’s 
judgment that he was an organizer of “rare skill.”
                                                          
475 Pursley OSD Interview, Sept. 6, 1995, p. 34.
476 See, p. 216, supra.
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Planner
Morris gave McNamara “highest marks” as a planner based almost 
exclusively on his introduction of the PPBS. He attributed “McNamara’s 
success in his first four years…directly from improvements in program 
planning and budgeting” 477 It is difficult to quarrel with his judgment. 
PPBS was McNamara’s most important innovation during his tenure as 
Secretary, with the possible exception of the reorientation in the military use 
of nuclear weapons that he spearheaded. PPBS gave him and his successors 
unprecedented control over the department and won the praise and respect of 
congressional leaders like Carl Vinson, the Chairman of the House Armed 
Services Committee who commented after one of McNamara’s budget 
presentations:
I say it from the bottom of my heart. I have been 
here dealing with these problems since 1919. I want 
to state that this is the most comprehensive, most 
factual statement that ever has been my privilege to 
have an opportunity to receive from any of the 
departments of Government.
*********
You dealt with both sides of the problems. When 
you reach a decision, you set out the reasons why 
you reached that decision. You point out why—it 
could have been done the other way, but the other 
                                                          
477 Morris Presentation, p. 14.
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facts were superior and therefore you followed the 
method you did.
It is a magnificent statement.478
PPBS has also passed the test of time. As Carol DeCandido wrote in 
1996:
Since its inception, PPBS has been in a state of 
constant evolution…However the basic elements of 
the system—three phases, program and budget 
guide to the services from the Secretary, OSD 
review of the service program and budget and 
proposals, and the use of quantitative analysis to 
choose among competing programs—have 
remained.
479
The same could be said today. The program is still evolving, but its core 
principles remain.
PPBS had its limits, however, especially as applied to war. Alain 
Enthoven told the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and 
International Operations that it could not answer basic questions like how 
many divisions the U.S. should deploy in Vietnam and where or whether the 
South Vietnamese government should negotiate with the NLF. It could be 
helpful in a number of important issues related to logistics and force 
                                                          
478 Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9751, before the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., Second Sess., p. 3306.
479 Carol L. DeCandido, An Evolution of Department of Defense Planning, Programming 
, and Budget System: From SecDef McNamara to VCJCS Owens, Strategy Research 
Project, (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996), p. 6.
331
structure, but on the broader questions of strategy and even tactics it had a 
limited role.480 The limited usefulness of PPBS did not however reduce 
McNamara’s responsibility with respect to the war. 
What strikes one as out of character was the apparent disinterest of the 
secretary in the conduct of the ground war in the South. To be sure, he was 
intimately involved in the issues of bombing pauses and target selection. He 
also advocated the erection of a barrier to impede infiltration from the North 
to the South. In general, however, he appeared to take little interest in what 
was happening on the ground with the troops he was sending to 
Westmoreland. He declined to define the terms of engagement when combat 
marines were first introduced into the country, although the NSAM directed 
him to do so; he did not attempt to mediate the dispute between the 
Marines’s “enclave strategy” and Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” 
tactics; he showed little interest in the Army’s PROVN report that strongly 
suggested that there was too much emphasis on military measures and too 
                                                          
480 See Hearings on Planning, Programming and Budgeting, before the Subcommittee on 
National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee Government 
Operations, 90th Cong, 1st Sess., Part 2, pp. 100-101. Enthoven gave a more upbeat 
assessment of the potential contributions of system analysis and PPBS when he published 
his book, How Much is Enough four years later (see pp. 291-293) There are those who 
argue that PPBS was actually used in the conduct of the war. Gregory Palmer asserts that 
“…American military intervention in 1965 [in Vietnam’]… was conducted according to 
[PPBS] principles.” He grounds this assertion by contending that PPBS and the Vietnam 
War were both products of “rationalist defense theories.” See Gregory Palmer, op. cit., 
Ch., 4,“The Influence of PPBS on the Escalation of The Vietnam War.”
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little on pacification. The Pentagon Papers were correct when they 
concluded that McNamara “…was more interested in management than in 
strategy”.481 What explains this uncharacteristic attitude on the part of the 
most activist Secretary of Defense? 
Perhaps, as George Herring suggests, McNamara knew that “…he 
was out of his element when compelled to go beyond the managerial aspects 
of military policy.”482 The difficulty with such an explanation is that 
McNamara was not generally deterred from dealing with issues just because 
they involved “military policy.” He was not diffident, for example, about 
debating nuclear military strategy with defense intellectuals at RAND and 
other think tanks. Perhaps that was because nuclear policy had developed a 
language and logic of its own, however bizarre that may appear to us now. 
Once he had mastered the language and logic of a subject he felt comfortable
operating within its boundaries.
Vietnam was different . It was part insurrection, part invasion. The 
goal of the enemy was not to win battles or even to control territory but in 
the words of Roger Hilsman “to gain administrative control over the sixteen 
                                                          
481 PP Gravel ed. III, p 475.
482 Herring, op. cit., pp. 38. 
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thousand hamlets of South Vietnam.”483 It was an entirely new kind of 
struggle without precedent, discernible logic, patterns or parameters. No 
wonder McNamara felt intellectually uncomfortable. 
Perhaps the only way he could have become comfortable enough to 
develop an appropriate managerial role was to enter into extended dialogue 
with the military, especially, the younger officers  developing  
counterinsurgency doctrine, diplomats, both American and foreign, 
especially those with knowledge of the history of Southeast Asia, and 
experts in economic development. Dialogue, however, was not part of the 
McNamara repertoire, so he never undertook such a process and left the 
military in virtually exclusive control of the ground war. 
Another possible explanation for his passivity was that he was unsure 
of the backing of the president in the event he attempted to intervene in 
tactical decisions made by the area commander. Presidential counselor, 
Clark Clifford describes Lyndon Johnson’s approach to the war at the end of 
1967. 
…Lyndon Johnson during this period often acted 
more like a legislative leader, seeking a consensus 
among people who were often irreconcilably 
opposed to each other, rather than a decisive 
                                                          
483 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 430.
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Commander in Chief giving his subordinates 
orders484
We know that one of Johnson’s principal concerns was that the 
military, especially his area commander, would give public utterance to their 
disagreement with the way the war was being waged. According to 
Westmoreland, at the February 1966 conference in Honolulu Johnson pulled 
him aside and told him, “General I have a lot riding on you” and later, “I 
hope you don’t pull a MacArthur on me.”485 McNamara who, as we have 
seen, was sensitive to the thinking of his superiors may have concluded that 
delving too deeply into combat operations risked both a presidential rebuke 
and an additional strain on civilian-military relations.
In summary, McNamara made a formidable contribution to defense 
policy with the introduction of PPBS into the budgeting process. When it 
came to actual military operations, however, he could not transfer that skill 
into coherent strategic and tactical planning. He was, in other words, 
equipped to be a peacetime secretary but not a successful wartime one.
                                                          
484 Clifford, op. cit., p. 527.




We have already considered McNamara as a communicator in 
Chapter 3. Communications in the McNamara Pentagon was formal and 
very much top down. He would use directives, and frequently provide 
specific instructions on how to implement them. For Morris, this 
demonstrated that “…McNamara’s communications skills were superb (1) in 
dealing with the president, (2) in dealing with his internal staff… and (3) in 
dealing in an intellectual sense with Congress, the public and the press 
through analytical material skillfully written and clearly presented,”486
Following the same kind of analysis as Chester Barnard, Peter 
Drucker has pointed out that effective communication does not depend on 
the person delivering the communication but on the ability of the recipient to 
perceive what is being communicated. Unless the recipient can perceive 
what he is being told, there is no communication only noise. To 
communicate, the speaker must “…talk to people in terms of their own 
experience…one can communicate only in the recipient’s language or on his 
terms.”487 When McNamara attempted to communicate in this way he was 
frequently successful.
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For example, early in his tenure he had great success with Congress 
on budgetary matters because he spoke in terms Congress could understand. 
It was comfortable with the subject matter and McNamara presented his 
budget in the format it was used to rather than attempting a presentation 
more compatible with the PPBS system that he had initiated.488
He was also successful in communicating with the President because 
he became a master of so-called “Goldilocks Principle.” The Goldilocks 
Principle, as described by George Ball, is a method whereby “…seasoned 
bureaucrats deliberately control the outcome of a study assignment by 
recommending three choices…By including with their favored choice one 
‘too soft,’ and one ‘too hard,’ they assure that the powers deciding the issue 
will almost invariably opt for the one - ‘just right.”’ 489 McNamara used the 
technique often in his memoranda to the President.
He was also very successful in the councils of government because he 
was skillful in a much-admired Washington talent — “tactical brilliances 
formed by strategic conformity  — the facility to outmaneuver one’s 
counterpart in a discussion without questioning the fundamental 
                                                          
488 Carl Vinson’s praise is persuasive evidence that he had been successful, see f/n 184, p. 
112.
489 George Ball, op. cit., p 388.
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assumptions.”490  As we have seen George Ball kept questioning basic 
assumptions, and no one took him seriously.
He could even be successful with the military when he adapted this 
approach. Paul Ignatius gave one example when McNamara sought support 
for his proposal to consolidate the Army’s technical services. He referred to 
the Army’s “line and staff: concept which had influenced modern 
corporations like Ford and GM.”491 The incident apparently helped diminish 
the opposition to his proposal.
In most cases, however, McNamara made no attempts to 
communicate in the recipient’s language. His communications with the 
military were most often distinctly “top down.” Morris did not even include 
the military in his list of those with whom McNamara communicated 
effectively — a telling omission. As Drucker described this form of 
discourse: 
For centuries, we have attempted communication 
“downward.” This, however, cannot work no matter
how hard or how intelligently we try. It cannot 
work, first, because it focuses on what we want to 
say. It assumes, in other words, that the utterer 
communicates. But we know that all he does is 
utter. Communication is the act of the 
recipient....All one can communicate downward are 
commands, that is, prearranged signals. One cannot 
                                                          
490 George Packer, “The Last Mission,” The New Yorker, September 28, 2009, p. 47.
491 See p. 128, supra.
338
communicate downward anything connected with 
understanding, let alone with motivation.492
Although he had some successes, McNamara was 
overwhelmingly a top down communicator. He 
made little effort to communicate in the recipient’s 
language or on his terms. The way in which he 
handled the TFX decision is probably the most 
prominent example of his communication failure, 
but there are many others since it was his standard 
way of operating. It was one of McNamara’s 
prominent failures as a manager.
Decision Maker and Implementer
There is no doubt that each year McNamara made thousands of 
decisions. As Tom Morris observed, “It was almost as if McNamara’s 
insistence on planning was so that he could make decisions. Decisions 
became an index of managerial productivity.”493 It is also incontestable that 
he followed up on his decisions. He frequently accompanied his decisions 
with instructions as of how to implement them and would scribble at the top 
of the page “the date and precise time he’d like to have a report.”494 The 
problem was as, Peter Drucker told Morris, that he would get caught up in 
minor issues. Drucker would write:
“McNamara’s greatest strength as a manager was 
his realization of the need for objectives…[but] his 
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greatest weakness was he always lost the objective 
over procedures. He always got caught up with 
them in minor points and the objective became 
secondary to the way in which this or that specific 
‘urgency’ of the moment was being done.” 
McNamara may have considered decisions as the index of 
management productivity, but in reality, the extreme reliance on him as the 
decision maker undermined the system he was attempting to establish.
McNamara’s Legacy  
From time to time McNamara would discuss with Alain Enthoven his 
aspirations for permanently reforming the Defense Department’s 
management system. He would talk “… about [the] achievement of Alfred 
Sloan in creating the system that became the permanent long-term 
management system for General Motors. McNamara said his ambition for 
the Defense Department was to create what would be a permanent reform in 
the management system of the Department in the hope that future secretaries 
would build on that, and strengthen and improve it.” It was a goal Enthoven
came to share and he blamed Nixon and the “extreme right of the 
Republican party” for failing to build on McNamara’s “reforms.” 495
Certainly, politics played a part in dismantling part of McNamara’s system. 
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A far more realistic appraisal, however, is that McNamara’s method of 
operation characterized by highly centralized, hierarchical, personalized 
decision-making implemented by his immediate staff could not be 
institutionalized. McNamara’s system, was as Charles Rossotti suggests 
below, inherently unstable and the very antithesis of the system Sloan and 
Brown instituted at General Motors.
Rossotti, a former staff member of System Analysis, analyzed the 
McNamara system cogently: 
His method relied on an extreme degree of 
centralization of decision making of far too many 
decisions. He set up an elaborate process of 
requiring detailed memorandums and budget 
decision documents for every program and even 
some smaller budget decisions, which all came 
eventually to him for decisions making.
*********
But the inherent weakness was that this process 
depended on one individual McNamara, making a 
huge number of decisions and making them all 
stick, with no real commitment from almost anyone 
else throughout the organization to these decisions. 
Eventually that broke down…If McNamara had 
paid some attention to institutionalizing and 
organizing the decision process, it would have been 
more stable. 496
The day before he left office on February 29, 1968, McNamara was 
too emotional to say even a few words at the farewell ceremony. There were 
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tears in his eyes, and he was at the edge of a breakdown. Most attributed his 
condition to exhaustion and despair over the course of the Vietnam War. 
Undoubtedly, they were important components of his emotional state.
There were probably several other emotions as well and one of them 
may well have been that there would be no McNamara system with the 
staying power of Alfred Sloan’s GM System. Joseph Kraft summed it up in 
a valedictory column on McNamara’s service:
Nobody should be under illusions as to what his 
[McNamara’s] departure means. It expresses a 
failure in the managerial faith, a crisis of the whole 
post-war generation.497
It is not clear to what “managerial faith” Kraft was referring. If he 
meant large transformational initiatives, foreign or domestic, like the 
Marshall Plan, the Vietnam War, the National Highway System, Manned 
Space Flight, that impulse is still alive. One need only review the rhetoric of 
the administration justifying the Iraq War to detect its continued vitality. 
If he was referring to the more prosaic management of The Pentagon, 
it did not vanish, but it took different forms. Subsequent Secretaries of 
Defense with the possible exception of Donald Rumsfeld did not attempt to 
impose a highly-centralized, top down managerial system in the McNamara
mode. A new structure developed which, although differing from 
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administration to administration, saw a division of responsibility. In many 
instances, the Secretary would manage the political and diplomatic aspects 
of the position including relations with the Joint Chiefs. His deputy, 
frequently a businessman, would be responsible for managing the 
operational side of the Department. The Laird/Packard team is generally
considered the most successful.498
This dissertation has laid much stress on RSM’s activism. It was a 
course of conduct that he extolled in word and deed. In various guises it had 
served him well throughout his career beginning at Berkeley and continuing 
throughout business school, the Army, Ford and the Defense Department. It 
was characterized by articulateness, assertiveness, decisiveness, and a 
willingness to work very hard. All of these traits meant that he was able to 
impose his personality rapidly on individuals and institutions. Just as he 
honored management “as the most creative of arts”, so he privileged 
activism as the only worthy form of management. 
Activism certainly helped him establish the primacy of civilian 
control and the adoption of the PPBS system when he first arrived at DoD. It 
raised him quickly to become the most influential of the president’s advisers, 
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and for a time to enjoy virtually unqualified deference from Congress. Yet it 
could not help him with the biggest challenge he faced, resolving the 
ambiguities of the Vietnam war, or lesser difficulties like the TFX 
controversy or even establishing a management system that would outlast 
his tenure. What he needed was a more nuanced approach or in the words of 
his colleague, Eugene Zuckert, “every pitcher should have a change of pace, 





 President Kennedy Inaugurated
 Khrushchev pledges support for “wars of 
liberation”
 Laos No. 1 danger spot in S.E. Asia
April
 Bay of Pigs Fiasco
May
 International Conference on the Settlement 
of the Laotian Question begins
June
 Khrushchev threatens to sign separate 
peace treaty with East Germany 
jeopardizing allied access to Berlin
July
 President Kennedy calls up Reserves and 
increases draft calls
December
 President Kennedy sends Gen. Maxwell 
Taylor and Deputy National Security 
Council adviser, Walt Rostow to South 
Vietnam. They recommend sending support 
and combat troops, more military advisers, 
and increased aid. President Kennedy 
follows recommendations except for 
combat troops
 McNamara makes first trip to Hawaii to 
plan Vietnam buildup
Year End
Total U.S. Military Personnel — 3200
January
 U.S. begins operation Ranch Hand which 
will dump an estimated 19 million gallons 
of defoliant on 10-20 percent of South 
Vietnam
 Marked increase in U.S. personnel. 
Undersecretary of State George Ball: “The 
balloon was going up”
May
 McNamara’s first trip to Vietnam: “Every 
quantitative measurement shows we are 
winning this war”
July
 General optimism of progress in Vietnam. 
McNamara orders preparation for 
withdrawal of U.S. troops beginning in 
1963 and total withdrawal by 1965
 International Conference on Laos 
concludes with all parties agreeing to a 
“neutral” Laos.
October
 Cuban Missile Crisis
Year End




 Battle of Ap Bac demonstrates 
ineffectiveness of South Vietnamese Army 
(ARVN)
May
 Buddhists in Hue demonstrate against 
government of President Diem and his 
brother, Nhu
June
 Self-immolation of Buddhist monk Tich 
Quang Duc
August
 Special forces loyal to Nhu attack Buddhist 
pagodas
September
 President Kennedy rebuffs President de 
Gaulle’s suggestion of neutrality for 
Vietnam; de Gaulle will continue to urge 
neutrality for the next six years to no avail
November
 Diem deposed in military coup with apparent 
U.S. acquiescence. He and his brother, Nhu, 
killed; U.S. recognizes new government 
under leadership of General Duong Minh
 President Kennedy assassinated
December
 “Strategic Hamlet” program suspended; 
increased pessimism over Vietnam in 
administration
Year End
Total U.S. Military Personnel — 16,300
January
 Continued ARVN ineffectiveness
 Westmoreland appointed deputy to General 
Harkins, head of Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam (MACV)
 McNamara tells House Armed Services 
Committee “bulk of U.S. armed forces in 
Vietnam can be expected to leave by 1965”
 General Nguyen Khanh deposes General 
Minh
April
 North Vietnam begins sending regular army 
troops (NVA) into South Vietnam
June
 Westmoreland appointed head of MACV 
 Honolulu conference of principal Vietnam 
advisers (Rusk, McNamara, Ambassador 
Lodge, Westmoreland, McCone (CIA)) 
discuss possible bombing targets in North 
Vietnam
August
 North Vietnamese torpedo boats attack U.S. 
destroyer Maddox
 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution PL 88-808
 Continued protests against government of 
South Vietnam
September
 First large scale demonstration in U.S. 
against the war in Berkley, CA
October
 George Ball drafts 67-page memorandum 
criticizing U.S. Vietnam policy
 Khrushchev ousted
November
 LBJ elected by landslide
 Intensified preparation for increased 
operations in Vietnam
Year End




 Continuing protests against government of 
South Vietnam
February
 Viet Cong attack U.S. barracks killing 32 
and wounding 98
 U.S. mounts reprisal campaign and then 
begins sustained bombing campaign against 
North Vietnam (“Operation Rolling 
Thunder”). The bombing campaign will last 
three years (with pauses) until October, 1968
 U.S. dependents leave country
March
 Two combat battalions of Marines arrive in 
Vietnam; mission: protect U.S. bases and do 
not engage in offensive operations
 First “teach-in” against war
April
 LBJ authorizes offense operations by U.S. 
troops, but change of mission not disclosed. 
Decision embodied in National Security 
Memorandum (NSM) 328
May
 Continued buildup of U.S. troops
June
 Westmoreland requests additional troops 
(“44-battalion request)” to increase U.S. 
personnel to more than 120,000 and suggests 
more troops will probably be required; gives 
no assurance of success
 Air Vice-Marshall Ky assumes premiership 
of Vietnam government
July
 LBJ grants Westmoreland request for more 
troops
August
 Congress passes law making it illegal to burn 
or mutilate draft cards
November
 Norman Morrison, a thirty-two year-old 
Quaker immolates himself before Pentagon
 Battle of Ira Drang Valley frequently cited in 
support of “search and destroy” operations
 Major anti-war demonstration
in Washington, DC
December
 Westmoreland request additional troops 
stating he needs 443,000 by end of 1967
 First suspension of bombing campaign
Year End




 Operation Rolling Thunder resumes
February
 Honolulu Conference attended by President 
Johnson, Vietnamese leaders, McNamara 
and other U.S. top advisers—renewed 
emphasis on the “other war” i.e., economic 
and social improvements
Spring
 Continued political unrest including 
Buddhist demonstrations
June
 Westmoreland asks for 542,588 troops by 
the end of 1967
July
 Majority of Americans still support war
September
 South Vietnam conducts elections for 
constituent assembly
October
 Manila Conference - Johnson attends with 
other political leaders of allied forces
December
 Harrison Salisbury of NY Times publishes a 
series of articles describing destruction from 
U.S. air war, especially civilian casualties
Year End
 Total U.S. Military Personnel — 385,300
February
 Junction City - largest search and destroy 
operation of war thus far (25,000 troops)
March
 Guam Conference with President Johnson 
Vietnamese leaders Thieu and Ky and other 
top U.S. advisers
April
 McNamara announces plan to build physical 
and electronic barrier to curb infiltration 
from North
 Massive anti-war parades in New York and 
San Francisco
 Westmoreland requests additional troops to 
bring total to 671,616 by 1968
 Westmoreland returns to U.S. as part of 
“charm offensive” to counter anti-war 
sentiment; speaks before joint session of 
Congress
May
 Alan Enthoven, head of Systems Analysis, 
sends McNamara memorandum arguing 
“size of force we [U.S.] deploy has little 
effect on the rate of attrition of enemy 
forces”
 Civilian Operations and Revolutionary 
Development Support (CORDS) established 
to manage pacification
August
 LBJ announces he will raise U.S. troop 
levels to 525,000
 McNamara offers pessimistic view of war 
prospects before Senate Preparedness
Subcommittee; Joint Chiefs consider 
resigning en masse
October
 Polls reveal that a majority of Americans 
oppose war
 50,000 march on Pentagon against the war
November
 Robert McNamara resigns as Secretary of 
Defense to become President of World Bank; 
he will leave office February 29, 1968
Year End




 War ends with the signing of “An Agreement 
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in 
Vietnam”
March
 Last U.S. troops leave Vietnam
April
 Communist Troops enter Saigon and 
President Duong Van Minh surrenders 
unconditionally
 More than three million Americans served in 
Vietnam
 47,424 Americans killed in action or died as a 
result of combat
 10,785 Americans died of non-battle injuries
 1,679 Americans listed as Missing in Action
 313,919 Americans wounded of which 153,300 
were listed as “serious”
 195,000-430,000 South Vietnamese killed 
during war
 440,000-1 million North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong killed
 Eight million tons of bombs were dropped 
during the war, more than four times as much 
as was dropped by the U.S. in World War II.*
*All figures are from James H. Willbanks, Vietnam War Almanac, 
(NY: Facts on File, 2009)
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GLOSSARY
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam – the South Vietnam Army
BNSP Basic National Security Plan
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command – the unified 
Combatant Command responsible for Pacific Ocean area. 
During Vietnam War it was responsible for the air war.
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
DARPA Defense Advanced Research  Projects Agency – agency of 
DoD responsible for the development of new technologies for 
use by the military
DDRE Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the 
Department of Defense
DoD Department of Defense
DPM Draft Presidential Memorandum - used by McNamara to 
make provisional policy recommendations to the President
FYDP Five Year Defense Plan
GVN Government of South Vietnam
HBS Harvard Business School
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of 
State
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSOP Joint Strategic Objective Plan – proposed annually by The 
Joint Chiefs to translate strategic planning guidance into 
specific integrated strategic war plans
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group (Vietnam) – the military
command directing American military advisers in Vietnam 
during the initial stages of U.S. involvement
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The military 
command in Vietnam directing U.S. and allied combat 
forces; it replaced MAAG
MPM Major Program Memorandum
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
350
NVA North Vietnamese Army
NSAM National Security Action Memorandum – an executive order
issued by the President relating to nation security applicable 
during the years 1961-1969
NSC National Security Council – the principal forum  used by the 
President to consider national security and foreign policy 
issues
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PCR Program Change Requests
PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System - initiated by 
McNamara
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces – entire armed forces of
South Vietnam
SIOP Single Integrated Operating Plan – the general plan for 
nuclear war
VC Viet Cong – a political and military organization that fought 
the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments, principally 
composed of indigenous South Vietnamese
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